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Foreword
The concept of social capital gained popularity during the 1990s, thanks
largely to the work of Robert Putnam. Numerous others, such as World Bank
researchers and European social scientists and economists, have also made
contributions on the topic. There is increasing evidence from both macro-
and micro-level studies that social infrastructure or social capital plays an
important role in the processes of development and growth.
Social capital provides a conceptual basis for economists and social
scientists to speak to each other and better understand the interface between
their disciplines. This is a rare opportunity which both groups welcome. The
Government Institute for Economic Research and the National Research and
Development Centre for Welfare and Health in Finland have arranged a
series of seminars and published seminar proceedings to examine the issue.
These seminars have been attended by world-renowned experts in this field
from the scientific community, national administrations and UN bodies.
At the same time it seems that the concept of social capital is being applied
practically in the field of development policy, helping to foster an understanding
of the processes in transition countries. It also seems to have practical
importance here in Finland in the realm of regional economic policy. The
problem of social exclusion is naturally where the concept of social capital
may have more relevance in the future, and its contribution to the theory of
socially sustainable development may prove to be of great value.
This book presents both the latest thinking on the concept of social capital
and some of its applications. It also includes some of the criticism of the
concept. It is hoped that this blend of contributions will help place the idea
of social capital in its proper context.
HELSINKI, DECEMBER 2000
Reino Hjerppe Vappu Taipale
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Introduction
to the Themes
of the Book
Jouko Kajanoja and Jussi Simpuia1
The roots of 'social capital' as a concept are local, having been developed
to assess local societies and regions. The ground-breaking research of James
Coleman (1988) and Robert Putnam (1993) have been supplemented by
studies primarily aimed at evaluating the disparities in development between
countries (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997; LaPorta et al. 1997; Hjerppe 1998;
Temple and Johnson 1998).
When comparing country groups or continents and the characteristics of
their social capital, the approach is more from a global perspective. Examples
in this book include Timo Voipio's article on social capital from the
standpoint of developing countries, as well as Pekka Sutela's article on Asia,
Africa and Eastern Europe. The global nature of social capital is emphasised
by the fact that the institute promoting this concept the most has been the
World Bank, which aims to develop it both as a topic of scientific research
and a policy-oriented approach. Social capital as used by the World Bank has
a global perspective in many connections. The Bank originally developed the
concept in conjunction with sustainable development and the study of
ecological and economic equilibria in the traditional sense (Serageldin 1996).
It has analysed various manifestations of social capital around the world, and
also compiles information on studies dealing with social capital.2
The local perspective of social capital is gaining new political meaning. The
European Union is not content merely to strengthen regions in Europe, but
is rather initiating a programme to mobilise local social capital in order to
curb unemployment and isolation, while simultaneously supporting European
success in global economic competition. These endeavours are evaluated in
Santiago Loranca's article in this book.
1
 We acknowledge with special thanks the assistance of John Rogers and Richard Burton. They did
excellent work, John Rogers as a translator and proofreader and Richard Burton as a language
consultant including some editing work.
2
 Michael Woolcock's article includes instructions on how to obtain information on studies.
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In Finland, similar analyses are presented in the Report of the Special
Parliamentary Committee for the Future (1998). This contains a special
section about social capital (pp. 48-50), focusing on the importance of
education, as well as productivity and equality, from the standpoint of the
potential of individuals. In a study of social capital nearing completion at
VATT (Alanen and Kajanoja 2000), the focus is on research findings relating
to local social capital and on assessing programmes of action. An important
notion in this connection is partnership.
The concept of social capital is thus prevalent in macro-level global studies,
meso-level studies such as the article by Aku Alanen and Lea Pelkonen, and
in local-level studies. It is also used in micro-level studies, such as research
on inter-company and intra-company networks. The articles of Michael
Woolcock and Kaj Ilmonen contain reviews of the micro-sociological roots
of social capital and - as Pekka Sutela notes in his article - at issue are the
basic classical concepts of sociological theory such as values, norms and
expectations.
There has yet to be a fundamental analysis of the historical roots of social
capital extending back to the classics of economic and social sciences.
Prominent names in this respect include Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Emile
Durkheim, Max Weber, Thorstein Veblen and many others who have
addressed the interaction of social and economic structures.
In his extensive survey of the literature Michael Woolcock evaluates many
ideas closely related to social capital. Woolcock's list can be supplemented
with the "network" concept. We now talk about network capital (Ledeneva
1998) and the network of social capital (Rose 1998). Research is being carried
out on unofficial networks of social aid and economic exchange. Network
research has particularly focused on the operative structures of "non-
modern" societies, such as the post-socialist transition societies, and systems
of unofficial exchange (Ledeneva 1998; Lonkila 1999; Jyrkinen-Pakkasvirta
and Poretzkina 1994). There are also examples of Nordic research from the
standpoint of network capital (e.g. Aarsaether 1999).
On the other hand, there is also interest in phenomena regarded as more
modern. This type of approach is represented by Jan-Erik Johanson's article
on networks in the business community (see also Leenders and Gabbay
1999). Those in the modern perspective include forms of local networks, as
assessed in Kaj Ilmonen's article, that have arisen alongside global networking.
The models presented in Santiago Loranca's article are based on the idea of
local operations that perform tasks traditionally regarded as in the domain
of central government. Network research also has links to the field of
"sociability" which in turn is based on basic questions of social theory.
(Giddens: Practices as intermediary links between individuals and institutions)3
3
 Giddens, Anthony (1984): The Constitution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
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The notion of social capital in the context of modem business administration
has its roots in the field of institutional business administration (Hjerppe
1998). An important theoretical breakthrough was the linking of social capital
to so-called new endogenous growth theory (Romer 1990). Since then,
however, theoretical development work has been modest. Research on
business administration-oriented social capital has focused on evaluating the
connection between variables describing social capital and economic growth
via cross-country studies (Kajanoja 1999). An exception is the study of social
capital concepts carried out by the World Bank (1998).
"... the most significant virtue of the discourse surrounding 'social capital'
is that it helps to bridge orthodox disciplinary and methodological divides
among scholars, practitioners, and policymakers" writes Woolcock in his
article. On the other hand, Sutela asserts in his article that the promise of a
great comprehensive theory of social sciences, considered by many to be
embedded in the concept of social capital, has yet to be fulfilled.
Articles on social capital have appeared routinely in the economic and
social science journals, as well as in those of other social science disciplines
such as political research. They tell as much about the difficulty of building
a common terminology as the promises it contains. The huge gap between
the disciplines of economics and sociology cannot be bridged immediately,
even if this would deepen and broaden the understanding of research topics
in various scientific fields.
The tendency of the World Bank to characterise socially sustainable
development in terms of projects to bolster social capital (World Bank 1998;
see also Wiman 1999, 34-35; Wiman and Partonen 1999) raises one of the
problems surrounding the social capital debate. How does social capital fulfil
the criteria set for the concept of capital? This topic has been addressed in
a World Bank study (Serageldin 1996; see also Hjerppe 1997). It has already
been shown that capital does not necessarily experience wear and tear or
become stockpiled or exchanged. The old forms of capital such as natural
resources or human capital do not fulfil those requirements, nor are they
satisfied by the physical capital made by humans. But in order to prove an
operatively useful concept, it should be possible to invest in producing
capital, or at least promote its utilization - and the investment should pay off.
The World Bank shows that the various definitions of social capital and the
views of different scientific fields have the following features in common:
All imply that social relationships and institutions have public good
characteristics. Because the benefits of such goods cannot easily be
appropriated privately, most rational actors underinvest in maintaining them.
Hence, there is a case for public support of social relationships and
institutions (World Bank 1998).
The challenge is then to find the social policy measures that support social
capital. This is the question that research on social capital should ultimately
seek to address.
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This book continues with the assessment of social capital which began in
Finland in 1997 and 1998 (Hjerppe 1997; Kajanoja 1997; Kajanoja and
Simpura 1998). The articles are primarily the product of presentations made
at a seminar held in Helsinki in April 1999.
The collection consists of dual English and Finnish language versions that
differ only slightly.
Michael Woolcock's article includes a detailed survey of the background and
birth of the concept of social capital and the relevant literature. It presents
an important synthesis and comprehensive analysis of the concept of social
capital, even though the focus of the article is on development science and
policies. Woolcock divides the definitions of social capital commonly used
until now into three groups: the communitarian, network, and institutional
viewpoints. He calls his own approach a synergistic viewpoint, according to
which social capital is "the norms and social relations embedded in the social
structure of societies that enable people to coordinate action to achieve
desired goals".
This represents the broadest viewpoint, which embraces the others.
Woolcock presents his conclusions on both social capital research and policy
applications.
In his article, Joukko Kajanoja emphasises the importance of understanding
social capital within the framework of economic capital. This leads to an
abstract definition, but according to Kajanoja the clash in social and
economic approaches facilitated by this kind of definition will not occur
without sparks flying. He asks whether social capital ultimately means the
subservience of social life to economic imperialism. As an answer he
emphasises that return on capital should be measured using indicators of
good life and sustainable development rather than gross domestic product.
Pekka Sutela calls for increased interaction between different disciplines
of the social sciences: notions of social capital could facilitate greater
dialogue between economics and sociology, but there have been few
concrete steps in this direction. Sutela does not believe that social capital is
automatically the key to understanding the development gap in the former
socialist countries. He ponders why Estonia is succeeding economically and
Russia is not, suggesting the main reason is that Estonia has a single clear and
common goal, namely aiming to become a part of Europe and striving for
EU membership. Russia, on the other hand, does not know where it is going,
according to Sutela. Under current conditions in Russia, confidence included
in social capital is an especially valuable commodity. It is needed because
of the reducing role of monetary transactions as dynamic chains of exchange
gain in importance.
Aku Alanen's and Lea Pelkonen's article constitutes a new page in the
history of empirical research on social capital. Their study uses a Romerian
growth model to investigate the connection between variables measuring
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social capital in Finnish provinces with production growth in 1970-1995. The
results confirm the connections found in previous cross-country comparisons
as well as the conclusions reached in Putnam's (1993) study on Italy. Whereas
participation in leisure time activities and municipal investments in social
capital are correlated positively with local production growth, participation
in politics and special interest organizations is not.
Timo Voipio addresses the connection between social capital and the
reduction of poverty on three levels: in northern, southern and north-south
global relations, with the emphasis on the latter two. Special attention is given
to the policies adopted by international organizations to eliminate poverty.
According to this analysis, at the end of the 1990s almost all state
development institutions recognised the importance of participatory measures
and empowerment of the poor. Voipio argues for the necessity of getting this
type of approach implemented in practice, too, and not becoming bogged
down focusing on short-sighted economic growth.
Santiago Loranca's article presents justifications for an EU programme
aimed at bolstering social capital by supporting local networks among
companies and the third sector. Such a deep and constructive local
partnership is seen as a viable means of mobilizing local resources to create
new types of economic activity, and ultimately to reduce unemployment and
curb social exclusion. The economic agents of the third sector play a key role:
supporting their activities is believed to create new small-scale social
enterprisingness, which can lead to better employment and eventually to
new types of entrepreneurship. It is thus companies which become the
partners of the third sector in this network approach.
Loranca's contribution indicates how the concept of social capital can be
used to shape international programmes in many different ways. It is
interesting to note that his article addresses social capital using the
mainstream World Bank approach. Jussi Simpura's comments on Loranca's
article emphasise that the Nordic countries, for example, display certain
institutional and historical features that could facilitate the implementation
of the EU's social capital programme; ignoring these features could place the
entire programme in jeopardy.
Simpura's comments also accentuate another Nordic feature: the idea of
the state as a benevolent institution built by the people themselves. The gap
between the state and the civil society is not as wide as appears to be assumed
in Loranca's model. "State-penetrated Civil Society", which appears to prevail
in Finland, is not a negative expression, but rather conveys that participation
by the state is seen as positive in building social capital at the local level.
Reijo Vaarala is critical of the concept of social capital based on his
interpretation of the history of the Finnish and Nordic welfare states. Vaarala
sees in this development a group of "agreements" regarding the mechanisms,
theories and institutions holding society together. Vaarala lists four of these
agreements: solidarity agreement, normal job agreement, generation
agreement, and gender agreement. These agreements, along with political
action, have laid the foundation for social capital and enabled adoption of
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related policies fostering further developments of social capital, such as
educational policy, labour policy, housing policy and so forth. Vaarala feels
that these agreements are weakening, and their meaning as a foundation for
policies crumbling. Thus the key elements fostering social capital are also
eroding. One consequence is that isolated groups of people are called upon
to be self-sufficient and active in situations where outside help would also
be needed. According to Vaarala, the key elements of social capital, such as
networks, and related rules of action, "do not seem to work well in a situation
where the agreements of the welfare state are replaced with market-based
agreements and where people lose resources that would be needed in
making decisions independently about their own lives."
Kaj Ilmonen's extensive article is similar to Woolcock's, and presents a
survey of historical approaches and a critique of the current debate on social
capital. Ilmonen pays special attention to the concept of trust in the context
of Putnam's (1993) social capital model and Seligman's (1997) form of
emphasising differences in the trust between people on one hand and trust
in institutions (confidence) on the other. Ilmonen feels that the major
similarities between these two types of trust must be taken into account. The
most important similarity is that both types apply to the future and its
predictability. According to Ilmonen, it is precisely this time perspective
inherent in trust not the subject of the trust (people, institutions) that makes
it a key mechanism of social action. Ilmonen's hypothesis is that if the future
can be controlled, even if only at an imaginary level, this will generate trust
- regardless of whether the feeling of controllability is related to people or
institutions. Trust between people strengthens when there are institutions
supporting it.
The last article in the book is Jan-Erik Johanson's study of control and
dissemination of information as an explanation of dispersed network
structures in public organizations. Apart from Alanen's and Pelkonen's
article, Johanson's study differs from other articles since the concept of social
capital is used and tested empirically. Johanson tests the theory that the
appearance of gaps, for example, in social networks of jobs can give workers
a competitive advantage in the form of more diverse information over what
their possible positions in an organization offer. Johanson's results appear to
support this assumption; on the other hand, it is difficult for a worker to affect
his own network structure and create dispersed networks offering benefits
of information availability.
Johanson's theory is based on Granovetter's (1973) interpretation of so-called
weak social relationships or the strength of commitments. "Strong"
commitments would include those related to membership of recognisable
social groups (class, vocational, ethnic, religious groups etc.). "Weak"
commitments are those that extend beyond the borders of these groups.
According to Granovetter's theory, these weak commitments are more
decisive than strong ones when it comes to social integration and related
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factors. Ilmonen also mentions Granovetter's theory as one of the key points
of departure in the debate on social capital, and Woolcock maintains that
Granovetter's thoughts are especially productive from the standpoint of
theories of social networks and social capital. This compilation of different
writers' views is a good example of the fruitfulness of social capital from the
standpoint of debate on sociological theory.
The intuitive appeal of the notion of social capital and its applicability to
everything, in the same way as the "third sector" (cf. Ilmonen's article), is not
a sign of confusion or obscurity, but rather a characteristic which facilitates
analysis of interesting topics. The concept of social capital indicates the
building of bridges between sociology and economics (see Hjerppe 1997),
and there have been conscious efforts to use this approach to establish these
connections. The articles of Woolcock, and of Alanen and Peltonen, take the
progress furthest in this respect, while Sutela is more cautious. The discussion
is not over regarding the relationships of different types of capital and the
nature of social capital as one such type. But it seems possible that the debate
surrounding social capital raises questions for consideration both within and
between the fields of sociology and economics. The articles of this book fulfil
their task if they foster such analysis.
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Social Capital:
The State of the
Notion1
Michael Woolcock2
Abstract
The 1990s witnessed an explosion of interest in the term "social capital." Not
everyone shares the enthusiasm for this trend, however, and a recent (even
necessary) "backlash" has begun to surface. Popularly conceived of as the
networks, norms of reciprocity and trust facilitating collective action, the idea
of social capital actually dates back at least to the early twentieth century. This
paper briefly traces the intellectual history of social capital, and examines the
various contemporary arguments celebrating and condemning its rise to
prominence. Four perspectives on social capital are identified from the
current literature - the communitarian view, the networks view, the
institutional view, and the synergy view - and examined in the light of the
empirical evidence. The synergy view, with its emphasis on incorporating
both the micro and macro dimensions, its focus on structural (as opposed to
1
 This paper is a revised and slightly modified version of a longer paper, jointly written with Deepa
Narayan (World Bank), entitled 'Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and
Policy', which is forthcoming in the World Bank Research Observer.
2
 Michael Woolcock is a Social Scientist with the Development Research Group, The World Bank. With
Deepa Narayan and Gloria Davis, he co-chairs the World Bank's Social Capital Thematic Group.
Please direct all correspondence to Michael Woolcock (mwoolcock@worldbank.org) at The World
Bank, Rm MC3-574, 1818 H St. NW, Washington DC, 20433 USA. The findings, views, and
interpretations expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily
represent the views of- and should not be attributed to - the World Bank, its Executive Directions,
or the countries they represent.
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behavioural) sources rather than outcomes of social capital, and its recognition
of the positive and negative outcomes that social capital can generate, has
the greatest empirical support while lending itself to the most comprehensive
and coherent policy prescriptions. For all its inherent ambiguities, the most
significant virtue of the discourse surrounding "social capital" is that it helps
to bridge orthodox disciplinary and methodological divides among scholars,
practitioners, and policymakers.
[T]he participation of the private citizen, if even rarely, in public
functions [is crucial for good government, because the citizen] is called
upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided,
in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities;
to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their
reason of existence the common good: and he usually finds associated
with him in the same work minds more familiarised than his own with
these ideas and operations, whose study it will be to supply reasons
to his understanding, and stimulation to his feeling for the general
interest. He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is
for their benefit to be for his benefit. Where this school of public spirit
does not exist, scarcely any sense is entertained that private persons,
in no eminent social situation, owe any duties to society, except to
obey the laws and submit to the government. There is no unselfish
sentiment of identification with the public. Every thought or feeling,
either of interest or of duty, is absorbed in the individual and in the
family. The man never thinks of any collective interest, of any objects
to be pursued jointly with others, but only in competition with them,
and in some measure at their expense. A neighbour, not being an ally
or an associate, since he is never engaged in any common undertaking
for joint benefit, is therefore only a rival. Thus even private morality
suffers, while public is actually extinct.
John Stuart Mill3
The idea of "social capital" has become one of the most widely used (and
abused) concepts in social science in the 1990s. Many scholars and
policymakers have welcomed this trend, while others remain highly skeptical
that it is more than a passing fad. In this paper, an overview of the recent
empirical work on social capital is presented, with a particular focus on its
1
 Mill (1861, end of Chapter 3)
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applications in the field of economic development.4 This overview is placed
in the context of the intellectual history of social capital, and an examination
of the merits of the various arguments celebrating and condemning its recent
rise to prominence. The paper concludes with an assessment of where future
research energies need to be directed in order to enhance the rigor,
relevance, and coherence of social capital scholarship.
Social capital: intuition and formal applications
"It's not what you know, it's who you know." This common aphorism sums
up much of the conventional wisdom regarding social capital. It is wisdom
born of our experience that gaining membership to exclusive clubs requires
inside contacts, that close competitions for jobs and contracts are usually won
by those with "friends in high places." We understand that much of the value
of a private college education resides in gaining access to powerful alumni
networks, and that getting ahead in a new professional venture typically
requires an active commitment to "networking." When we fall upon hard
times we know it is our friends and family who constitute the final "safety
net." When our computers crash we fear being left "out of the loop", knowing
all too well that the information, informal tips and feedback exchanged daily
via listservers and email are vital to ensuring the quality of our work.
Conscientious parents devote hours of time to the school board, to helping
their kids with homework, to protecting them from falling in with the "wrong
crowd", only too aware that a child's intelligence and motivation are not
enough to ensure a bright future. Less instrumentally, some of our happiest
and most rewarding hours are spent talking with neighbours, sharing meals
with friends, participating in religious gatherings, and volunteering in
community projects.
Intuitively, then, the basic idea of "social capital" -that one's family, friends
and associates constitute an important asset, one that can be called upon in
a crisis, enjoyed for its own sake, and/or leveraged for material gain - makes
a lot of sense to most people. What is true for individuals, moreover, also
holds for groups. Those communities endowed with a rich stock of social
networks and civic associations will be in a stronger position to confront
poverty and vulnerability (Moser 1996; Narayan 1996), resolve disputes
(Schafft 1998; Varshney 1999), and/or take advantage of opportunities
(Isham 1999). They are likely to be safer, cleaner, healthier, better educated,
and more prosperous. These insights have two key implications for
developing economies in general and for poverty reduction in particular.
First, they highlight the poor's characteristically rich endowment of social
connections as a potential asset - e.g. for managing risk and uncertainty
4
 Other detailed reviews of social capital as it pertains to economic development issues can be found
in Hyden (1997), Harriss and De Renzio (1997), Grootaert (1998a), and Woolcock (1998). See also
, Platteau (1994).
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(Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999), and for extending credit (van Bastalaer
1998)5. Second, these insights turn attention to societies with weak, hostile,
or indifferent public institutions, where fragile and/or isolated social
networks - the result of oppression, civil war, or entrenched inequality, for
example - serve to undermine systems of law enforcement, lower social
cooperation, and weaken the capacity to respond effectively to economic
shocks (Narayan 1999; cf. Rodrik 1998a, 1998b). Together, these processes
diminish the impact of foreign aid, stifle economic growth, and undermine
the effectiveness of even the most carefully conceived development projects
(World Bank 1998).
Turning these apparently obvious and important features of daily life into
a coherent theory, finding valid and reliable empirical indicators for key
concepts, and identifying commensurate public policy measures, however,
is a task that social scientists have largely ignored in recent decades.
Nevertheless, events in the post-Cold War era - from ethnic violence and
widespread corruption to rising inequality and the emergence of national
separatist groups - have demanded a more sophisticated appraisal of the
virtues, vices and vicissitudes of "the social dimension" as it pertains to the
wealth and poverty of nations. The social capital literature, broadly defined,
represents a first approximation of the answer to this challenge.6 The rate at
which this literature has accumulated since the mid-1990s is quite extraordinary,
but it is a trend that has not been universally applauded. Before proceeding
to examine it in some detail, it is worth considering the cases made by both
supporters and detractors.
The rise of social capital: substance or style?
The spectacular growth of the social capital literature in the 1990s has
occurred for a number of reasons (see below), but it should come as little
surprise to discover that its popularity has also spawned a "backlash."
Trenchant criticisms of social capital now appear in the academic press (e.g.
Fine 1999), but one repeatedly hears variations on familiar themes in
conference discussions and informal conversations. Some of the concerns
expressed by the critics are legitimate and deserve to be taken seriously;
others are inflated and insensitive to the broader goals being achieved. Let
us examine both sides of the coin.
5
 The poor's social capital can also be a liability - e.g. when strong downward-leveling pressures are
exerted upon those that succeed economically - as we discuss in more detail below. The "assets"
dimension is stressed here since it is more theoretically novel; that is to say, the poor are
characteristically defined in terms of their actual and perceived "deficits" - lack of income, housing,
health care, education, credit. The social capital approach, however, explicitly recognizes that at least
the poor have each other, and that this can be a useful foundation on which to manage adversity and
accumulate other assets (see Moser 1998).
6
 Chanda and Putterman (1999) provide a more detailed discussion of the literature examining the
relationship between various social indicators and economic growth.
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For the critics, "social capital" is flawed because it:
- merely repackages old ideas. Social capital's popularity across the political
spectrum says more about its style (good 'marketing') than its conceptual
or empirical substance
- collapses complex, discrete issues (trust, norms, networks, etc.) into a
single term
- is merely the latest social scientific fad or buzz word! Conceptually, it has
become 'all things to all people', and thus nothing to anyone
- cannot reconcile the 'virtues' and Vices' of social relationships
- encourages and rewards 'economic imperialism' (Why refer to social
relations as 'capital'?)
- reinforces, and/or legitimizes orthodox (neo-'Washington consensus')
development policies
- is highly problematic to measure
- is a Western (especially US) concept supported by Western research, with
little relevance elsewhere.
There is a measure of truth to some of these claims, to be sure, but rather than
offer a detailed or divisive point-by-point rebuttal, a more constructive
response is to stress what has been gained by the rise of social capital
scholarship. For all its inherent ambiguities, it should be noted that the rise
of social capital is due in no small part to the fact that it:
- gives classical sociological themes a voice they would not otherwise enjoy
- lends a measure of theoretical coherence to disparate concepts
- provides a common discourse transcending disciplinary, sectoral, and
methodological lines (see Brown and Ashman 1996; Brown 1998)
- can and does reconcile 'virtues' (benefits) and 'vices' (costs) of social
relations
- facilitates sociology's entry into high-level policy discussions
- challenges prevailing theories across the social sciences (especially those
in economics), while offering a potentially fruitful focus for complementarity
- is stimulating an unprecedented quality and quantity of empirical research
on 'the social dimensions' of development; increasingly rigorous measures
of social capital at both the local and cross-national levels are being
developed
- has broad intuitive and substantive appeal despite linguistic and cultural
differences.
While recognizing the limitations of social capital and encouraging open on-
going debate, on balance it is hard to argue that the losses have been
outweighed by these tremendous gains.
In accepting the desirability of these gains, however, it is important to have
a comprehensive conceptual framework capable of providing a measure of
coherence to the field, a standard against which to critique current research,
and a guide for future work. The emergence of such a framework remains
the subject of considerable debate, but it is instructive to review the evolution
of that debate, and the arguments put forward by various camps.
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Making sense of the social capital literature: four perspectives
Four distinctive views (or "theories") of social capital can be discerned in the
literature.7 The first perspective, which I will call the communitarian view,
is popular but narrow, and equates social capital with local level organizations,
namely the associations, civic groups and informal networks that nurture the
norms of trust and reciprocity facilitating mutually beneficial collective action
(see Table 1). This view, measured most simply as the density of clubs,
societies, and associations in a given community, implies that social capital
is inherently "good," that "more is better," and that it always has a positive
effect on a community's livelihood and sense of well-being.
In their celebration of community and civil society, many enthusiasts of this
view of social capital have ignored its important "downside" (Fortes and
Lanclolt 1996). For example, where communities or networks are isolated,
parochial, or working at cross-purposes to society's collective interests (e.g.
ghettos, gangs, drug cartels), "productive" social capital is replaced by what
Rubio (1997) - discussing the case of Columbia - calls "perverse" social
capital, which greatly hinders development. There are certainly many
benefits associated with being a member of a highly integrated community,
but there are also significant costs, and for some - e.g. bright girls taken out
of village schools because of community expectations - the costs of their
"connections" may greatly outweigh the benefits. In the case of organized
crime syndicates in Latin America and Russia, such groups may generate
large negative externalities for the rest of society in the form of lost lives,
wasted resources and pervasive uncertainty. The communitarian perspective
also implicitly assumes that communities are homogenous entities that
automatically include and benefit all members. The extensive literature on
caste inequality, ethnic exclusion, and gender discrimination in South Asia
- outcomes often produced, maintained, and enforced by community
pressures - suggests otherwise.
Some further examples may help to clarify the characteristic virtues and
vices of social capital. Consider the familiar menu of benefits accruing to the
well connected. We expect that those with direct ties to corporate, academic,
civic, and political leaders will be more likely to secure access to safe
neighbourhoods, good schools and well-paying jobs. In a competitive world,
they will be more likely to secure financing for their project, to get their voice
heard, and their interests acted upon. These same networks and patron-client
relations, however, can also promote illegal "sweetheart" deals, sponsor
corruption and facilitate nepotism, thereby eroding public confidence in the
7
 These classifications extend those initially put forward by the World Bank's first interdisciplinary
Social Capital Group, convened in January 1996 (see Grootaert 1998a). For a trenchant critique of
these views, and their alleged unilateral participation in what Tendler (1997) calls "decentralization
fever" among development agencies, see Harriss and De Renzio (1997). See also Fine (1999), who
criticizes social capital in general (and "the World Bank's" use of it in particular) on the grounds that
it allegedly obscures issues of class and power. While this may be true for certain conceptualizations,
I argue that an institutional view of social capital (outlined below) highlights the mechanisms by
which class and power relations are initiated, maintained and perpetuated. It can thereby provide a
foundation for a more realistic conceptual framework for understanding, and hence overcoming,
inequality and power.
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impartiality and efficiency of public institutions (Shleifer and Vishney 1993;
La Porta et al. 1998). Similarly, we expect neighbourhoods blessed with high
levels of participation and "community spirit" to be pleasant and prosperous
places to live, with everyone supporting one another by looking after
children, checking houses when owners are away on vacation, and keeping
an eye out for menacing strangers. But life in small towns, where an
abundance of social capital means that everyone literally knows everyone
else's business, can also be characterized by a stifling of dissent, tremendous
pressures to conform, and entrenched hostility to "outsiders."8 The work
inspired by Olson (1982) argues convincingly that long-standing civic groups
can hinder rather than help democracy by distorting political processes in
their favour. As Unger (1998, 16) rightly concludes,
ease in forming cooperative groups may be associated as much with
communalism, criminality, or fascism as -with democracy, as much with
conflict as with cooperation, as much with growth-choking distributional
coalitions as with small-scale family-based flexible firms or large
multinational enterprises.
Examples from the developing world further demonstrate why merely
having high levels of social solidarity or informal groups does not necessarily
lead to economic prosperity. In Kenya, a participatory poverty assessment
found over 200,000 groups in rural areas, but most of these were unable to
lift the poor out of poverty (Narayan and Nyamwaya 1996). A World Bank
report on Rwanda (World Bank 1989) reported the existence of more than
3,000 registered cooperatives and farmers groups, and an estimated 30,000
informal groups, yet these were unable to prevent one of history's most
gruesome civil wars.9 Similarly, in many Latin America countries indigenous
groups are often characterized by high levels of social capital or social
solidarity, but experience high levels of poverty nonetheless (Narayan 1999).
This is the case in poverty-stricken Haiti, where social capital, "rich at the
local level", is employed by peasant groups to "meet labour requirements,
gain access to land, protect clientship in the marketplace, promote mutual
aid, assure protection from state authorities, and generally manage risk."
Even so, these groups cannot overcome the crippling effects of colonialism,
corruption, "geographical isolation, political exclusion, and social polarization"
(White and Smucker 1998, 1-3).
8
 In certain forms, moreover, social capital can be not only an impediment to economic advancement,
but a life-threatening liability. Those with friends and associates confined to "low" places typically
face a long uphill struggle to get ahead. Neighbourhoods cursed with rampant crime, high
unemployment and insidious drug dealers struggle to break out of this cycle precisely because their
residents are often deprived of access to external job networks, while being simultaneously saturated
with role models demonstrating indifference (even hostility) to education, formal employment and
peaceful conflict resolution (Wilson 1987, 1996). This is a central message of the films 'Once Were
Warriors' and 'Boyz in the Hood', in which socially isolated (but nonetheless potently real)
communities perpetuate tragically destructive behaviour. When the only people one interacts with
are also chronically poor, addicted, abused or otherwise down on their luck, it is hard to conceive
of - let own create or find — opportunities for a more stable and rewarding lifestyle (Fernandez Kelly
1995). Efforts to leave, moreover, can be considered acts of high treason and betrayal that only
elaborate acts of commitment can assuage.
9
 We are grateful to Maya Tudor for bringing this study to our attention.
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In the light of these concerns, a second perspective on social capital can be
identified that attempts to account for both its "upside" and "downside." This
view stresses the importance of vertical as well as horizontal associations
between people, and relations within and among other organizational
entities. This could include relations between community groups or other
organizational units such as firms. Building on the seminal work of
Granovetter (1973), it recognizes that horizontal (or "strong") ties are needed
to give families and communities a sense of identity and common purpose.
This view also stresses, however, that without "bridging" (or "weak") ties that
cross various social divides - e.g. those based on religion, class, ethnicity,
gender, socio-economic status - strong horizontal ties can become a basis
for the pursuit of narrow sectarian interests.10 Strong ties in the absence of
weak ties, moreover, can actively preclude access to information that would
otherwise be of great assistance to the community (e.g. tips about job
opportunities). This more nuanced perspective, which can be called the
networks view, regards the tension between social capital's virtues and vices
as a defining properly, one which explains in part why scholars and
policymakers have been so persistently ambivalent about its potential as a
theoretical construct and policy instrument.
Kozel and Parker (1998) employ a variation on this perspective in their
analysis of poor communities in rural north India, where they report that
social groups among poor villagers serve vitally important protection, risk
management, and solidarity functions. It is the more extensive and leveraged
networks of the non-poor, by contrast, that are used for strategic advantage
and the advancement of material interests. Crudely put, the networks of the
poor play "defence", while those of the non-poor play "offense" (cf. Briggs
1997). Barr (1998) reports strikingly similar results from her work on the
relationship between the structure of business networks and enterprise
performance in Africa. Poor entrepreneurs, operating small local firms in
traditional industries, form what she calls "solidarity networks", sharing
personal information about members' conduct and intentions, the primary
function of which is to reduce risk and uncertainty. Larger regional firms, on
the other hand, coalesce into "innovation networks", sharing knowledge
about technology and global markets with the explicit goal of enhancing
enterprise productivity, profit and market share (see also Van Dijk and
Rabellotti 1997; Fafchamps and Minten 1998a; Fafchamps and Minten,
1998b). Far from dismissing the vitality of traditional village groups in poor
communities (the modernization view) or romanticizing it (the communitarian
view), the networks view in effect recognizes that these groups can both help
and hinder economic advancement. Accordingly, the problematic task facing
the poor - and those who would "assist" them - is finding a way of drawing
initially upon the social resources of family members and peers, but then
1
 This was also the essence of Banfield's (1958) notion of "amoral familism," and Hirschman's (1958)
concerns about "group-focused" development.
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forging broader and more autonomous ties beyond the group as their
demand for larger markets and more sophisticated inputs expands.
The networks view of social capital, most closely associated with the work
of Alejandro Fortes (1995,1998) and his colleagues on ethnic entrepreneurship,
builds on an extensive critique of the communitarian view. Its particular
strength is its willingness to engage in detailed policy discussions11, doing
so on the basis of compelling evidence and detailed empirical assessments
of the veracity of competing explanations. This view, however, minimizes
the "public good" nature of social groups, regarding any benefits of group
activity as primarily the property of the particular individuals involved. As
such it is highly skeptical of arguments that social capital can (or should) be
measured across larger social aggregates, such as different societies or
nations. Neither does it incorporate or assign any distinctive importance to
macro-level institutions such as the state, and their capacity to both shape and
be shaped by local communities. To be sure, the networks perspective
recognizes that weak laws and overt discrimination can undermine efforts by
poor minorities to act in their collective interest, but the role communities
play in shaping institutional performance generally, and state-society relations
in particular, is largely ignored.
A third perspective of social capital, the institutional view, argues that the
social and political environment shapes social structures, thereby enabling
norms of cooperation and reciprocity (or distrust and defection) to develop.
In effect, this approach treats social capital as a dependent (rather than
independent) variable, and extends the importance of social capital to formal
organizations, such as government, firms and the legal system. The work of
Evans (1995) and Skocpol (1994), among others, has been the most
influential in this regard, showing that if the state is demonstrably ill-suited
to assuming full responsibility for all aspects of modern economic life, then
it is equally erroneous to pit states and societies against one another in a zero-
or negative-sum game, i.e. to argue that firms and communities thrive to the
extent that governments retreat. Rather, equitable and sustainable development
takes place when representatives of the state, the corporate sector and civil
society establish common forums in and through which they can identify and
pursue common goals.
The fourth view, which I call the synergy perspective, argues that the
performance of public institutions, private firms and social networks is
mutually dependent on one another. The synergy view accounts not only for
the virtues and vices of social relations within and across community
boundaries, but recognizes that the very capacity of social groups to act in
their collective interest depends crucially on the nature and extent of their
engagement with formal institutions. It also stresses that the performance of
states and firms themselves depends on their own internal coherence,
credibility and competence, and their external accountability to civil society
(Tendler 1995).
11
 See, for example, Massey and Espinosa (1997) and Massey (1998) on US-Mexican migration.
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The synergy view argues that development is an inherently contentious and
contested - that is to say, political - process, one in which the role of the state
is crucial, not marginal.12 But development struggles are not always won by
the most powerful, nor must a challenge to authority entail violent conflict.
Where subordinate groups and activists can forge broad, coherent coalitions
(Keck and Sikkink 1998), and nurture relations with allies in positions of
power (Fox and Brown 1998), rights and resources previously denied them
can begin to be accrued. Similarly, patient efforts by competent NGOs,
extension services and development agencies to mobilize and harness local-
level social resources among the poor, and to use these as the basis for
transferring knowledge and "scaling up" initial accomplishments, can reap
significant dividends (Isham, Narayan, and Pritchett 1995). As Uphoff (1992,
273) astutely recognizes,
paradoxical though it may seem, "top-down" efforts are usually
needed to introduce, sustain, and institutionalize "bottom-up"
development. We are commonly constrained to think in "either-or"
terms - the more of one the less of the other - when both are needed
in a positive-sum way to achieve our purposes.
Table 1. Four Views of Social Capital: Key Actors and Policy Prescriptions
Perspective Key Actors Policy Prescriptions
1. Communitarian View
Local association
2. Networks View
Intra ('strong') and inter
('weak') community ties
3. Institutional View
State-society relations
4. Synergy View
Community networks
and state-society
relations
Community groups
Voluntary sector
Entrepreneurs
Business groups
'Information brokers'
Community groups
The state, public institutions
Private and public sector
Communities
'Small is beatiful'
Encourage volunteerism
Decentralization
Creation of enterprise zones
Civil society federations
Enhance rule of law, rights
Build capacity, competence
Co-production,
complementarity
Accountability, transparency
Reduce inequality
Participation, linkages
This fourth approach to understanding social capital, developed in more
detail below, suggests that there are thus three central tasks for theorists,
researchers and policy makers. The first task is to identify the nature and
extent of the social relationships characterizing a particular community, its
formal institutions and the interaction between them. The second is to
See, among others, Fox (1996, 1997), Heller (1996, 1999), Tendler (1997), and Rodrik (1998b, 1999).
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identify ways and means by which positive manifestations of social capital
- widespread cooperation, trust, institutional efficiency - can offset, and/or
be created from, its negative manifestations - sectarianism, isolationism,
corruption. Put another way, the challenge is to transform situations where
local social capital "substitutes" for weak, hostile or indifferent formal
institutions into ones in 'which both realms "complement" one another.13 The
third task is to recognize with the classical sociologists that successful
economic development - the basic transition from Gemeinschaft (traditional
kinship-based community life) to Gesellshaft (society) - itself transforms the
calculus of costs and benefits associated with the particular dimensions of
social capital, and thus alters the desirable combinations of these dimensions
at any given moment in time. A small victory today may provide the blueprint
for greater success tomorrow, but in so doing it may also change the very
conditions that made the initial success possible (cf. Berry 1993).14
So what, then, is social capital? Each of the four perspectives outlined
above makes an important contribution but, based on the evidence, the
synergy view appears to have the greatest empirical support.15 Accordingly,
we define social capital as the norms and social relations embedded in the
social structure of societies that enable people to coordinate action to achieve
desired goals. Since the attainment of these goals by one group may have
positive or negative consequences for others, a central task of public policy
is to facilitate conditions generating positive externalities. Moreover, that
social capital can generate both positive and negative externalities implies
that there are several dimensions of social capital, and that it is different
combinations of these dimensions that produce these different outcomes.
This definition focuses on the sources of social capital, rather than the
outcomes derived from it (Fortes and Landolt 1996; Edwards and Foley 1997;
Foley and Edwards 1999). Social capital does indeed generate a shared ability
to exchange information, enhance the "internalization of externalities" (e.g.
the enforcement of contracts), and facilitate collective action, all of which are
crucial for development and poverty reduction (Collier 1998). But precisely
because coordinated action and the exchange of information can be used for
purposes both fair and foul, it is necessary to build on the definition above
13
 On this question, see Narayan (1999).
14
 By strengthening previously subordinate groups and/or weakening previously dominant groups -
creating what Evans (1995, 229), paraphrasing Marx, calls the "gravedigger problem" - successful
development potentially sets in motion an underlying dynamic creating new distributional coalitions
with fresh claims to make on the resources of both the state and other social groups. Managing this
transition fairly and efficiently is one of the major tasks of development, but all too often it fails to
happen. Writ large, this is the "paradox of plenty" (Karl 1997) faced by countries suddenly in receipt
of a large economic windfall (from, say, oil). The windfall potentially could be used to fund the
construction of schools, hospitals, and other public goods (as it is in Norway), but in countries with
weak public institutions and wide social cleavages (Venezuela, Nigeria) this windfall is squandered,
providing a small cadre of unaccountable political and business insiders with enormous personal
incomes.
15
 The World Bank's Social Capital Initiative, sponsored by the Government of Denmark, is currently
conducting ten large innovative projects covering issues ranging from water management to post-
conflict reconstruction. The results of these studies, conducted in different regions of the world, will
be published in 2000. For an overview of the SCI, see their website at: http://www.inform.umd.edu/
IRIS/ (click on 'Programs and Activities', the 'Social Capital Initiative').
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and develop a conceptual framework that can accommodate these different
outcomes. No local community acts in an institutional vacuum, and
institutions themselves act in accordance with both their own internal
coherence and the nature of their engagement with various constituent
groups. This conceptual framework must therefore be capable of incorporating
different dimensions of social capital at both the micro/community and
macro/institutional levels. To develop such a framework, we first need to
examine in some detail "what the social capital literature on development tells
us about itself, and to explore the nature of the evidence and arguments
brought to bear in support of different positions.
The contemporary social capital literature
in historical perspective16
Notwithstanding the current wave of interest in social capital, research
incorporating the letter and spirit of this concept has a long history in the
social sciences. The details of social capital's intellectual history are outlined
in Woolcock (1998), but a brief chronology begins with Lyda J. Hanifan
(1916), who employed the term, anticipating James Coleman, to explain the
role of community participation in shaping school performance. According
to Hanifan (1916, 130), social capital referred to
those tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of
people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse
among the individuals and families who make up a social unit... If [an
individual comes] into contact with his neighbour, and they with other
neighbours, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may
immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social
potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions
in the whole community.
Social capital as a concept then disappeared for four decades, but was
"reinvented" by a team of Canadian urban sociologists in the 1950s (Seeley,
Sim, and Loosley 1956) and Jane Jacobs in the early 1960s (Jacobs 1961)
before being elaborated upon by economist Glenn Loury in the late 1970s
(Loury 1977) and then sociologist James Coleman in the 1980s (Coleman
1987,1988).17 (A complementary approach was also being developed by the
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in the 1970s, though Anglo-American
scholars were not fully aware of this until the late 1980s.) The major impetus
to contemporary scholarship on the topic, however, came with political
scientist Robert Putnam's (1993a) seminal work in the early 1990s on regional
governance in Italy. This project inspired his subsequent research on the state
of social capital in America (1995, 2000), which culminated in his provocative
thesis that Americans in the late twentieth century were "bowling alone", i.e.
16
 More extensive coverage of this issue as it pertains to economic development issues is provided in
Woolcock (2000) and Narayan (1999).
17
 George Homans also discussed the concept briefly in the early 1960s in his work on exchange theory.
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becoming increasingly disengaged from one another by withdrawing from
public life.18 Despite the lack of continuity in these different uses, it is
remarkable how similar they are to one another.
The seminal work of Coleman (1988,1990) and especially Putnam (1993a,
1995) has inspired most of the current "work, which has since coalesced
around studies in (at least) nine fields. These fields are: (1) families and youth
behaviour problems; (2) schooling and education; (3) community life
("virtual" and civic); (4) work and organizations; (5) democracy and
governance; (6) general cases of collective action problems; (7) public health
and environment issues; (8) crime and violence; and (9) economic
development.19 Within this last field, two major research projects in the mid-
1990s were responsible for expanding and refining our understanding of
social capital, and for incorporating it into the theory and practice of
economic development.
The first project on social capital and economic development was
sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation, under the leadership of Alejandro
Fortes. The substantive focus of this project was the study of immigration,
ethnic entrepreneurship and urban poverty, and the reasons why different
national groups displayed such variable capacities to adjust to their new
surroundings. Why, for example, did Mexicans and Puerto Ricans fare so
much better in some US cities than others? Why were particular Asian
communities able to generate funds from among their members to launch
small business enterprises, while African-Americans, for the most part, were
not? Why were many residents of inner-city ghettos seemingly unable to free
themselves of the high crime rates and joblessness around them? Two key
findings emerged from the Sage Foundation project in terms of a general
theory of social capital.20 First, social capital is a double-edged sword: on the
one hand, it can provide a range of valuable services for community
members, ranging from baby-sitting and house-minding to job referrals and
emergency cash. But there are also costs, in that those same ties can place
considerable claims on members' sense of obligation and commitment that
have economic consequences. Group loyalties may be so strong that they
isolate members from information about employment opportunities, foster
a climate of ridicule towards efforts to study and work hard (e.g. claiming that
doing well in school amounts to "acting white"), or siphon off hard-won
assets (e.g. supporting subsequent cohorts of co-ethnic immigrants21). These
18
 I am grateful to Robert Putnam for helping us find early examples of social capital research. Putnam
(1993b) and Coleman (1994) first laid down to scholars of development the challenge of social capital
theory.
19
 For citations on the first eight fields, see Woolcock (1998). See also the World Bank website on social
capital at: http://wrvw.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital.
20
 For a full account of the fruits of this project, see Fortes (1995). See also Fortes (1997).
21
 Fortes and Sensenbrenner (1993) report on the case of prosperous Asian immigrants who resorted
to Anglocizing their names in order to free themselves of communal obligations to support
subsequent cohorts. A happier example of assimilation, in which community ties remain more or
less intact, is that of American Jews; on this, see Gold (1995). See also, among others, Zhou and
Bankston (1994) and Sanders and Nee (1996).
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results gave rise to the logical conclusion that there must be two basic
dimensions of social capital at the community level, namely "strong" intra-
group ties and "weak" extra-group networks: both were needed to avoid
making tautological claims regarding the efficacy of social capital.22 (Without
this distinction, for example, an argument could be put forward that
successful groups were distinguished by their dense community ties, failing
to consider the possibility that the same ties could be preventing success in
another otherwise similar group.) The clear challenge to social capital theory
and research, the Sage group concluded, is to identify the conditions under
which the many positive aspects of repeated social interactions can be
harnessed, and their negative aspects dissipated.
Table 2. Summary and Extension of the Russel Sage Foundation Findings
High
Extra-Community
Networks
(Linkages)
Low
Mexicans in
San Diego
RECENT RURAL-TO-
URBAN MIGRANTS
The homeless
OUTCASTS
"Anglicized" Asian
immigrants in Los Angeles
SUCCESSFUL
MEMBERS OF
MICROFINANCE
PROGRAMMES
Urban ghettos
POOR VILLAGERS
Low High
Intra-Community Ties (Integration)
Lower Case - Findings of the Russel Sage group
UPPER CASE - APPLICATIONS TO DEVELOPMENT
22
 This idea has its origins in Georg Simmel, who wrote extensively on the social boundaries separating
"insiders" and "outsiders." Simmel (1971 [1908], 253, 255) also recognized that development and an
expanding division of labour produced
•A need and an inclination to reach out beyond the original spatial, economic, and mental
boundaries of the group and, in connection with the increase in individualization and
concomitant mutual repulsion of group elements, to supplement the original centripetal forces
of the lone group with a centrifugal tendency that forms bridges with other groups... [A]s long
as the small primitive group is self-sufficient, a pervasive equality exists in that each member
of the group works for the group itself; every achievement is sociologically centripetal.
However, as soon as the boundaries of the group are ruptured and it enters into trade in special
products with another group, internal differentiation develops between those who produce for
export and those who produce for domestic consumption - two wholly opposed modes of
being.
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Second, the Sage group proposed that precisely because social capital could
confer both costs and benefits, it was important to distinguish between its
sources and consequences - i.e. what social capital is ("the medium") and
what it does ("the message").23 As summarized in Table 2, different
combinations of intra-group ties (Integration) and extra-group networks
(Linkages) could have profoundly diverse effects on members' welfare, even
though any given group could rightly be said to possess "social capital."24
Furthermore, as members' welfare changed over time, so too did the optimal
"calculus" of costs and benefits associated with particular combinations of
Integration and Linkages. Poor entrepreneurs, for example, once heavily
dependent on their immediate neighbours and friends (i.e. their "strong ties")
for credit, insurance, and support, required access to more extensive product
and factor markets as their businesses expanded. Economic development,
these authors concluded, took place when an ongoing "coupling and de-
coupling" social mechanism was in place (Granovetter 1995). This mechanism
allowed individuals initially to draw on the benefits of close community
membership, but in doing so also ensured that they acquired the skills and
resources to participate in more extensive networks that transcended their
community, thereby progressively incorporating them into mainstream
economic life. Applied to development, studying social capital primarily in
terms of types and combinations of social relationships enables us to
recognize that, on the one hand, poor villagers typically have an abundance
of social capital in terms of strong ties (neighbours, family members), but a
dearth of social capital in terms of weak ties (awareness of, access to, and
sustained participation in external networks).
Meanwhile, a second group of scholars concerned themselves with
examining the manner in which social relationships contributed (or not) to
development at the institutional level. Sponsored by the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences, this group, under the leadership of Peter Evans,
examined case studies from India, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, and Brazil
in search of the conditions fostering developmental "synergies" - i.e.
dynamic professional alliances and relationships - between and within state
bureaucracies and civil society.25
23
 "Defining social capital functionally," Edwards and Foley (1997, 669) correctly point out, "makes it
impossible to separate what it is from what it does." Matters are complicated further when social
capital is classified as a public good that is, by definition, under-produced by society. Social capital
in the form of trust, some argue, is created as a by-product of other collective endeavors such as
participation in civic associations, but these activities are themselves public goods, and are also
identified as social capital, leaving us with the problematic conceptual task of distinguishing between
"the sources of social capital [and] the benefits derived from them" (Fortes and Landolt, 1996: 19).
Our approach endeavours to focus on the different sources of social capital, recognizing that these
can give rise to both positive and negative outcomes.
24
 This table draws on the Sage project results, but also incorporates findings from other related
research, and provides simple examples of cases which correspond to each of the combinations of
the basic dimensions of social capital at the local/community level.
25
 These studies were published in the June 1996 issue of World Development.
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Three master hypotheses emerged from the AAAS group:
(1) Contra public choice and communitarian theorists, neither the state nor
societies are inherently good or bad; governments, corporations and
civic groups are "variables" in terms of the impact they can have on the
attainment of collective goals.
(2) States, firms and communities alone do not possess the resources needed
to promote broad-based, sustainable development; complementarities
and partnerships forged both within and across these different sectors are
required. Identifying the conditions under which these synergies emerge
is therefore the central task of development theoiy and practice.
Moreover, because these conditions emerge historically, comparative
analysis is likely to be an especially fruitful methodological approach to
correctly identifying them.
(3) Of these different sectors, the state's role in facilitating positive
developmental outcomes is the most problematic and important. This is
so because the state is not only the ultimate provider of public goods
(stable currencies, public health, universal education) and the final
arbiter and enforcer of the rule of law (property rights, due process,
freedom of speech and association); it is also the actor best situated to
facilitating enduring alliances across the boundaries of class, ethnicity,
race, gender, politics, and religion.26 This assertion does not render
communities and firms of negligible importance; on the contrary, they
have an important role to play in their own right, and in creating the
conditions that produce, recognize and reward good governance.
Table 3 • Summary and Extension of the AAAS Project Findings
High
Low
Developmental States
Predatory States
Socialism
Engagement with
 Corruption
Civil Society F Inefficiency(Embeddedness)
Anarchy
Low High
Coherence, Credibility & Competence of
Public Institutions (Organizational Integrity)
See Narayan (1999). For a related argument from political economy, see Roclrik (1997).
Michael Woolcock 31
Specifically, equitable and effective economic development requires the
difficult task of assembling and maintaining coherent, credible and competent
public institutions that are simultaneously actively engaged with the day-to-
day affairs of their constituents. These twin features, which I call organizational
integrity and embeddedness (cf. Evans 1992, 1995), characterize situations
in which public officials are, on the one hand, skilled employees working
within a coherent organizational structure, impartially exercising their duties.
On the other hand, these officials are also openly accountable for their
actions, and are able to make timely adjustments to crises and opportunities
alike, doing so in large part because they are in touch with the on-going
concerns of those under their jurisdiction (e.g. business and civic leaders).
This result, it turns out, is generalizable across a broad range of formal
organizations: positive developmental outcomes are most likely when
institutions - public, private, and civic alike - are characterized by high
organizational integrity and embeddedness. Importantly, where one or more
of these features is absent, sub-optimal, even highly destructive ("predatory"),
outcomes can be expected (see Table 3). India, for example, has a highly
trained cadre of civil servants (the Indian Administrative Service), but their
public accountability and engagement with key business leaders is
comparatively low (Bardhan 1995).27 On these criteria, as Stark and Bruszt
(1998) point out, the socialist state was not a "strong state" as popularly
portrayed, but rather a weak state, where party loyalty rather than merit
determined promotions, and where input from business leaders sensitive to
global standards and competition was never sought.
This general framework has been complemented in the last few years by
several innovative studies attempting to quantify social capital and its
contribution to economic development. As indicated above, social capital
scholarship is so rich partly because it draws on a variety of methodological
approaches, all of which have an important role to play in interpreting,
challenging and refining each others' findings (cf. Tarrow, 1995). In order to
arrive at more concrete policy recommendations, however, there is a need
for more comparative research using precise measures of social capital to
examine within-country variations and across-country variations in poverty
reduction, government performance, ethnic conflict and economic growth.
(See Woolcock and Narayan [19991 for a more detailed discussion of recent
attempts to generalize regional and cross-national measures of social
capital.)
27
 For a comparative study of the state's engagement with different Indian industries, see Pingle (1996).
It is important to recognize that there are many studies using both qualitative and participatory
methods to understand local level institutions. Open-ended methods such as key informant
interviews and focus group discussions allow for a rich exploration of an institution's history and
evolution. Venn diagrams, a Participatory Rapid Appraisal technique, have been used extensively
in participatory poverty assessments to map local level institutions, their power structures, and their
relations with different social groups in a community (see Rietbergen-McCracken and Narayan 1998).
Similar approaches can also be used to map the structure and functions of formal institutions.
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Implications for development theory and policy
It is far too early, of course, to proclaim that social capital research amounts
to a coherent theory or a new "paradigm" for development studies.
Nevertheless, as this paper has endeavoured to show, there is good reason
to believe that viable alternatives to prevailing orthodoxies are in the wind,
and that the social dimension of economic development is finally being given
the serious treatment it deserves. In this final section, I consider some of the
implications of social capital research for development theory and policy. It
should be stressed that these implications are necessarily preliminary, and
that others are invited to refine, correct or expand upon them.
The first implication for development theory is that the concept of social
capital offers a way to bridge sociological and economic perspectives,
thereby providing potentially richer and better explanations of economic
development. In a world beset with ethnic conflict, political tension and
financial crisis, no single discipline (if ever it could) can hope to provide
either a full accounting of these problems or realistic prescriptions for
change. Dialogue across disciplinary, sectoral and professional lines alike is
caicial for both conceptual and operational advancement. A second implication
is that economic growth is shaped by the nature and extent of social
interactions between communities and institutions (cf. Rodrik, 1998a). This
has profound implications for development policy, in which attention to the
embeddedness of economic life in the social and political environment has
until recently been largely absent. This paper affirms that understanding how
"outside" agencies can facilitate sustainable poverty alleviation in diverse
(and often poorly understood) communities remains one of the great
challenges of development (Klitgaard 1990, 12).
Recent work by the World Bank and the development community at large
on social development, participation, institutions and governance lays the
building blocks to help us move forward. Five broad recommendations
follow from this review of the social capital literature in its broader
institutional and political context. First, for all development interventions,
especially at the country level, the use of social institutional analysis is
recommended to correctly identify the range of stakeholders and their
interrelations. Understanding how their power and political interests will be
affected by proposed policy interventions is a vital consideration, since all
policy interventions are embedded in the existing social organization: in
informal social relations, networks, and institutions. The impact of this social
embeddedness needs to be factored into the design of institutional reform
policies, both in the public and private sector and at the national, state, and
local levels. Particular attention also needs to be paid in design interventions
to the potential for dominant groups to mobilize resources in ways that
undermine the public good.
Second, the use of participatory processes and spaces facilitating consensus-
building and social interaction among diverse sets of stakeholders is vitally
important. Finding ways and means by which to transcend social divides so
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as to build social cohesion and trust is crucial for economic development.
One of the great virtues of the idea and discourse of "social capital" is that
it provides a common language for these different stakeholders, enabling
them to communicate more openly with one another. Third, measures to
support information disclosure policies at all levels should be encouraged to
enhance informed citizenship and the accountability of both private and
public actors who serve to foster the public good. Fourth, emphasis should
be placed on improving physical access and modern technology to foster
communication and information exchange across social groups to complement
social interaction based on face-to-face interchange. Among other things, it
is strongly supportive of efforts to get key decision-makers and researchers
out of their offices in capital cities, and into the field. Finally, it is important
to evaluate all development interventions through a social capital lens, with
their value assessment including the potential impact of the intervention on
social capital. Policy and project intervention designs and processes may
need to be changed to ensure that the voices of those most affected by these
policies and programmes - especially the poor - are taken seriously.
Conclusion: toward rigorous and relevant social capital research
In an insightful essay, Easterly (1998b) argues that attempts by economists
to explain variations in economic growth can be likened to a series of
mythological quests. In this quest, "a person and some companions set out
on a dangerous journey in search of some magical object such as the Holy
Grail or Golden Fleece. But they discover in the course of the journey that
the solution they are seeking lies not with the magical object but within
themselves." In the 1950s and 60s, economists thought development's Holy
Grail lay in investments in infrastructure and technology transfer (physical
capital). In the 1970s and 80s, attention shifted to education and health
(human capital). It is tempting to conclude that the quest for development
in the 1990s has now come full circle, and that the answer lies, after all, within
ourselves, i.e. our communities and institutions (social capital).
This is not the message that supporters of social capital should be
attempting to convey. Accumulating and investing in physical and (especially)
human capital remains central to development, and it would only be
committing the errors of the past to imagine that a single factor or issue can
explain the wealth and poverty of nations. In exploring the literature on
social capital and development, this paper has sought to convey a recurring
message that the social dimension is a central component of attempts to
mobilize other growth-enhancing resources. Social capital does not exist in
a political vacuum; rather, the nature and extent of the interactions between
communities and institutions holds the key to understanding the prospects
for development in a given society. The capacity of social capital to be used
for purposes supporting and undermining the public good requires careful
attention to its various dimensions. Finally, in the absence of formal
insurance mechanisms and financial instruments, perhaps the most important
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example of social capital at work is the use by the poor of their social
connections as a primary means of protection against risk and vulnerability,
and of procuring resources to advance their interests.
We may never have all the answers to the ambiguities inherent in trying to
foster economic development by investment in physical capital, human
capital, and now social capital. Nevertheless, as Szreter neatly puts it (1998, 8),
with mass stress and overwork for many and unemployment and social
exclusion for others in the West, with financial maelstroms in the East,
and chronic poverty and famines in the South, allied to ubiquitous
environmental degradation and pollution, all sane citizens are asking:
isn't there a better practical guide to economics? Is it not time for a more
human, less rapacious, and, ultimately less self-defeating economic
paradigm? A previous generation, faced with a similar international
breakdown in the practical credibility of neo-classical economics,
invented and applied the multiplier as a central mechanism for a new
economics, Keynesianism, which successfully provided for the needs
of a whole, lucky generation, which we now look back on as the post-
war golden age. Now it is time to develop social capital as the focus
for another new economics to serve another generation...
If we wait for another generation till we know all there is to know about
social capital, however, we may look back and see another lost decade.
Rather, to foster further our knowledge and understanding of social capital,
we should adopt a learning-by-doing stance. For the World Bank and the
development community at large, this implies more rigorous evaluations of
project and policy impact on social capital; greater work on unbundling the
mechanisms through which social capital works; and understanding the
determinants of social capital itself.
Finally, it would be the ultimate irony if those people most interested in
researching and generating social capital did not themselves foster trust,
openness and a willingness to share information, ideas and opportunities in
this field. It is in this spirit that I invite readers to access, use and contribute
to the World Bank's Social Capital Thematic Group, and the extensive
knowledge base of ongoing research around the world in the social capital
domain.28 It is only through collaborative efforts - with all that this entails
regarding struggle, perseverance, negotiation and willingness to learn - that
genuine progress will be made. While continuing to debate theoretical and
conceptual issues, it is vital that the focus remains squarely on the larger
issues of poverty reduction, democracy and justice, and on finding ways and
means by which to harness our collective financial, intellectual and moral
resources to serve these ends. A research agenda that remains committed to
rigor and relevance, not petty disciplinary squabbles, and that does not try
to run before it can walk, offers the best way forward.
28
 The website for the World Bank's Social Capital Thematic Group, along with instructions for how
to receive our newsletter and/or join the email discussion group, can be reached at <http://
www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital>.
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Social Capital
and Economic
Efficiency
on
Jouko Kajanoja
I basically agree with Woolcock's conceptual conclusions. He is not satisfied
with the communitarian or networks views or with the institutional view
restricting itself to state-society relations. Instead he emphasises the synergy
of social capital, a perspective much wider than communitarian and
networks views and mere state-society relations because it encompasses
them all.
Woolcock's approach reflects the traditional1 view of the World Bank,
whose wider understanding of social capital has conflicted with the opinions
of most sociologists and economists who have worked with the concept,
such as Coleman, Putnam, Leonardi, Fukuyama, Knack, La Porta, Portes, etc.
(Kajanoja 1999).
Reflecting his synergy perspective, Woolcock defines social capital as
follows: "the norms and social relations embedded in the social structure of
societies that enable people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals".
Social as capital - comments on the definition
I have only one question: is this definition broad enough? Does it include all
kinds of social phenomena which may have an influence on achieving
desired goals? I doubt it. For example, why is the word "coordinate" needed
in defining social capital? We can imagine social norms which have
favourable effects but which do not require any coordinated action. Social
norms favouring decent work instead of lounging around, or reciprocity
instead of indifference, do not necessarily need any coordinated actions to
be realised, but they are still fundamental features of social capital.
The word tradition is a little misleading. It shows how short the history of the concept is. The tradition
of the World Bank was launched by Ismail Serageldin in 1996 (Serageldin 1996).
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My question is a minor one and may sound academic, but there is a reason
for emphasising it.
One of the main promises of the concept of social capital lies in its potential
-1 cite Michael Woolcock -"to bridge orthodox disciplinary and methodological
divides among scholars" of economics and sociology. This divide is not only
among scholars, but also among 'practitioners and policymakers' as Woolcock
continues. As we are interested in bridging social and economic divides, it
is appropriate to fit the concept of capital into the framework of economics;
it should be included in the conceptual family of physical (man-made or
natural) capital and human capital. In this context social capital justifiably
includes all social phenomena that influence the efficiency of the economy.
Human resources which have effects on the economy can be divided into
two parts - human capital and social capital. Human capital is an individual
concept covering individual properties. Social capital covers all those aspects
of human resources which are social, i.e. which are properties of a society,
be it smaller or larger.
I put my question in another form. Why not use the concept of social
infrastructure, which may well include social norms and thus cover the same
phenomena as social capital? Or why not use more contentual words like
trust, reciprocity, accountability, transparency, communicativity, legality,
etc.? What is the added value of social capital? Why use the controversial term
capital?
My answer is that social capital integrates social phenomena with
economics. Social capital interprets social infrastructure not only as a
nominal category but also as an intentional one. The purpose of capital is
return. In economics return is mainly understood as profit, economic growth
or productivity. But it may or should be understood as better life and more
sustainable development, as I will argue later on.
Social capital helps to cover all forms of capital in the framework of
economics, a view clearly expressed in a publication of the World Bank
(Serageldin 1996). From this perspective the definition of social capital could
be the social phenomena that enable people to achieve economic efficiency
and other desired goals.
Such a definition is very abstract, and would leave social capital as an
umbrella concept probably seldom used in concrete research work, where
contentual concepts like trust, reciprocity, networks etc. would be favoured.
This kind of definition could parallel physical capital. Research on physical
capital very seldom employs the concept of physical capital, which is a
distinct notion with respect to other factors of production. And in that sense
- and only in that - physical capital is a fruitful concept.
If defined in an abstract way, social capital would include all social aspects
- in addition to physical and human capital - yielding the desired goals. There
are powerful arguments that this distinction justifies the notion social capital.
One may argue that such a definition is too abstract; it is all things to all
people and therefore nothing to anyone. It is without smell and taste. We
need a more lean and mean definition.
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My reply to such arguments is that we need to create a channel of
communication between social and economic issues so that economists and
sociologists (and those in politics concerned with economic and social
issues) can start using the same language to create a productive argument and
debate. The collision between social and economic issues will certainly not
be without smell and taste.
Improved communication between sociology and economics will have a
remarkable impact on how we understand the interaction between these two
spheres. The idea of combining social structures and norms with economic
efficiency is not a new one. The works of Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Emile
Durkheim, Thorstein Veblen, Max Weber and many other classics of
economics and sociology have all dealt with the issue. The concept of social
capital resurrects the idea and carries it forward with the work done by
institutional economics and the new economic sociology. What is new here
is that the effects of social structures and social norms are the subject of
concrete empirical research, which will happen in the most efficient way if
disciplinary and political divides are bridged by an abstract definition of
social capital. In research it is then consistent to use more concrete and
contentual notions like trust, network, reciprocity etc. The notion of social
capital is needed to emphasise the distinction of social phenomena from
other kinds of production factors.
Developed countries and the trade-off-doctrine
Michael Woolcock writes: "... the most significant virtue of the discourse
surrounding social capital is that it helps to bridge orthodox disciplinary and
methodological divides among scholars, practitioners, and policymakers."
I would like again to stress this virtue - perhaps even more than Woolcock.
I think that the slight difference in our approaches stems from the fact that
Woolcock is mainly interested in development theory while my perspective
is the situation in the developed countries. From the point of view of the
latter, slightly different issues emerge compared with those raised by
Woolcock.
I argue that the bridge between social and economic issues is better
understood through development theory - both in its economic and
sociological approaches - than using economic and sociological theories
dealing with the developed countries. Although we see the importance of
social capital more clearly in developing countries, we cannot say that social
capital is a more relevant concept in developing countries than in our own
societies. The concept of social capital may well be just as plausible and
useful in the discourse dealing with the OECD countries. It is needed to open
our eyes. In relation to the developing nations our eyes are already at least
half open thanks to development theory, which has understood the
interdependence between social and economic issues better than theories
dealing with the developed countries.
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There is a deep "orthodox disciplinary and methodological divide" between
scholars of mainstream sociology and mainstream economics in relation to
the developed countries. And there is also a deep divide between economic
and social policy. Part of this divide is the trade-off doctrine, which is deeply
rooted in mainstream economics and in economic policy. There is a strong
belief here that expenditures on social activities cause 'welfare losses', i.e.
they harm the efficiency of the economy. On the other hand, the trade-off
doctrine common among social policy practitioners is that economic
efficiency is socially and morally questionable.
In mainstream economics, economic development is usually understood
and studied as a determinant of economic factors. To extend this view we
need theories to explain the kind of influence that social networks, informal
social structures, state institutional structures, social norms, trust etc. have on
economic phenomena. If the concept of social capital contributes to this
extension, the concept is welcome, and as a result we gain a better
understanding of economic development.
In the other camp, 'economic efficiency' or 'economic growth' are concepts
seldom heard in sociology. If the notion of social capital is successful in
bridging social and economic divides in scientific and political discourse, it
will represent a remarkable step in economics and in sociology alike, and
may have substantial policy ramifications. This is even more of a pressing
need in the developed than the developing countries, because it is easier for
the scholars of economics and sociology to see the interaction in the latter,
since most of them live in the former and are less able to perceive their own
societies as a whole.
Social capital - economic imperialism?
Next I will comment on one policy argument against the concept of social
capital. This argument takes issue with the fact that 'capital' is an economic
term and thus inseparably connected with the word 'return'. The way of
understanding the concept of social capital I have advocated above is
especially vulnerable to this argument, which says that social capital means
that the social aspect of life will be sacrificed on the altar of economic growth.
Human relations will no longer be human but rather merely serving
economic efficiency. The instrumental and economic-technological doctrines
will colonise us. Social capital "encourages and rewards economic imperialism",
as Woolcock puts it. The argument raises the big question of the economic-
technological rationality of modernity.
In his definition of social capital Woolcock does not speak about return.
He expresses the intention of social capital "to achieve desired goals". But
if our ambition is to bridge sociology and economics, i.e. to link social aspects
with the efficiency of the economy, we cannot avoid the problem. The
function of capital is to yield a return in the economy, so we must deal with
the problem of return.
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The solution to the problem is approached by pondering how we measure
the efficiency of the economy. Efficiency is always for something, it does not
exist in isolation. The proper aims of an efficient economy may be quality
of life and sustainable development. Standard textbooks of economics do not
mention efficiency or growth as a final goal; typically they express it as 'to
meet human needs'.
The next question is whether the traditional measures of economic
efficiency are adequate. Does gross domestic product (GDP) measure the
efficiency of the economy in a proper way? Certainly not. GDP is needed in
measuring quality of life and sustainable development, and it is needed as
an intermediate phase. But as a measure of the economic efficiency of a
nation many other factors should be taken into account. This includes the
work done in households, the amount of leisure hours, ecological factors,
physical safety, social security, crime, equality, democracy, human rights and
many other factors. Together, all these things measure quality of life and
sustainable development. GDP is not enough, and as such misleading.
Some problems in the way GDP is calculated today are avoided by
formulating a 'genuine progress indicator' (GPI) (Cobb et al. 1995; GPI
Atlantic 1999) as an alternative to the GDP. In this indicator crime-related
costs, for example, are deducted from the GDP, whereas in the GDP crime
is seen as output; a broken window is fixed and the repair costs are included
in the GDP. There are a lot of other adjustments to GDP in the GPI, including
the value of housework and voluntary work in the third sector, as well as any
increased leisure time. Deductions are made for pollution of the environment
and for any decrease in the use of non-renewable natural resources. Many
other corresponding adjustments are made. The GPI is also adjusted
downwards if the rise in the GDP has affected only a small minority and the
income level of the majority has fallen, as has occurred in recent years in the
US, where GPI calculations have been made. According to these data the GPI
started to fall in the early 1960s. In 1990-94, the GPI fell by 6.4 percent per
year, while the corresponding change in the GDP was a rise of 1.1 percent
per year in 1995.
The GPI does not take into account factors that are difficult or impossible
to measure in money, such as health and many factors related to the physical
environment. This pertains also to human rights, democracy, equality,
participation and many other features of a socially desirable situation. Our
goal is fruitful interaction between people. We focus not only on material
living conditions, but rather address the question of what kind of social
community we want to live in.
Thus we need new measures. Fortunately there is a promising renaissance
of social indicators and other non-monetary measures of quality of life and
sustainable development.
Another possibility is to incorporate within GDP many of those things
which are now missing. Ethical and ecological principles can be incorporated
in production by norms, taxes and fees. As a result many externalities are
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incorporated within GDP. But there are limits to this. Both extra calculations
for correcting GDP and extra social indicators are needed in addition to an
"incorporated" GDP.
Adequate material subsistence is a precondition for a good life. In that
sense the traditional measures of the return of capital are needed, but
hopefully improved by correcting the major faults in GDP - as indicated by
the 'genuine progress indicator' - and internalising the externalities. In
addition we need non-monetary indicators. If the return on social capital
were measured by indicators of quality of life and sustainable development,
wouldn't everybody love economic growth - and social capital?
Virtuous circle?
I conclude my comment with an optimistic perspective. We have good
reasons to argue that the measures of social capital constitute part of the
measures of quality of life and sustainable development. Social capital is - by
definition - an instrument of the efficiency of the economy. The efficiency
of the economy should be measured by quality of life and sustainable
development. Accordingly, social capital is at the same time an instrument
and an intended output. Thus we have a virtuous circle.
It is an empirical hypothesis that social capital has much in common with
good life and sustainable development. It must be verified. The empirical
study of this worthwhile topic is in its early stages, but the prospects are
promising.
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Social Capital
in Transition
Economies
on
Pekka Sutela
The understanding of social capital, as presented skilfully and with great
erudition by Michael Woolcock, is rich with themes from classical sociology.
For a Finn who studied sociology at Helsinki University at the turn of the
1960s and 1970s, it resonates well with the catchwords of the topical
macrosociological teachings of Erik Allardt at the time. Society, for him, was
about values, norms and expectations. This is for practical purposes almost
identical with the definition of social capital offered by Woolcock.
Should one therefore simply argue that social capital is the current
buzzword for society and culture? No; social capital is also a vehicle of
discourse. I have great sympathy with the notion if it helps, as Woolcock
claims it will, to convince modern sociologists that their discipline is more
than a literary study. Thus social capital might be a way of winning many
sociologists back to their own discipline. And even better if it convinces at
least some economists - my own breed - that others might also have
something useful to say about what used to be called the decomposition of
total factor productivity in growth theory. There will never be total unity of
the social studies, but there should be much more cross influence. Until now,
a major stumbling block has been the lack of theory and method in sociology.
While social capital as such will not remedy this problem, it might contribute
to progress.
But if we understand that social capital is about the fundamental issues of
sociological theory, we also know that it cannot prove to be the miracle of
interpretation that will help us solve problems. If a final social theory were
possible, we probably would already have it.
In particular, it seems to me that the great social changes such as seen in
the former socialist countries during the last decade or so do not lend
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themselves easily to sociological interpretation. Sociology might well be a
discipline for more normal times, while in spells of rupture history and the
study of the state have the upper hand. Let me illustrate this provocative and
unfashionable claim by presenting the case best known to me, the transitions
- or transformations, if you wish - in Central Europe and the former Soviet
Union (FSU). Let us take Estonia as our example for Central Europe and
Russia for the FSU.
It was assumed from the very beginning that the transitional recession
caused by systemic change and the accompanying policy stances would lead
to a larger output loss in the FSU than elsewhere. Russia stood to benefit from
several aspects of the trade shift, but this would be outweighed by the
difficulties caused by its greater remoteness from a market economy. But the
comparison was usually in terms of Russia vs Poland. If we look at Russia vs
Estonia, the relative advantage of the initial conditions of the smaller country
becomes much less obvious. One can even argue that in many, perhaps most,
respects Estonia had worse initial conditions than Russia. It benefited from
a living memory of independence, (partial) democracy and a market
economy. Estonia could also capitalise on the geographical and cultural
proximity of the Nordic countries. But otherwise the country had a deep
linguistic cleavage, no economically valuable natural resources, the need to
establish all national institutions from scratch, a weak industrial base and the
necessity of a swift turnabout in external economic relations.
Estonia's tradition of holding a national singing festival could perhaps be
seen as one instance of developed social capital, but the existence of national
traditions did not prevent the inter-war Estonia from lapsing through
disorganised politics into authoritarian rule. The country also relinquished
sovereignty with almost no resistance in 1939-1940. The politicians who sung
together at the time of the Singing Revolution in 1988-1991 have not avoided
being ferociously picked-off since then. There are no studies showing that
Estonia has had exceptionally good social capital.
Nevertheless, the country has emerged - together with Poland and Latvia
- among the fastest growing transition economies. Less than ten years after
regaining independence, it seems that Estonia might well accede to the
European Union in the first wave of Eastern Enlargement. The explanation
for this does not need to involve social capital.
The transition from the Soviet to the European model has been a top-down
process. This is true everywhere. What differentiates success from failure is
whether the state - the political organisation of the society - has been able
and willing to create the appropriate framework for private activities. This is
true in countries like Poland and Estonia, but not in Russia. Why?
One explanation favoured especially by liberally-minded economists
relates to the weakness of the state. A weak state fails to establish a level
playing field; it is unable to set consistent and relevant goals and does not
have the necessary resources to achieve whatever goals it may have set. The
consequences are a familiar litany: rent-seeking, widespread corruption, a
money-grabbing government, and huge gulfs between goals and resources,
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all of which lead - inter alia - to arrears, a virtual economy and finally to
domestic and foreign defaults. In the case of Russia, about which feelings
tend to be polarised, the prevailing discussion now is whether a continued
muddling through is possible or whether the country will join the sorry ranks
of failed states - possibly with dramatic consequences.
But how is a weak state to be explained? Surely some theoretical
construction linking the state with the prevailing social capital can be
imagined, but resolving such a tangled web would amount to mastering
possibly the most difficult of all social study questions, the relation between
the state and society. Fortunately, such heroic endeavours are unnecessary,
because looking at the state in a historical perspective is enough.
The Estonians (and similarly the other Central Europeans) had two things
the Russians were devoid of. First, they had a relatively well-defined goal.
In the early 1990s, the essence of the transition throughout Central Europe
was defined as a return to Europe, In practice, this meant gaining membership
as fast as possible to the EU, NATO, OECD and the rest of the 'alphabet soup'.
These clubs set requirements for potential members that together amount to
a policy conditionality vastly more multi-faceted, binding and detailed than
anything that the international financial institutions require from their clients,
Russia included. This conditionality requires consistent and credible state
policies that create and foster a reasonably appropriate framework for private
activities. Although Estonia now has the eighth government since
independence, the frequent political changes have had almost no impact on
the policies pursued.
This does not imply that being a normal European state is the Panglossian
state of affairs. But it does mean a crucial degree of consistency, predictability
and credibility - the attributes that state policies need, or so economic theory
tells us. Neither does it imply that being a full member of the alphabet soup
is necessarily the optimum. On the contrary, it seems evident that policy
conditionality is stronger in the pre-accession phase than after it: look at the
Greek case. Therefore, from an technocratic point of view, global welfare
would be maximised if candidates were kept as candidates as long as
possible without destroying the credibility of their membership aspiration.
But this is tricky to judge and probably politically impossible to implement
anyway: see Turkey and Bulgaria.
The implication in Russia's case is that a credible conditionality could not
have been created by promising Russia all these memberships provided it
fulfilled the normal criteria. For the underlying problem is deeper. Russia
itself could not set membership as its goal; it cannot return to Europe because
it never was a normal European country. That is at least what most Russians
have always been convinced of. The essence of being Russian is being
uncertain about what that actually means. Russian literature and social
thought are infused with the question of what Russia is: where does it come
from and where is it going? The answer - always - is a paraphrase of this
eternal question. And - this is the crucial thing - if you do not know where
you want to go, any road will take you there; if this is not an old Russian
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saying, it could be. Any road will do - is this not an apt description of Russian
policies during the last fifteen years?
Because the state did not know its destination, it was weak. This is the
forward-looking perspective of the historical explanation for the contrast
between Russia and Estonia. The second is a backward-looking aspect. For
Estonians, a handy explanation was available for all that was imperfect,
wrong or bad in their society: the Soviet army had imposed socialism upon
them. This was something totally alien, a consequence solely of the
occupation. It was therefore easy for Estonians to make a clear mental cut
with history (though many consequences naturally remained, not least of all
the non-Estonian speaking residents). This was not possible for the Russians.
They had themselves developed, implemented, defended and supported
Soviet socialism. Indeed, the USSR could be seen as Russia's proudest ever
achievement. Therefore, no clear-cut break with history was possible in any
respect. And it shows.
This is a simple historical explanation, and well in line with all available
empirical evidence. Although the concept of social capital, and sociology in
general, are not needed here, they are likely to become clearly more relevant
when more of the sound and fury of history had abated and the more subtle
differences between societies begin to emerge. Even then some of the
questions to be posed and answers found might not be the ones we expect.
It is sometimes taken for granted, for instance, that Russia is exceptionally
short of trust among people, which is one of the central aspects of social
capital. But on reflection, a cash-based economy is probably among all
exchange economies the one that needs the least trust. Only trust in the value
of money, that is in the state, is needed. In a money transfer-based exchange
economy, trust in the banking system is also needed. The post-Soviet type
of economy, on the other hand, is a re-demonetised exchange economy
where barter dominates. The usual form of barter is not the relatively straight-
forward even if inefficient bilateral kind. More common are multi-lateral
barter chains, often complex in nature, that would seem to demand a higher
degree of trust among participants than a money economy. The failures of
the state to pursue efficiency-oriented policies created this barter-based
economy, and thus the state could not be trusted. This 'trust vacuum'
demanded the existence or creation of trust among enterprises, many of
whom may have had no prior knowledge of one another. Could Russia
actually become a high trust economy in reality?
Issues of social capital - i.e. the fundamental issues of social science - will
continue to occupy us for some time to come.
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Can Regional Economic
Growth be Explained
by Social Capital?
The Production Function:
an Empirical Experiment with
a Provincial Dataset Covering
the Period from 1970 to 1995
Aku Alanen - Lea Pelkonen
Background
Interest in the concept of social capital has grown tremendously in recent
years. The debate has strong theoretical overtones, leaning perhaps more
towards sociology and political science than economics.
Much of the empirical work to date has consisted of country comparisons
and analysis of single regions. In the United States one particularly important
line of work is represented by comparisons of ethnic groups. Following
publication of Putnam's seminal study on Italy one might have expected a
growing tide of interest in intra-country comparisons, but at least in European
regional studies this has not happened, except for Italy. As far as we can see
it is now up to empirical regional studies to provide something for the
theoretical debate to chew on: without this empirical input it is unlikely that
the theoretical debate will be able to make very much progress. (1)
Our own study is a strictly empirical piece of work in which we offer no
in-depth conceptual analysis. Social capital, to us, serves as an umbrella
concept that takes in a wide range of terminology. (2) In a somewhat crude
definition, we regard social capital as the 'effects of civic contacts, networks
and trust upon the economic production of a community'. From this vantage-
point our intention here is to try and identify indicators describing these
networks and relationships of trust and to establish whether they are related
in any way to the value of production. This analysis could, of course, be
conducted within a more traditional framework by looking simply at the
interaction between social and economic elements, but we feel that the
concept of social capital may well help to give a firmer structure to our
analysis.
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One of the key problems in the study of social capital has to do with research
methodology. Do we use different methods in cross-country studies and in
regional comparisons within the same country? In principle the indicators
may well be the same, yet even such basic concepts as trust may be
understood somewhat differently in these two research settings.
One of the reasons for the backwardness of comparative empirical
research lies no doubt in the lack of statistical data. To compile statistics on
matters such as norms and trust is in itself extremely difficult and demanding;
and to have to produce these statistics oneself, for one's own research
project, certainly does not make things any easier. Not everyone can enjoy
the same opportunity as Putnam and others to work on a series of
comparative studies over a 20-year period.
Most of the empirical work in regional studies, we believe, has been
concerned with developing countries. This is explained by World Bank
interests and priorities: with most of its operations concentrating on the Third
World, this is also -where it will be doing most of its research into questions
of social capital. The Bank is perhaps the world's leading proponent of this
theme, which means that the agenda is also largely determined by its policy
line. In the present case, for instance, we have found only very few previous
studies in Europe which pursue the same line of inquiry as we do here. (3)
In a European context, we feel, social capital needs to be treated differently
than it is in the Third World; this applies both to the weight it is given and
to its theoretical content. The exact subject of the study and the approaches
adopted will of course largely be determined by the statistical data available
to empirical research. For this reason our paper is essentially an experimental
effort; we want to establish whether the approach suggested makes sense in
the first place. In contrast to the situation with many other phenomena,
comparative analysis of social capital is in a sense more difficult in a regional
than a cross-country setting. Key concepts such as trust, norms and civil
society are fundamentally collective notions, and it is extremely difficult
statistically to isolate their effects to a certain province or municipality (4).
It may well be much harder to uncover differences in levels of trust between
regions than between countries.
Overall, the findings of our study suggest that during the 1970s, and
particularly in the first half of the decade, the indicators we used for the level
of municipal investment in increasing social capital do indeed correlate
statistically with economic production in the Finnish regions. In the 1980s,
this statistical link is clearly less strong. However, if we look at the whole
period under review from 1970 to 1990, there is certainly a detectable and
consistent statistical association between social factors and regional growth.
Crime and other behavioural indicators also showed statistically significant
associations with economic growth, but it is not easy to interpret the meaning
of this. Electoral turnout was not found to have any statistical association with
regional economic growth. By contrast, participation in leisure organisations
showed statistical correlation with economic growth during the 1980s, whereas
participation in interest organisations and religious movements did not.
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By and large our results are consistent with the findings of studies that have
used materials from different countries to compare the prevailing climate of
trust (e.g. Hjerppe 1998).
Neoclassical model of the economy
There are at least two basic ways to measure the impacts of social capital on
economic performance. The first is to start out from the mainstream growth
models of traditional economics and to insert in them indicators of social
capital. The second option is to leave these growth models aside and to rely
instead on correlations and regressions; this method has been employed,
among others, by Knack and Keefer (1997) in an important empirical study
comparing the economic payoffs of social capital in different countries.
However, unlike the growth models, this latter approach does not allow for
dynamic comparisons over time.
Solow's neoclassical growth model has served as a standard for the
empirical testing of growth theories ever since the 1950s. Over the years this
basic model has been augmented by including of different variables
depending on the perspective adopted in each case.
The basic model is a Cobb-Douglas production function Y = f (A, K, L),
where society's production Y is usually measured as GDP, A is a technical
parameter, L is labour force input and K is physical capital. GDP simply
measures the value of production, i.e. goods and services.
Elaborations of GDP and the growth model
A number of indicators have been developed in recent years to complement
national income accounting and GDP. Most typically, these indicators
describe different kinds of social variables; in this sense they might be
assumed to generate growing interest in issues of social capital. (5)
One of the tools which may be expected to assume an important role in
assessing and explaining the economic impacts of social capital is the
statistical system known as SAM (Social Accounting Matrix). SAM has been
quite widely adopted for purposes of social accounting and looks set to gain
increasing significance in the work of statistical agencies.
One possible option is to develop satellite accounts for GDP without an
umbrella system, and then later to try and establish a link between these
satellite accounts. Development efforts in this area have concentrated on
household accounting systems and on green accounting. As yet, no satellite
accounts have been developed for the measurement of social capital, or at
least there are no such accounts in widespread use.
If we want to measure economic output not in terms of production growth
but, say, welfare growth, then we will need to find some other measure to
replace GDP. One of these new measures of welfare is the Genuine Progress
Indicator, or GPL (6) Recent applications have shown that while GDP has
increased in the United States since the 1970s, the value of GPI has fallen
(Cobb, Halstead and Rowe 1995), i.e. the output measure of welfare or
quality of life has declined. However, these new substitutes for GDP have
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been heavily criticised on both theoretical and empirical grounds (e.g.
Neumayer 1999). We have little information on these new applications in
other countries, especially for individual regions (except maybe in Canada).
Indeed, so far in the European context GPI is merely an example of one
possible direction that might be pursued. If GPI served as an indicator of
economic welfare output or Y in a growth model, this would be written in
the following form:
Y = f (A, (GDP), K, L etc.).
However, we have no intention in this paper to use GPI or any other
modifications of GDP for measuring economic performance; our calculations
are based on the traditional method in which production is measured in terms
of GDP. We realise that in order to explain the growth of welfare through
social capital we would need to have an indicator like GPI, but then our
explanations would necessarily be extremely complex if we had the same
items on both sides of the equation. However, in future it could be even more
interesting to study the impact of social capital on welfare than on
production.
Endogenous growth theory
In neoclassical growth models growth was explained by an increase in the
number of production factors and by technological development. The latter
was exogenously given. In the new endogenous growth model, technological
development is determined from within the economic region. The focal
concern in the new growth theory models has been with the role of human
capital or education.
One of the basic tenets of neoclassical growth theory is that if a certain
growth factor in the production function is increased, it will at some stage
lead to increasing or diminishing returns to scale. An increase in returns
depends on a wide range of factors in the baseline situation and on how
balanced is the increase of each input, etc. The new endogenous growth
model does not have the assumption of diminishing returns with increased
inputs, but an increase in education or in human capital is considered an
external effect operating within the economy (or region) which offsets the
diminishing returns to scale. This is based on the tenet that education is an
asset that does not diminish when used or transferred, but rather creates new
activity. Continuous overeducation, on the other hand, would not have any
effect on returns. This issue has been at the centre of much debate, but this
is not the place to dwell upon the various assumptions and results that have
been presented (e.g. Lucas 1988; Romer 1986, 1990).
Analysis based on an endogenous growth model
Endogenous growth theory thus has it that a region can, through its own
actions, shape and influence the conditions for economic growth and growth
Aku Alanen - Lea Pelkonen 55
itself, and that these actions can be measured. This new theory of growth
provides the basis for our analysis of social factors. More specifically, the
model we use is the Mankiw-Romer-Weil growth model, which is perhaps
the most widely used economic growth model, at least in regional analyses
of educational level.
This growth model is again a Cobb-Douglas type model in which H refers
to educational level and t to time span.
Y = K(t)a H(t)!3 [A(t)
The endogenous growth model is most typically used for measuring the
impacts of educational level on economic growth. Our idea in this paper can
also be traced back to an empirical experiment in which the aim was to
assess, at the provincial level, the impacts of educational level on economic
growth in eight industries during 1970-1995 (Pelkonen and Ylonen 1998) (7).
We started out with the assumption that social capital is a public commodity
in the same way as education, the only difference being that social capital
is a collective, and education a private public commodity.
Our baseline assumption was that certain social factors could behave in the
model in the same way as human capital. Increased trust will also have
positive external effects. If trust is increased beyond a critical point, however,
it may lead to diminishing returns. (8) In the theoretical debate on social
capital the problem of excessive trust is usually associated with strong bonds
among people. If trust is confined to family members and to the immediate
circle, this may have an inverse relationship to economic growth, because
misplaced trust prevents or undermines trust in society at large (e.g. Putnam
1993; Knack and Keefer 1997). Likewise, if people participate in different
kinds of civic organisations during their leisure time, this will, up to a certain
point, increase their skills of networking and interaction and thereby increase
production. However, if people spend all their energies on civic action, for
instance during periods of intense political activity, this may result in
diminishing returns. In other words the same rule holds good for the amount
of social capital as applies to other types of capital: ideally there should not
be too much of it nor too little.
We maintain then that the idea of endogenous growth could well be
expanded to the domain of social capital, at least at the theoretical plane. It
is not immediately clear whether this can be applied to all types of indicators,
because it is much harder to measure social capital than it is to measure
human capital.
We have seen no previous efforts to augment a growth model in this way,
but can see no reason why it cannot be done. Following the inclusion of
social factors, the basic version of our model is written as follows:
Y = K(t)a H(t)P S(t)Y [Aft)
where S refers to different indicators of social capital. Our regression analyses
are aimed at establishing the effects of changes in S on Y.
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Can Putnam's Italian experiment serve as a model for Finland?
In principle we have the same goals and intentions as Putnam and his
collegues, but in practice we do virtually everything differently. Putnam was
interested in the impacts of Italian civil society and the reform of regional
administration on economic development. We have excluded from our
analysis the political role of institutions and civil society, a key concern of
Putnam, who set out to establish the effects of institutions on regional
development and on differences in that development. There are two sets of
reasons for this omission: first of all the decision had to do with the choice
of regional classification employed in our study, and secondly the inclusion
of this aspect would have made our experiment far too extensive.
For reasons of research economy, we assume, Putnam chose to focus on
a couple of regions in both southern and northern Italy, although the number
of regions did vary at different stages of the study. Putnam's primary source
consisted of interview data; statistical materials, which sometimes encompassed
all regions in the country, served a complementary role - at least this is the
impression one gets from the book. Putnam was chiefly interested in
studying the operation and reform of institutions. The concept of social
capital, it seems to us, was largely a by-product of his analysis - an outcome
rather than an original objective.
In our method, by contrast, interview data had little more than a marginal
role, quite simply because no suitable material was available for our
purposes. (9) It is unfortunate that in his later studies in the US, Putnam has
not (to the best of our knowledge) compared social capital at the regional
level.
While the experiences gained with the Italian material are no doubt valid
and applicable in that particular context, we do have serious reservations
about importing them to such a country as Finland. Italy is a land of sharp
contrasts and divisions, whereas Finland and the other Nordic countries on
most indicators show only minor regional differences (e.g. regional differences
in per capita GDP are among the smallest in the whole of Europe
(Kangasharju 1999)). There are also strong traditions of state dependence in
the Nordic countries, which is clearly reflected in research as well. In spite
of their cultural differences, there is a consistent pattern of the social state
exerting strong influence in all domains of society. Further, although people
in Finland are certainly no less keen on sports than the Italians, the role of
sports organisations is perhaps less important.
If we were to apply Putnam's method to a similar study in Finland, we
would need to select perhaps a couple of regions (municipalities or districts)
from eastern, northern, central and southern Finland, as well as from the west
coast, and then do separate interview studies in these regions, perhaps
focusing on the municipal level. This, however, would exclude the use of
GDP and other similar indicators for the measurement of economic production.
Besides, this kind of design requires very detailed and extensive knowledge
of the target regions at the recruitment stage. We opted for a different strategy
and included all regions in our analysis.
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Problems related to the selection and use of statistical data
Why use provinces instead of a more endogenous mix of regions?
For the purposes of our analysis we chose to use the old division of state
administration into 12 provinces. This was based primarily on pragmatic
considerations. First of all this is the only classification for which data are
available on GDP and investments prior to 1988; even then we had to content
ourselves with five-year intervals because regional accounts have only been
compiled every five years. This choice had important implications with
respect to the focus of our study because it meant we had to omit from
consideration all the institutional material. It is precisely through an
institutional analysis that we might have been able to tie up the theory and
practice of social capital with one branch of mainstream economics, i.e. that
of institutional economics.
It is also important to note that a province is not an economic region in the
conventional sense of the term. It is not an organisation based on intra-
regional cooperation, but a definition imposed from the outside by state
administration and in that sense unsuited to testing an endogenous model.
This is why our study was essentially an experimental piece of work in which
a chief concern was to search for indicators of social capital.
If we had contented ourselves with the old division into four major areas, that
would have given us access to a longer time series of interview materials,
particularly on time use and leisure activities. However, this division is far too
heterogenous for the purposes of this kind of regional study, leaving internal
differences undetected. Besides, as far as we can establish, these four regions are
not nearly as clear-cut constructs as the regions in Italy. One option, of course,
would have been to divide Finland into two or three regions and test this idea.
Indeed, it is our intention to follow up this research with a regional division
that better corresponds to the idea of both economic and endogenous
regions; possible candidates include the new units of regional administration
('maakunta' or region), or districts (NUTS 3 or 4 level). The municipality
would be an ideal unit as far as the requirement of endogeneity is concerned,
but not from the economic point of view.
Why the time period 1970-1995?
We chose to focus on the period 1970-1995 for purely pragmatic reasons; this
is the only period for which comparative data are available. Regional GDP
data are available for I960, but the integration of these statistics with other
sources proved too difficult and they were therefore excluded from the
comparison. Appendix 1 describes in closer detail the process of compiling
GDP, investment, labour force and educational indicators arid the problems
involved.
Selection criteria for indicators of social capital
To comply with the idea of endogenous growth theory our indicators of
social capital should be derived from the regional level, reflecting the impacts
of regional actors on local development. Indicators derived from the level of
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the state or from a major corporation are unlikely to shed any light on means
and endeavours at the regional level. In practice, of course, it is extremely
difficult to make this distinction between regional activities and activities
undertaken by the state or a major corporation within that same area. In
Finland, for instance, investment programmes by local municipalities to
increase social capital are often funded by state subsidies.
We chose to look at three basic types of indicators, initially searching for
examples from each category and then making the final choice not on the
basis of suitability but availability. It was surprisingly difficult to find suitable
indicators, particularly in the second and third categories: as well as having
to meet the requirements of the time series and regional representativeness,
they also had to fit in with the existing data on economic production.
First of all we tried to find indicators describing social behaviour, either
negative (e.g. suicides) or positive (e.g. participation in voluntary
organisations). A major difficulty with this set of indicators is that there is no
way of knowing whether they genuinely describe social factors or possibly
some other kinds.
In the second category our concern was with the question of how much
the regional society has been willing to invest in the promotion of social
behaviour. Here the indicators describe the volume or value of input,
measured on the basis of certain expense items in local authorities' financial
statements. An input-output analysis might seem a tempting option, but in
reality there are so many mediating factors that this is hardly feasible. For
instance, the most affluent regions will probably have had more resources
to invest in the promotion of social capital to start with, which will be
reflected in the results even though the initial investment was made before
the measurements.
The third category of indicators consists of opinion polls, which typically
have been used in country comparisons to describe, for instance, the
confidence shown by citizens in their own country; this, as far as we can
judge, is the primary method that Putnam used. In Finland there are a number
of institutions which regularly conduct interview surveys that as such would
be well-suited to the measurement of social capital. However, the problem
is that these interview materials are not comparable over time or across
different regions. We do not know of any series of interview surveys in which
social capital (trust etc.) would have been measured from the 1970s onwards
by using even roughly the same items with regionally representative samples.
One might, of course, consider the option of conducting an interview survey
in, say, five districts, in which case we would not need a very large sample.
If it were possible to establish that these five districts were typical of a larger
region, then this might indeed be a sufficient number; however this would
be extremely difficult to do and the analysis itself would need to be based
on a crude regional classification (such as the division described earlier into
four major regions).
There are some interview materials that might lend themselves to this kind
of analysis, but so far this is not possible.
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Regression results
Behaviour indicators
We looked at a very large number of behaviour indicators and decided
eventually in favour of two that describe positive trust and two that describe
negative trust. The choice 'was based not only on considerations of content
and applicability, but also on the availability of data.
Electoral turnout
We selected three sets of indicators to measure political trust, i.e. those
describing electoral turnout, membership numbers and participation. In
addition, we had data from interview surveys. The choice of electoral turnout
is based on it being the only measure for which comparative data are
available. Turnout for municipal elections was measured because it was
assumed that this provides a more accurate reflection of trust at the local
level. We concede that electoral turnout, in itself, is not a very significant
measure, but it is nonetheless the only one available. The biggest political
parties and Gallup Finland have conducted regular questionnaires since 1973
to measure various aspects of political trust. Party-political trust is obviously
not the same thing as trust in society, but at least so far no other time series
are available at the provincial level.
The use of electoral turnout as a measure of trust involved a number of
problems. Turnout rates have been steadily declining for a long time, but it
is extremely difficult to explain and understand the reasons behind this trend.
It is not necessarily an indication of growing distrust in society at large, but
people may for instance feel that they have better and more meaningful ways
of making their voice heard than through political parties. Indeed, it could
be argued that a declining turnout rate in an area indicates a positive search
for new channels of influence, i.e. an increasing sense of trust. However, our
more traditional null hypothesis was that a decline in electoral turnout
reflects a decline in trust.
Results: Electoral turnout seemed to show a negative trend in relation to
economic growth in the 1970s, but from then on a positive trend. Statistically
significant associations were noted for 1970-75 and 1975-80 only. On this
basis we can draw no firm conclusions about electoral turnout as an indicator
of social capital and social trust.
Suicides
We opted to include suicides as one of our indicators in spite of their inherent
social ambivalence. We regard suicide as a negative manifestation of social
trust. The literature generally shares the same premise, arguing that integration
with the social environment is associated with a low level of suicide mortality.
The reasons may well lie elsewhere, but suicide research has tended largely
to concentrate purely on social issues. For instance, Durkheim (1985) in his
classic work associated the increase in suicides with economic changes and
crises. For him, income level or production level 'was not the most significant
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factor; in fact high-income regions very often tended to have higher suicide
rates.
In Finland there have long been very marked regional differences in
suicide mortality. Research at the municipal level has shown that regions
undergoing dramatic social and economic changes have also tended to
report an increased number of suicides (Lonnqvist and Salovainio 1989,114).
Our statistical measure of suicides was the number of suicides committed
by males aged ten or over by province (i.e. the ratio of committed suicides
to the population in question) at five-year intervals.
Results: It seems that during the 1970s suicides showed a negative
relationship to economic growth, but since the 1980s the association has
been positive. Statistically significant associations were found for 1970-75
and 1990-95. The number of statistically significant observations increased
when GDP growth was calculated per capita, but the coefficients of
determination declined to some extent compared to calculations of GDP per
employed person.
Participation in associations
One of the key explanations for the success of northern Italy in Putnam's
analysis was the large number of clubs (many associated with football).
Putnam argues that the sense of trust people build up in these clubs (i.e. not
the traditional strong bonds of trust among family members) may also be
conducive to an increased sense of trust in other domains of society and the
economy. More recently in his studies on the United States Putnam has
observed a decline in citizen participation in various organisations. He
maintains that social capital has declined and that this has affected
developments in general (Putnam 1995).
Many of Putnam's ideas have met with a favourable reception among
researchers concerned with questions of social capital, but his contentions
with regard to participation in civic organisations have still not been
corroborated by concrete research (e.g. Inglehart 1997, 227). It is indeed
quite possible that Putnam's findings are peculiar to the Italian case or the
regional comparisons he made in Italy. Knack and Keefer (1997) have carried
out country comparisons to study the impacts of participation in organisations
on trust and on GDP growth. In these studies they make a distinction
between leisure organisations, interest organisations and religious
organisations. The results from different studies are not fully consistent but
they reveal no evidence of any links between increased participation in
organisations and increased trust. Some of the positive effects of participation
in organisations may be offset by negative influences. The use of such
participation as an indicator of social capital has also been sharply criticised
in the debate on regional development in Russia. Critics have pointed out
that, for instance, climate can play a far more important role in explaining
the number of organisations than any other factor (Harter 1997).
In a more in-depth analysis of participation in organisations, the concept
of social capital may also be criticised for omitting to deal with conflicts
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classes and politics. In its neutrality it can also be regarded as a theory that
supports the ideology of the dominant groups in society, in that it implicitly
emphasises trust and confidence in the prevailing circumstances. On the
other hand, the effects of social trust can also be weighed in the context of
campaigns aimed at social change. Likewise, the critical stance taken by the
theory of social capital to fraternal networks seems to imply that in order to
work properly, the theory requires genuine democracy and in this sense it
can be taken to serve as a political emblem.
In Finland there has been very little research to study the connections
between participation in organisations and economic development; even the
seminal thesis by Martti Siisiainen focuses more on the theoretical and
political side of organisations. There is also very limited empirical evidence
on the regional variation of participation in organisations. (10)
In our analyses then we have had to content ourselves with the data and
results from the 1981 and 1991 leisure surveys and from time-use studies.
Reasonably similar data would have been available from the 1970s on the
membership of organisations and on time use, but these were based on a
crude regional division.
Results: Statistically significant positive values were obtained for the
association of total participation in organisations, membership of sports
organisations and membership of cultural and leisure organisations with
GDP growth during 1980-1985. By contrast, membership of religious
organisations, trade unions or political parties failed to show any statistically
significant correlation with economic returns. Overall, then, the results
suggest that membership in a special interest group has less economic impact
than participation in leisure activities.
We also calculated regressions from the time-use studies (which measured
the amount of time people spent in organisations) relative to economic growth.
These calculations produced no statistically significant results. Since the time-
use surveys did not distinguish between different types of organisations, we
were also unable to establish whether there is any difference between the
impacts of participation in different types of organisations.
Crime
The regional crime rate was taken as an indicator of social distrust. We made
a distinction between three types of crime: property offences, traffic
violations and all crimes. Our statistical measure was the number of crimes
reported to the police relative to the region's population.
Criminal offenders may show high levels of trust towards other criminals,
and mistrust towards the rest of society. A criminal offence directed at law-
abiding individuals will adversely affect the sense of trust experienced by the
majority of the population. Our null hypothesis was that the lower the level
of crime, the greater the volume of social capital, i.e. the greater the trust in
the region. This conflicts with the fact that economic growth often seems to
push up crime rates as well, but we obviously had to choose some null
hypothesis.
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In the light of the research evidence available it seems that crime rates do tie
in with trends in economic development (Siren 1984, 1997 ): economic
growth often accompanies increased crime rates. There is only limited
research in Finland on regional trends in crime rates. The indicator we used
in this analysis is the number of crimes reported to the police relative to the
population in the region.
Regional variation in crime may often be explained by hidden factors
within crime statistics. There is no doubt that regions differ to some extent
in terms of how readily crimes are reported to the police; but if these
differences are very great, this may completely defeat our analysis. However,
we have no evidence on the true extent of these differences. Analysis of the
breakdown of criminal offences by type could help to shed some light on the
issue. For instance, the share of economic crimes may be higher in some
regions, and attitudes towards economic crime or certain other types may be
more lenient. There is some evidence that court sentences for similar
offences may vary quite widely between eastern and western Finland, for
instance.
Results: Statistically highly significant values were obtained for the crime
variables, especially during the first three periods of 1970-75, 1975-80 and
1980-85. The trends would seem to vary somewhat according to the economic
trends, i.e. during periods of growth they were positive and during periods of
economic decline negative. The interpretation suggested by these figures is
that the role of social capital is highlighted during periods of decline.
Input indicators
The choice of input indicators closely reflects the discussion of how and to
what extent a society can increase or grow social capital, or whether it is even
possible intentionally in general. We know so little about the real effects of
different social inputs on social capital. In principle we accept the idea that
intentional growth is possible.
Our input indicators consist of certain expense items from local municipal
budgets, summed at provincial level. Investment expenditure by municipalities
would provide a better measure, but no disaggregated investment statistics
are available from municipal balance sheets prior to the 1990s. Besides, our
assumption was that the social preferences of local authorities should at least
to some extent be reflected in their operational economies, i.e. if the
municipalities in a province invest in social capital, then this should be
reflected in the region's overall economy. We did not want to be discouraged
by the fact that municipal balance sheet statistics are notorious for being open
to different interpretations, particularly on account of the long time series.
One major problem of interpretation derives from the summing-up at
provincial level: some municipalities emphasise the factor of social capital
and others do not, which means that the result at provincial level will tally
with neither. The province is not normally the most important target for
municipal identification, although there are again regional differences in this
respect.
Aku Alanen - Lea Pelkonen 63
We chose the following expense items as our indicators of social capital:
expenditure on sports and outdoor recreation, expenditure on public
libraries, expenditure on parks and other similar areas, and expenditure on
adult education centres and workers' institutes. Provincial per capita indices
were calculated for five-year periods in 1970-95. Regression analyses yielded
positive and statistically significant results for all these indices in the 1970s.
The economic recession meant that the results for 1990-95 were partly
irrelevant, and therefore ignored. Statistical significance disappeared by the
1980s. However, total growth regression for 1970-1990 also showed statistically
significant results on all the variables mentioned.
One possible interpretation for these findings is to suggest that municipal
economies in Finland showed a tendency towards convergence in 1970-80
and after 1985, perhaps because of the state subsidy system or for some other
reason. In the long term, however, municipal investment in social capital in
1970-90 appears to have shown a positive correlation with economic growth.
To test these findings we inserted some other expense items (expenditure
on education and on health care services) from municipal budgets into the
model and conducted regression analyses. For these items no statistically
significant results were obtained for any of the periods under review.
Conclusions
Our aim in this study was to search for indicators describing social life and
to establish with a growth model whether these indicators were associated
with per capita (and per employed person) fixed-price GDP growth at the
provincial level in 1970-95.
In the 1970s especially during the first half of the decade, it would seem
that social capital did correlate statistically with economic production,
whereas in the 1980s the statistical link seemed to disappear. The onset of
the deep economic recession of the early 1990s meant we were unable to
conduct a proper statistical analysis for the 1990s because there was no
growth in fixed-price GDP, particularly with respect to the per capita figures.
Therefore, the comparisons for most indicators were restricted to the period
of consistent growth from 1970 to 1990. Indeed, during this period
statistically significant figures were obtained for quite a few indicators, so
much so that it can be tentatively concluded that social capital to some extent
statistically explains economic growth. Whether there is a connection in
reality is, of course, much harder to establish.
One possible interpretation is that during periods of slow economic
growth the role of social capital is highlighted in Finnish regional development
(and can be detected in statistical sources), whereas during periods of
economic revival indicators of social capital no longer explain regional
growth. This, of course, is a phenomenon we have learned about in other
contexts: once the importance of something has exceeded a certain
quantitative or qualitative threshold it is impossible to distinguish its
individual influence, since it is merged with other factors. This may also go
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some way towards explaining why studies of social capital have largely
concentrated on developing countries. On the other hand this may also be
an overinterpretation because we did not study the link between social
capital and economic growth at the country level.
In a self-critical interpretation it might also be suggested that our statistics
are having difficulty in keeping up with the pace of change as regards social
phenomena and different kinds of networks. We simply do not know how
to produce statistics that adequately describe advanced, modern society
during periods of growth and prosperity. We know that there are certain
phenomena and relations of interaction that remain hidden, but we do not
known how to uncover them. (11)
To obtain two sets of figures that would allow us to check our findings, we
used our model to compute regional GDP growth for both the employed
population and per capita; no such comparison would of course be possible
if we looked simply at the volume of GDP because of differences in the size
of different regions. Per capita growth tended to show slightly more
statistically significant results. Was this attributable to migration; did something
else perhaps happen in Finnish society; or does the explanation lie in the
statistics, or perhaps in regional convergence?
One possible explanation is that our measurements were taken at five-year
intervals throughout; therefore, if the trends had shifted in the interim, this
may have given rise to bias. However, since this is a first experiment with this
kind of research method, we must exercise special caution in drawing our
conclusions.
It is commonly assumed that human capital is an individual property and
social capital a collective one. Now, if trust is collective, there may still be
groups of people in society who do not share this feeling; certain minorities,
for instance, may well be excluded from some areas of social life. However,
if minorities such as poor people or those with a low level of education are
more or less evenly scattered across the country, then the lack of social capital
should also be equally distributed, and thus there is no way of uncovering
the shortage. The result in itself is nonetheless quite interesting in that the
shortage in this case exhibits no regional dimension.
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Notes
1. Social capital as a black box
Critics have attacked the concept of social capital as too broad and sweeping, purporting
to explain everything but in the end not really explaining anything. It has been likened
to a dummy variable or a black box whose contents remain a mystery. The only way
to respond to this kind of criticism is through sound empirical work
2. Theory versus practice
A loose umbrella concept, we feel, allows for a wider range of experimental empirical
research. If we wanted to categorise or compare our work with other lines of research
on social capital, it is perhaps most conveniently slotted under the second, pragmatic
category in Woolcock's three-tiered classification in this book.
This, very briefly and roughly, is how Woolcock divides social capital research into
three perspectives: 1. the communitarian view (all trust is good); 2. the pragmatic (or
Putnamian) network view, according to which trust may have both positive and negative
effects; and 3. the institutional view, in which institutional factors are associated with
social factors.
We are somewhat dubious about drawing a direct link between theory and practice
in the context of social capital. As far as we can tell the theoretical debate on social capital
has only just begun to unfold and gather momentum. The question that now needs to
be asked is whether this theoretical debate should be waged separately at different
regional levels and in country comparisons; we also need to address the question of how
small regional units should be treated in analyses. Moreover, there will no doubt be
considerable differences between analyses of developing countries and advanced
industrial countries. Likewise, different theoretical apparatus will be needed at different
regional levels.
3. The situation in neighbouring countries
It may be easier to do empirical regional research of social capital in a country like Italy
where regional differences are big. The real test of Putman's ideas comes in countries
with minor regional differences, and in this context the Nordic countries are a nightmare
for the regional scientist.
In Finland Putnam's book did not arouse special interest among regional scientists at
the time of publication. Interest in his ideas is a recent development.
Swedish scholars working in regional studies were very impressed by Putnam's book.
He was invited on a few occasions to deliver lectures in Sweden, his book was translated
into Swedish (Putnam 1996), and in general his ideas have enjoyed much wider currency
in Sweden than in Finland. Moreover, Putnam's colleague Leonard! is still on the
research board at the Swedish Institute for Regional Research. The Putnam boom
probably has to do with the fact that traditional hard indicators used to enjoy a clear
position of dominance in Sweden, and Putnam paved the way for a revolution in softer
methods.
Against this background it is unfortunate that no-one in Sweden has published any
regional research comparable to our experiment. Economic researchers in Sweden have
also been less keen to adopt Putnam's ideas or terms, despite a strong tradition there
of similar work in social economics (e.g. work on the impacts of equal incomes
distribution on GDP growth, etc.).
As far as Russian regions are concerned a distinction needs to be made between the
debate waged among Western scholars and that among Russian colleagues. Russian
regions constitute a very promising object of study for social capital research because
of their clear cultural differences. On the other hand, the interest there has been confined
to political scientists. Nonetheless, Putnam's book has also been translated into Russian
(Harter 1997, Petro 1998, 1999, Lewin 1996).
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In Finland research into social capital (using this concept) has so far been conducted
exclusively at the national level, even though the project's main proponent in the
country Qouko Kajanoja) has a background in regional studies. Also, the only empirical
study so far (Hjerppe 1998) compares different countries. So why then has the empirical
regional aspect of social capital received so little attention in Finland and in the other
Nordic countries? We are not able to answer this question now at the present time. (It
should be pointed out though that in Finland quite a lot of work has been done at the
municipal level in Putnam's footsteps; the only difference is that these efforts have not
been linked up with indicators of the total economy).
So is the act we are trying to follow quite simply beyond our capabilities; or is the lack
of empirical work due to problems with the construction of adequate empirical
indicators, i.e. to the absence in this effort of statistical professionals?
4. Migration
One of the biggest problems in the measurement of regional as opposed to country
variation in social capital is presented by migration. Migration changes the social
cohesion of both the source and the target region and at the same time affects their social
capital. There is no way of telling in advance if and when migration will increase or
reduce social cohesion and capital. The people moving out may be among the most
active strata in the source region, the hub of its social life. Those remaining may feel
depressed and apathetic if the migration away is of a permanent nature and if those
moving out are indeed the most active people. In the target area the new arrivals will
not necessarily continue in their active role, or they may pick up from where they left
off; much depends on how the energy of the people moving in is harnessed to their new
environment. In the worst case both the source and the target area will see a loss of social
capital. Putnam (1995, 236) says that migrants adapt to the new environment quite
rapidly, at least in Italy, and that in this sense social capital is not dependent on the
individual's personal characteristics. In the Finnish case we would be inclined to take
a somewhat more cautious position.
5. GDP calculation and social capital
If GDP is derived from incomes, it is calculated as the aggregate of wages, salaries,
profits, interests etc., allowing for the consumption of fixed capital or depreciation. The
present formula for calculating GDP is based on fixed capital alone and omits all other
forms of capital. Normally, of course, investment in material or immaterial fixed capital
is recorded in GDP or value added in the amount of depreciation. In contrast, investment
in education and social capital does not increase the value of production or GDP in the
present application (with the obvious exception of wages and salaries), but merely
represents intermediate consumption.
The more rapid the (physical or mental) consumption of capital, the greater will be
its impact on added value in different industries (and hence on GDP) in the present
method of calculating GDP. Education expenditure is directly reflected in value added
through wage expenses, but not as an investment expenditure. Its multiplicative effects
are not of course included in the calculation. Education is not consumed nor does it run
out, though it may of course become outdated and unproductive. It is very difficult to
measure its effects directly. The same applies to the effects of social capital, which are
impossible to isolate from GDP, but we can try to assess them using dependency
calculations with different indicators. On the other hand, even if we did have the data
we needed to calculate GPI, it would still be extremely difficult to measure the impacts
of an increase in social capital on the standard of living.
6. SAM and GPI
SAM does not provide an immediate solution to the measurement of social capital, but
it certainly marks an improvement on GDP in that it incorporates income distribution
as well as the education level of the workforce. SAM is an open system that allows for
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the incorporation of other variables as well. As far as growth research is concerned its
main problem is that it is a static equilibrium model and therefore suitable for short-term
analyses only. It is also extremely laborious to set up.
GPI starts out from the value of private consumption as specified in the national
accounts of each country. Values are then deducted and added each year for indicators
describing the state of the environment, changes in income distribution, household
production, leisure value, crime, etc.
7. Growth model applied by Pelkonen and Ylonen
Pelkonen and Ylonen applied the same growth model as us when they used three input
variables - labour force, investment and educational level - to explain the development
of output, i.e. fixed-price regional GDP at the provincial level in 1960-95 and at the
district level in 1988-95 in ten industries. So far they have published two reports. In some
industries regional level of education produced relatively high coefficients of determination.
As far as we can establish educational level is not necessarily bound to the amount of
social capital, whereas other forms of human capital probably are dependent on social
capital. We intend to look into this problem later on at a regional level.
8. Can there be too much or too little social capital?
There are at least three avenues through which social capital exerts its influence on
economic growth:
- If social trust increases, then both domestic and foreign investors will also show greater
confidence in the region's economic prospects.
- Increased trust will also facilitate innovation and information exchange at different
levels and in different networks, which in turn will strengthen the economy. (Asheim
1999)
- Trust serves to increase social cohesion; the mechanism works roughly like this: In a
football club or other such organisation people learn mutual trust and cooperation,
regardless of their social backgrounds. This may increase their trust in other people
and also in other communities and in this way reduce asocial behaviour. If people
have trust in different parts of society, they will also be prepared to work hard and
even to accept minor problems and shortcomings in society. All this may encourage
greater optimism in their labour input.
The effects of civil society, then, are reflected in different networks teaching people to
transfer their skills of cooperation to other spheres of life as well, e.g. to working life
(learning by doing).
However, there is good reason to ask whether there really is no feasible limit to
network cohesion. Perhaps a network should not be so close and tight that it leaves no
room for other contacts; surely in this case there is an excess of social capital at this level
and too little capital overall. This should be reflected in at least some indicators.
Other examples of excessive social capital are provided by strong and weak bonds,
which are also mentioned by Putnam. Strong bonds occur among family members, while
weak bonds are based on leisure interests, world-views, etc.; fraternal networks belong
in this same category of bonds, which add to the social capital of a certain circle but
reduce it at the level of society as a whole. There has been quite extensive research
internationally into the weakness vs. strength of classical ethnic relations. At a certain
level of activity it benefits people within the same family or with the same ethnic
background to keep in touch, but at a higher level of economic activity these social
bonds soon become a burden because they cannot be transcended.
Strong and weak bonds or ties are not the only terms employed in this context; in
Russian sources, for instance, one often sees the terms long bonds and short bonds
(Levin 1996).
In a work organisation the growth of trust may lead to the removal of a control-based
system and to the focus of attention turning to other aspects, the assumption being that
this will help to increase efficiency and production. If there is excessive growth of trust
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within a certain part of the network relative to the whole network, say in a highly
hierarchic work organisation, then the growth of social capital here will adversely affect
output.
The level of critical activity in civil society will also influence the amount of social
capital. On one hand this kind of activity may indicate mistrust towards other groups
of people or towards society as a whole; on the other hand it may signal a real sense
of confidence that society can withstand criticism and indeed needs it. If there is no real
drive to change society, this activity may be a sign of ostensible trust, i.e. the kind of
trust that prevents effective operation of the community. In interview surveys this may
give rise to false notions; the interviewee may indicate a sense of trust, yet in practice
take no part at all in developing society, i.e. show no trust at all.
Does political trust, then, differ from other social capital? After all, excessive activity
in a certain individual domain may adversely affect the overall result. For instance, if
people are obsessively involved in political activity, they may not have the energy to
do anything else. Moreover, a very narrow-minded political or religious orientation may
prevent those involved from exploring new dimensions or new links with other areas
of life, activity or work. In this sense the same applies to social capital as to any other
type of capital: it is easy to have too much or too little of it. The right amount has to be
determined separately for each case.
Overall, however, the concept of social capital does not lend itself very well to the
analysis of political ties; it fits in better with horizontal rather than vertical relations and
ties in politics. It does not provide a very convenient tool for the treatment of class
conflicts or indeed the structures of the state and society in general. This line of inquiry
needs an entirely different conceptual and theoretical toolbox.
9. Interview material
For the purposes of our study we reviewed some cross-sectional interview materials
containing relevant items on social trust, but were unable to test them with our model.
For instance, the latest Kuntasuomi 2004 survey includes a set of items on social
alienation. From this source we extracted some data on the provincial level. There
appear to be no major differences at the provincial level in degrees of alienation.
Alienation attitudes show no correlation with economic development, with the possible
exception of the lowest province on the economic ladder. For instance, in the province
of Central Finland alienation was at a lower level than anywhere else, which means that
social trust should be at its highest here. However, in terms of economic production this
region has not shown particularly impressive results. Alienation was highest in the
province of North Karelia, which has consistently ranked among the poorest economic
performers throughout the period under review (Pekola-Sjoblom 1998).
10. Organisational capital
The doctoral thesis by Siisiainen (1986) is a theoretical piece of work which very much
concentrates on the political aspect. According to Siisiainen the relationship between
citizens' organisations and the state is an exchange relation in which the former take over
part of the state's functions and lighten the load on the welfare state. In another context,
however, he uses the concept of organisational capital to describe the social meaning
of organisational activity (Siisiainen 1988). Organisational capital, Siisiainen says, can be
defined as consisting of 'those societal resources that are produced by the organisation
through its collective efforts, that are given to individual subjects by virtue of their
membership of the organisation, and that are based on the organisation's social
networks and relations of interaction that reproduce those networks.'
Siisiainen's concept comes quite close to that of social capital, although he derives it
from Bourdieu. The main difference is perhaps that the theory of social capital (if indeed
it is legitimate to speak of a theory) stresses the democratic experience of trust that
organisations give to their individual members, whereas Siisainen attaches more
importance to the role of organisations as social agents.
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Cultural capital, as defined by Bourdieu, is of course strictly tied to social class and in
a sense comparable to what education is to individuals: it is a public commodity
possessed by the individual. The theory of social capital, in contrast, denies or at least
ignores class and conflict theory, as well as politics. In this sense the theory of social
capital could even be described as naively adapting to the interests of whichever groups
happen to predominate in society at each moment in time.
Siisiainen has also done some work to explore the regional structure and development
of organisations in Finland. However, the data do not provide a sufficiently solid basis
for statistical comparison. In a Nordic comparison the number of organisations and
participation in them are at fairly modest levels in Finland, but compared to the rest of
Europe the figures are in fact quite high. It is also important to note that civic activity
increasingly takes place outside of official organisations. It is difficult to say whether this
has any implications with respect to social capital in comparison with other countries.
The database on all registered civic organisations in Finland could be used to measure,
for instance, the number per capita. However, it would not be possible on this basis to
isolate active organisations from non-active ones; we therefore decided not to use the
regional data from this database.
One difficulty in evaluating participation in organisations from the social capital
perspective relates to their internal democracy, activity and hierarchy. We tend to think
that the more hierarchic the organisation, the less social capital it will be able to offer.
Simply looking at the numerical data will not reveal whether organisations in certain
areas are active and possibly under authoritarian leadership. In the latter case it is
unlikely they will generate increased trust. A sports club, for instance, may be
authoritarian or democratic by internal nature. However, we have no evidence on these
issues and therefore have confined ourselves to numerical data. Putnam addresses this
same issue and insists that if southern Italian sports organisations are more hierarchic
by nature than in the north, then that merely lends further support to his results on social
capital that are based exclusively on numbers (Putnam 1993, 245).
11. Networks and company operations
Both network research and how social capital operates in companies are areas in which
we feel the concept of social capital has real development potential. Unfortunately, we
were unable to find a single indicator describing the operation of province-level
networks or company operations that we could have tested in our model. We therefore
had to exclude them from our discussion.
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Appendix 1. Statistical parameters
l.GDP
All GDP figures were converted into 1990 prices using the country GDP
price index. Regional GDP figures were initially drawn from the statistics
of old regional accounts. The figures for 1970 and 1980 were taken as such
and in deflated form, and the realignment of municipalities between
provinces has been taken into account at the 1990 level (i.e. using the 1990
municipality-level GDP share). The figures for 1975 were calculated as
extrapolations of the 1973 and 1976 regional accounts figures through
country-wide industry comparisons and municipality changes according
to the 1990 levels. The figures for 1985 were calculated as means of the
1984 and 1986 regional accounts statistics relative to industry development;
municipality changes were taken into account in the same way as in 1990.
The 1990 statistics were taken as such. The 1995 GDP figures were
calculated entirely on the basis of the municipal data.
2. The population and labour force data were derived from the population
and employment statistics.
3. Investment data were calculated for 1970-1985 using figures from the old
regional accounts, in the same way as for GDP. The data for 1990 and 1995
were calculated separately from unpublished investment files: Aku
Alanen, Seutukunnittaisetinvestoinnittoimialoittain 1988-1995. Unpublished
manuscript. Tilastokeskus 1998.
4. Education data were calculated from Statistics Finland's education database.
Two different classifications were used: 1) a sliding classification comprising
all levels, and 2) a three-tiered classification between lower, intermediate,
and higher education.
5. Crime figures were derived from Statistics Finland's annual crime statistics.
A distinction was made between property offences, traffic violations and
other criminal offences. The total figures were then divided by each
province's population.
6. Suicide figures were derived from Statistics Finland's cause-of-death
statistics. The indicator for suicides is the number of suicides committed
by males aged 10 or over relative to the corresponding total population.
7. The figures for participation in associations were derived from Statistics
Finland's leisure surveys and time use studies. For the level of major
regions the figures are published in: Vapaa-aika numeroina 4; Kulttuuri ja
viestinta: 6 / 1993 Tilastokeskus Ajankayttotutkimus 1987-1988.
8. Turnout figures for municipal elections were derived directly from the
Statistical Yearbook. The same source was used to link electoral districts
to provinces.
9. Data on expenditure in municipal operational economies were derived
from municipal economic statistics for 1970-1995. The sums were divided
by the population numbers for each province and indices formed on that
basis.
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Appendix 2. Regression results
(Figures in bold are significant at the 10 % level)
Behaviour indicators
Electoral turnout
Per capita
1970-1990 1970-1975 1975-1980 1975-1980
CONSTANT
GDP
ELECT72
ELECT76
R-Squared
CONSTANT
GDP
ELECT80
ELECT84
ELECT88
ELECT92
R-Squared
Per employed
CONSTANT
GDP
ELECT72
ELECT76
R-Squared
CONSTANT
GDP
ELECT80
ELECT84
ELECT88
ELECT92
R-Squared
Suicides
Per capita
.1793
-.0119
-.28E-3
.5316
1980-1985
-.2096
.0174
.57E-3
.1096
person
1970-1990
.3799
-.0306
.42E-4
.6813
1980-1985
-.8340
.0712
.19E-3
.4559
.4635
-.0270
-.0019
.6031
1985-1990
.1126
-.0058
-.18E-3
.0161
1970-1975
.7549
-.0534
-.0015
.5419
1985-1990
.9227
-.0752
.23E-3
.5115
.7107
-.0479
-.0021
.5182
1985-1990
.1718
-.0097
-.42E-3
.0499
1975-1980
.9224
-.0747
-.27E-3
.7477
1985-1990
1.002
-.0801
-.53E-4
.5050
1970-1990 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985
CONSTANT
GDP
SUICIDE
R-Squared
.1714 .4388
-.0133 -.0364
.0031 -.0394
.4184 .2661
.2409
-.0194
.0120
.1250
-.1763
.0166
.0405
.1833
.6122
-.0424
-.0015
.4261
1990-1995
-.0332
-.0013
.64E-3
.0792
1975-1980
.8859
-.0723
-.16E-3
.7394
1990-1995
.6404
-.0480
-.25E-3
.0408
1985-1990
-.1482
.0145
.0409
.2893
1990-1995
-.0535
-.0017
.99E-3
.1330
1990-1995
.5129
-.0423
.57E-3
.0554
1990-1995
.1392
-.0122
-.0054
.0385
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Per employed person
1970-1990 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995
CONSTANT
GDP
SUICIDE
R-Squared
3798
-.0304
.0030
.6816
.6952
-.0558
-.0562
.3430
.8637
-.0711
-.0077
.7416
-.8253
.0712
.0133
.4671
.7888
-.0634
.0198
.5425
.6909
-.0552
.0348
.1238
Association of total participation
1980-1985 1990-1995
CONSTANT
GDP
PARTICIPATION
R-Squared
-.2300
.0204
.0590
.2847
.1749
-.0133
-.0527
.0969
Membership of trade unions
1980-1985 1990-1995
CONSTANT
GDP
TRADE UNION
R-Squared
-.0619
.0066
.0723
.2470
.1299
-.0116
-.0072
.0355
Political activity
1980-1985 1990-1995
CONSTANT -.2844 -.2388
GDP .0272 .0195
POLITICAL .1507 .3505
R-Squared .0763 .2753
Membership of sports organisations
1980-1985 1990-1995
CONSTANT -.2663 .1618
GDP .0251 -.0142
SPORT .1222 -.0261
R-Squared .4149 .0502
Membership of religious associations
1980-1985 1990-1995
CONSTANT .0072 .0677
GDP .0019 -.0068
RELIGIOUS -.0177 .0870
R-Squared .0149 .0611
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Membership of cultural organisations
1980-1985 1990-1995
CONSTANT
GDP
CULTURAL
-.0244
.0040
.2685
.2456
-.0212
-.3345
R-Squared .3452 .1707
Membership of leisure organisations
1980-1985 1990-1995
CONSTANT
GDP
LEISURE
-.4243
.0417
-.0452
.1488
-.0128
-.0286
R-Squared .5946 .0453
Time-use
CONSTANT
GDP
TIME-USE
R-Squared
1985-1990
.0376
.28E-3
-.0014
.0900
1990-1995
,1296
-.0119
.50E-3
.0406
Property offences
CONSTANT
GDP
PROPERTY
R-Squared
1970-1990
.2407
-.0201
.2732
.6629
1970-1975
.8176
-.0762
1.599
.8448
1975-1980
-.1790
.0244
-1.826
.5115
1980-1985
.2449
-.0244
1.669
.7742
1985-1990
.1532
-.0114
.2111
.0594
1990-1995
-.0168
.0021
-.1656
.0725
Trafic violations
1970-1990 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995
CONSTANT
GDP
TRAFFIC
R-Squared
.1995
-.0161
.0716
.4341
.8297
-.0787
1.099
.5562
.4389
-.0329
-.7489
.4974
-.2874
.0251
.8507
.3229
.1300
-.0080
-.1056
.0306
.0338
-.0043
.1722
.0629
All crimes
1970-1990 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995
CONSTANT
GDP
CRIME
R-Squared
.2409
-.0202
.0853
.5245
.9713
-.0924
.6903
.7483
.1277
-.0034
-.5078
.7253
-.1679
.0122
.6288
.7436
.0722
-.0037
.0276
.0135
.1174
-.0106
-.0021
.0350
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Input indicators
Expenditure on public libraries
1970-1990 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995
CONSTANT
GDP
LIBRARIES
R-Squared
Expenditure
.2128
-.0179
•91E-3
.6170
on adult
.5788
-.0546
.0036
.4564
.3984
-.0363
.0010
.3246
education centres and
1970-1990 1970-1975
CONSTANT
GDP
ADULT ED.
R-Squared
Expenditure
.1197
-.0087
J8E-3
.6485
on parks
.1259
-.0108
.0043
.7478
1975-1980
.1563
-.0138
.0013
.6960
-.0168
.0053
-.19E-3
.0739
workers'
1980-1985
-.0282
.0065
-.36E-3
.3158
.0886
-.0054
.32E-4
.0291
institutes
1985-1990
.0822
-.0042
-.20E-4
.0131
.1265
-.0116
.98E-5
.0372
1990-1995
.0723
-.0073
.52E-4
.0660
and other similar areas
1970-1990 1970-1975
CONSTANT
GDP
PARKS
R-Squared
Expenditure
.1840
-.0145
.17E-3
.4637
on sports
.5289
-.0476
.0016
.5637
1975-1980
.2111
-.0159
-.19E-3
.1158
1980-1985
-.5005
.0490
-.38E-3
.1008
1985-1990
.0946
-.0056
.24E-4
.0125
1990-1995
.0093
-.65E-3
-.35E-4
.0603
and outdoor recreation
1970-1990 1970-1975
CONSTANT
GDP
OUTDOOR
.2142
-.0175
.30E-3
.6224
-.0566
.0015
1975-1980
.8225
-.0747
.72E-3
1980-1985
.2421
-.0217
.23E-3
1985-1990
.1106
-.0078
.45E-4
1990-1995
.0782
-.0052
-.61E-4
R-Squared .6351 .6090 .2421 .1865 .0497 .0783
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Social Capital
and Reduction
of Poverty
Timo Voipio
Introduction
The emergence of the concept of "social capital" during the 1990s has been
linked with the search for "sustainable growth" in the perspective of our
children's lifetime. My own point of departure is grave concern over the
unsustainability of global growth trends. I have tormenting suspicions
concerning the realism of assumptions about future growth oriented toward
material goods and (even ecologically-based) modernisation. On the other
hand, I have a strong belief in the ability of people and society to adjust, when
necessary, for the pursuit of a better future. In relation to social capital, I hold
to the belief that norms which foster the ideals of equality and solidarity will
make the inevitable adjustments easier for us all, and that co-operation and
networking can foster groundbreaking innovations.
The topics in my title, "social capital", "poverty" and "poverty reduction",
are all concepts that are given different definitions and meanings according
to the context. For the sake of clarity, it is perhaps worthwhile specifying
what I mean by these concepts in this paper.
Social capital
Perhaps the most striking dividing line for interpretations of the concept of
social capital runs between those of Bourdieu and Putnam. But the main
thing is not whose name is associated with these interpretations. What is
essential to grasp is that in the sociological writings of Bourdieu1 and his
school of thought, social (or cultural) capital is generally the resource of an
individual, while for Putnam,2 Serageldin3 and many others - including the
1
 Bourdieu (1984, 1988).
2
 Putnam (1993, 1995).
3
 Serageldin (1996, 1998).
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organisers of this seminar4 and myself5 - social capital is regarded primarily
as a resource of society.6
My active interest in social capital was awakened by Sustainability and the
Wealth of Nations, written a few years ago by Ismail Serageldin of the World
Bank.7 I have perhaps played a role in promoting the use of this concept,
as it was discussed in the National Finnish Commission for Sustainable
Development and included in the Council of State's Report on the Future8,
and subsequently in other documents, e.g. Finland's Policy on Relations with
Developing Countries9.
As I mentioned, I am not convinced of the possibility for infinite growth
in a finite world. I am convinced that as long as generations with personal
experience of the post-war period of growth remain in power, we will not
be able to have any serious public debate about a future without growth.
However, it is possible to ponder what forms of capital have potential for
growth. We all know that even physical capital can grow only in a limited
fashion at best. And the limits of ecological capital cannot be stretched
forever. On the other hand, we know of no limits to growth in human and
social capital.
Figure 1. Sustainable Growth Potential of Selected Capital Types10
Physical/
man-made
capital
Ecological
i.e. natural
capital
Physical/
man-made
capital
Ecological
i.e. natural
capital
BEFORE AFTER
4
 Kajanoja (1997); Kajanoja and Simpura (1998).
5
 Voipio (1998a, 1999b); Voipio and Hoebink (1999); Cox, Healey and Voipio (1999).
6
 According to Coleman this distinction is not clear. He thinks social capital can be a resource of either
an individual or society/organization.
7
 Serageldin (1996).
" Valtioneuvosto (1997).
9
 Ulkoasiainministerio (1998).
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 Serageldin (1996).
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According to Serageldin's more recent definition11 the social capital of a
society consists of institutions, relationships, attitudes and values that steer
the interaction of people and foster economic and social development. Social
capital is more than the sum of society's institutions: it is "the glue that binds
them together".
My way of thinking differs from those of Putnam and Serageldin and most
other writers on this topic, as I see humankind as a whole, as a "global
society", for which social capital can be a vital resource and its lack a
significant problem.
Reduction of poverty
Reduction of poverty is commonly claimed as the prime aim of the World
Bank, the Department for International Development Cooperation of
Finland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and almost all other international
development financial institutions and agencies. This is highlighted in Table
1, which presents the main development policy goals of the government of
Finland, the EU, the World Bank, and OECD's Development Assistance
Committee (DAC), as well as those defined by the UN Conference on Social
Development in Copenhagen 1995.
Table 1. Goals of International Development Assistance in 1990-2000
UN/Soc.dev./
Copenhagen95
1) Poverty
elimination
2) Reduction of
unemployment
3) Prevention of
social exclusion
Finland
1) Poverty
reduction
2) Environment
protection
3) Equality
+ democracy
+ human rights
EU
1) Suistainable
development
2) Global economic
integration
3) Poverty
prevention
World Bank
1) Poverty
reduction
2) Poverty
reduction
3) Poverty
reduction
OECD-DAC
International
Development Targets
1) Extreme poverty
-50% by 2015
2) Primary education
for all (girls!) 2005
3) Infant, child, and
maternal mortality +
reproductive health
services by 2015
4) Environmental
sustainability
strategies in all
countries
I have some sympathy towards the critical (and admittedly too cynical)
statements of some academic and NGO commentators, for whom one major
barrier to achieving the target of universal poverty reduction is that in terms
of institutional continuity it is important for aid organisations that this goal
never be achieved - i.e. that the work of the aid agencies will never end. The
Serageldin (1998).
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seed of truth in this otherwise exaggerated view has to be taken seriously by
all aid agencies. I am nevertheless a reformist: I think it is important - and
possible - for national development assistance organisations to change and
overhaul their operations so as to maximise the positive impact of their
resources and activities on poverty. In the rest of this article I attempt to assess
the trends and effects of development co-operation geared toward reduction
of poverty. This has been my main topic of research for the last three years.12
Poverty reduction requires the analysis and systematic elimination of
multidimensional factors causing isolation. Social capital and the lack thereof
are useful heuristic instruments in this work.
Management of poverty, emergence of social sciences and
social contracts as social capital
According to Giovanna Procacci13 the elevation of poverty into a socially
important Poverty Question (or Social Question) in France in the revolutionary
period 1789 to 1848 helped to shape the emergence of the social sciences
in their current form. Before the 1789 revolution the term "poverty" was
absent from all debate on social issues. There were only "beggars", who were
beyond the scope of universal social rights as lying within the realm of police
guardianship.
In 1848 the French revolutionary movement demanded the right to work
for the proletariat. The rebels maintained that society was in debt to the poor
and that the time had come to repay this debt. However, the liberal state
ideology did not approve of the idea of society's debt to the poor. It did not
want to burden the financial system with the poverty issue. However, those
in power could not ignore the demands of the masses for redistribution of
society's wealth and welfare. The rebellion forced the ruling class to search
for new ways to manage the poverty problem peacefully. Social scientists
such as Auguste Comte demanded the even more drastic alternative of a
"philanthropic" or "positive" poverty policy, based not on rights but on
morals. He also coined the term "collective good", which could be achieved
through a "Social Contract". The state would recognise the poor as rights-
bearing citizens, but these poor citizens would have to recognise that their
citizenship involved both rights and obligations.
In order to ensure social harmony and the continuation of the status quo,
Europe's liberal governments approved rather considerable changes in the
"rules of the game" of society. By changing laws and administrative practices
the poor gained the right to form trade unions, the right to send their children
to school and - above all - the right to vote (although women did not gain
this right until the 1900s).
12
 Voipio (1997a, b; 1998a,b,c, d; 1999a, b)
13
 Procacci (1989, 1997).
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It is very interesting to compare the European debate of the last century to
the current debate on global poverty. What is the role of the social sciences
in managing poverty in the light of philanthropic social contracts? We can
consider the reduction of poverty as either:
(a) an internal challenge of Northern societies, generally referred to as
building the "welfare state" (or more recently its "crisis");
(b) an internal challenge of Southern societies, generally referred to as the
"development" problem (and recently also the development "crisis");
(c) questions related to relations between the rich North and the poor South
- and especially their inequality, generally referred to as "global policies".
(a) North: Globalisation and regional economic integration, for example in
the EU region, have changed the established social contracts of affluent
nations, e.g. Finland, in a significant manner. The social capital that
prevails in Finland's exceptionally homogeneous population has over the
years been institutionalised into strongly equality-oriented economic
policies, income distribution and taxation policies, and regional policies,
as well as social and cultural policies administered largely by autonomous
municipalities. These policies and the mutual relations between local and
central governments in Finland clearly differ from those in the EU core
countries (e.g. France and Germany) exemplified by job-related "social
partnerships"14, and from the civic society of Anglo-American small
towns, and from social capital embodied in the "third sector"15, a model
which we are perhaps too eager to emulate in Finland nowadays.
(b) South: The national elites of the poor countries of the world today, such
as Tanzania and Nepal, need national social contracts in order to be able
to preserve the status quo, or at least to control the pace and direction
of social change. To what extent and in which ways do they need
development assistance from abroad in order to serve their ends?
Development co-operation has been geared toward reducing poverty
primarily via individual projects. Only in recent years has the interest of
development planners focused on the building blocks of social contracts
such as legislation, forms and practices of government, and other
institutional questions. Have aid organisations and development
researchers side-stepped questions related to equality and democratic
shortcomings on purpose, or unconsciously?
(c) Global: To what extent does the unpredictable threat of Southern poor
nations "force" the rich states of the world and large corporations to
search for a new foundation for the "social contract of the global
community", which would allow the "Global South" to relax its critical
stance towards the rationale of global economic organisations, e.g in
negotiations within the UN and the WTO, or in international environmental
14
 Cf. e.g. Heikkila and Kautto (1997).
15
 Cf. e.g. Anttonen (1998).
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agreements.16 How can the developing countries be persuaded to accept
that the rules of the game should change, when the basic trend -
liberalisation and growth - has been imposed on them by the world's rich
nations? How willing are the rich countries and large corporations to
accept fairly peaceful yet significant changes in the ground-rules of the
global economy in order to retain their control of the global community?
What is the role of development assistance aimed at poverty reduction
in this "global management"? What other international economic, tax or
social policy means are available? What about the role of development
research or global social policy research?
In the rest of this chapter I analyse the potentials, limitations and practical
resources for reducing poverty on all these three levels: North, South as well
as the global relations between the North and South. The role of social capital
is different on all these levels.
The development aid given by Finland and other industrialised countries
is the main object of my own research, so I concentrate on this here. It is
nevertheless clear that this is insufficient to provide a complete picture.
As regards global relationships, the kind of social capital required and/or
created in the normative work of UN organisations and conferences should
also be evaluated17. At the same time one should analyse the global financial
architecture that the G7 group, the Davos economic forum, Club of Paris,
OECD, IMF and World Bank offer on a take-it-or-leave-it principle to the poor
national economies of the world. The WTO-level negotiations on elimination
of international trade barriers are proceeding slowly because the poor
countries do not believe the assurances of the major industrialised countries
about the benefits of the liberalisation currently proceeding on many
fronts.18
The negotiating power of the poor countries is currently stronger in
international environmental negotiations (on climate change, biodiversity
and desertification) than in any other forum, since the poor know that the
rich, too, have much to lose in the case of global environmental catastrophe.
When considering the Southern and Northern countries it should be
remembered that significant country-specific differences exist which make
generalisations problematic, Studies on social capital should distinguish
whether the object of research is a country, a municipality, a neighbourhood
or a family. The social capital in my own family and neighbourhood is
different from that in my home town of Riihimaki, where social capital is built
and visible in a very different way compared to large cities such as. Helsinki,
or to the Finnish national level, not to mention the EU. World Bank
researchers have done extensive work to assess the characteristics, sources,
16
 A general but rather thorough picture of these issues is available in Voipio (1999c).
17
 For more about the Global Agenda read e.g. Tan (1997).
18
 Voipio (1999c).
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dynamics and measurement of social capital on a local level.19 The World
Bank's studies — as well as the widely cited work of Robert Putnam —
nevertheless stem largely from North American life experience, which in the
spirit of communitarism glorifies the "civic society", consisting of parent-
teacher associations, churches, Lions clubs and bowling teams. North-
American commentators seldom seem to trust that social interaction, security,
predictability and other elements of social capital could also flourish and
bloom in elected and tax-financed state and municipal institutions, whereas
in countries such as Finland, for instance, such a conviction is widely shared
and supported by collective life experiences.
Reduction of poverty and social capital in poor developing
countries
The new Finnish government policy on relations with developing countries20
has been commended by some international experts21 for the way it views
the reduction of poverty as a challenge for a coherent, multidimensional and
human-rights based developing country policy. Finland puts special emphasis
on co-operation with the least developed countries and the poorest
population groups in order to help these countries and groups avoid
becoming excluded from the globalising world economy.
The Finnish government - in practice the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - has
thus addressed the reduction of poverty from the standpoints of (a)
individuals, (b) families (households), (c) regions, (d) classes and social
groups, (e) gender, (f) governments, (g) ethnic groups, as well as (h) the
collectively poor "Global South". This is exemplary by international
comparison.
The portfolio of the Minister of Development Co-operation also contains
important messages for all other ministers, and for Finnish society as a whole.
The challenge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not only to look out from
Finland to the world beyond, but also to turn the focus on Finnish society,
and especially other ministries. I look forward to the day when the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs takes an active stand on certain matters being dealt with
in other Finnish ministries - and in the European Commission - by including
in its statements views demonstrating that Finland's (and the EU's) decisions
are also credible from the standpoint of poor people in developing countries.
It is easy to think of issues relating to energy, transport, agriculture and
immigration policy, for example, where Finland's own domestic and EU-
level decisions significantly affect the potentials of poor countries to realise
their own development aims.
I now move on from these issues related to Finland and global perspectives,
to internal questions regarding the societies of poor developing countries,
19
 Cf. http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/index.htm
20
 Ulkoasiainministerio (1998).
21
 Cox et al. (1999b).
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and to the significance of social capital as a resource on the national,
municipal and neighbourhood level.
The new poverty strategy of the World Bank
For me and many other development researchers, civil servants and NGO
lobbies, the World Bank has for decades been perhaps a favourite target of
criticism, the "Big Bad Wolf", about which it is always easy to find something
wrong. However, it must be admitted that the World Bank has continuously
been the "intellectual leader", whose information, analysis and policy stances
have ultimately been followed by all international aid organisations - and
also by critics like myself. It must also be said that during the past four years
under the leadership of Jim Wolfensohn the World Bank has sought to correct
mistakes in its own thinking and operative culture more systematically than
any other developing organisation I know of. The recent organisational
reform of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs pales by comparison with
the World Bank's internal "structural adjustment program", i.e. the "Strategic
Compact".
The World Bank is currently preparing a new poverty report called the
World Development Report 2000/1 (WDR).22 The Bank has published a
corresponding poverty bible twice before, in 1980 and 1990. In both cases
almost all international donors, i.e. national development aid organisations,
accepted and copied the World Bank's poverty reduction strategy almost
verbatim in their own strategies. Against this background, it is interesting and
significant to analyse the kind of a strategy the World Bank intends to employ
to reduce poverty in the 21st Century.
This time the World Bank is preparing its poverty strategy with maximum
participation. It has published the framework of its poverty bible and initiated
a moderated international e-mail discussion, which at least gives the
impression that any poor or disadvantaged world citizen can affect the
content of the next poverty bible with his or her opinions, if able to gain
access to the Internet and e-mail.23
My own view is that if the World Bank officially sanctions the main thrust
of the task force preparing the WDR-2000/1, the report will indeed be
'revolutionary'. The main difference compared to the World Bank's 1990
poverty strategy is as follows:
The WRD-1990 presented a three-pronged strategy for the reduction of
poverty (cf. Table 2). The new WDR-2000/1 presents a three- or, in fact, a
four-pronged poverty strategy, but the prongs are now appreciably different
and substantially more "political". I think it is significant that an organisation
with ten thousand economists has dropped "economic growth" as one of the
22
 See http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty
23
 This discussion can be followed at the website http://www.worldbank.org/devforum/
To participate in the discussion ( and to follow the discussion of others) send a message to the
moderator of the discussion at the address: majordomo@worldbank.org. Leave the subject field
empty, but write in the message field the following text: subscribe WDR2001.
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main pillars of its strategy, and replaced it with "empowerment" as the first
pillar and "security" as the second. The first and second prongs are based on
the realistic vision that it is possible to increase social capital even in the
poorest societies, and that such matters as participation, social cohesion and
livelihood risk management are prerequisites even for pro-poor material
economic growth. The authors of the WDR-2000/1 say that the new strategy
has three prongs, but I see it as having four: in addition to the three prongs
there is a new "dimension", which I think the World Bank's approach has
been lacking so far: a "global structural dimension".
Table 2. Contrasting World Bank Strategies for Poverty Reduction in 1990 and 2000
1990 2000
1) Broad-based
economic growth
(employment)
2) Investing in people
(education, health)
3) Social safety nets
1. EMPOWERMENT
(a) Voice and participation
(b) (Inequality, social cohesion and social capital
2. SECURITY
(a) Risk management, social protection, social safety nets
(b) National crisis management
3. OPPORTUNITIES
(a) Making resources available
(b) Pro-poor policy reforms
4. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
(a) Poverty and global forces (technology, trade, capital
movements, labour standards, environmental change
and environmental standards)
(b) Pro-poor developmet aid, debt relief, international
taxation.
The more one thinks about this framework, the clearer it becomes that the
poverty strategy of WDR-2000/1 is very different from that of WDR-1990. If
all donors adopt the World Bank's new strategy as loyally as they adopted
the ideas of the WDR-1990, we can now predict that international development
co-operation will change greatly in the first decade of the 21st Century. I
certainly hope so!
Development agencies of Western countries - "DAC donors"
The national development aid organisations of the western industrialised
countries (OECD countries) have typically supported the World Bank in their
poverty reduction strategies. Among the members of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, there has nevertheless been a will
to establish a constructive balance with the World Bank.
In 1996 the leaders of the OECD aid authorities and departments
negotiated and approved the DAC donors' joint strategy for the 21st Century.
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In their strategy paper "Shaping the 21st Century"24 ('S21') the donors
translated the main aspects of the UN Global Agenda (which emerged as a
common understanding of the large-scale UN conferences of the 1990s) into
measurable targets with deadlines that could be monitored from one year to
the next. The first target set out in the International Development Targets of
S21 is the reduction of the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by
one half by the year 2015.
The time until 2015 is rather short. The members of the DAC and the key
multilateral donors26 participating in the activities of the DAC decided in 1998
to establish the DAC Informal Working Group on Poverty Reduction, the task
Table 3. International Development Targets (IDT) of OECD Countries*5
GOAL
Economic well-being
REDUCING EXTREME
POVERTY
Social development
UNIVERSAL PRIMARY
EDUCATION
GENDER EQUALITY
INFANT AND CHILD
MORTALITY
MATERNAL MORTALITY
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
Environmental sustainability
and regeneration
ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFINITION
The proportion of people living in extreme poverty in
developing countries should be reduced by at least one-half
by 2015.
There should be universal primary education in all countries
by 2015.
Progress towards gender equality and the empowerment of
women should be demonstrated by eliminating gender
disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005.
The death rates for infants and children under the age of five
years should be reduced in each developing country by two-
thirds from the 1990 level by 2015.
The rate of maternal mortality should be reduced by three-
fourths between 1990 and 2015.
Access should be available through the primary health-care
system to reproductive health services for all individuals of
appropriate ages, no later than the year 2015.
There should be a current national strategy for sustainable
development, in the process of implementation, in every
country by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss
of environmental resources are effectovely reversed at both
global and national levels by 2015.
24
 OECD-DAC (1996): 'Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation.' This
report is available in Finnish in the publication: 'Suunta 2000-luvulle' (Kesu).
25
 More information about international development targets and their monitoring can be seen at the
OECD-DAC website http://www.oecd.org/dac/indicators.
26
 Australia, Belgium, Spain, European Commision, Netherlands, IMF, Ireland, United Kingdom, Italy,
Austria, Japan, Canada, Luxembourg, World Bank, Norway, Portugal, France, Sweden, Germany,
Finland, Switzerland, Denmark, UNDP, New Zealand, United States.
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of which is to develop and negotiate guidelines for more efficient means to
implement, co-ordinate and monitor development assistance geared toward
actual reduction of poverty. At the same time it was recognised that a need
exists for a common understanding of the meanings of "poverty" and
"poverty reduction", and what kind of criteria and indicators of poverty
reduction and increase should be used. The DAC gave the Informal Working
Group on Poverty Reduction a term of two years, i.e. 1999-2000, to carry out
this task.
The DAC Working Group on Poverty Reduction started its work by
commissioning an international group of researchers coordinated by the
British Overseas Development Institute (ODI) to carry out a "Scoping Study",
in which I participated as the only Finnish researcher. I will briefly present
some of the main observations - while stressing some of the more significant
matters from the standpoint of social capital.
What kind of aid and to whom?
Even though all DAC donors affirm in interviews that they are committed to
the International Development Targets (IDT), some aid organisations
suggest that "poverty reduction" is the wrong goal. The differences in
approach are related partly to language, and partly to social theory.
When considering EU co-operation, it is perhaps important to understand
that especially for the French the reduction of poverty seems an inappropriate
goal. The English term "poverty" is translated into French as "pauvrete",
which brings to mind old-fashioned connotations (paupers, poor relief, etc).
The French would prefer to replace "poverty reduction" with the more
modern and political concept of "prevention of social exclusion" as the
common global goal of development assistance.
Development aid interventions can be focused directly on assisting the
poor, or indirectly on structural pro-poor changes in social structures and
institutions. Each way can lead to strategic or practical approaches. The
different approaches employed by DAC donors for poverty reduction are
shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Practical and Strategic Approaches to Poverty Reduction in Targeted
Development Aid with Direct and Indirect Focus of Interventions
Practical
Strategic
Direct
E.g. catastrophe aid; basic health care;
basic education; food aid; food-for-work;
micro-credit
- e.g. USA
E.g. empowerment of the poor + women;
micro-credit
- e.g. Ireland
Indirect
E.g. sector aid: education, health, small
farming, village roads, micro-credit
- e.g. Denmark
E.g. debt relief; good government, capacity
building; education; micro-credit
- e.g. Sweden
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Allocating aid primarily to the worst off countries is one way to ensure that
development assistance is poverty-oriented. The problem with this approach,
however, is that it is not sufficiently sensitive to the internal differences and
inequalities within countries. Even in the poorest countries aid can end up
in the hands of the affluent elite. On the other hand, in middle-income - and
even wealthy - countries the division of income can be so uneven that there
are really poor persons living among the affluent.
The income or consumption level of the family (household) is a poverty
criterion used by all DAC donors. Several donors think, however, that this
"money-metric" indicator is not sufficient. Poverty is a multidimensional
phenomenon which has to be assessed using other criteria as well, e.g.:
- access to basic social services (education, health care, drinking water, etc.)
- possibility to own, use and/or borrow the main factors of production, e.g.
farm land, money
- social status, e.g. gender or ethnic background
- potential to influence political and administrative decision-making.
Many donors stress that poverty can be (a) absolute or relative; (b) transient
or permanent. Germany has defined the main goal of its development aid as
reduction of absolute poverty. Others, such as Switzerland and France, put
more emphasis on relative poverty and on the social processes that
regenerate poverty:
"Poverty and richness are the results of one and the same process - the
unequal distribution of income. It is based on power, violence and
structural violence." (Switzerland)
"Poverty is by definition a relative concept. Where inequality is great,
there also is the greatest poverty." (France)
The World Bank defines poverty as an absolute phenomenon, but takes a
more instrumental stance towards equality, which it regards as a useful factor
supportive of economic growth and poverty reduction: evidence from World
Bank and IMF-funded research indicates that poverty reduction is easier and
more successful in countries where inequality is less pronounced. The UNDP
stresses that poverty is not a state of affairs, but a process, where structural
factors prevent people from making choices which allow them to realise their
full potential as persons.
What is poverty?
A strong and clear - and coherent - concept would be the best basis for co-
operation of donors in reducing poverty. Few DAC donors have defined their
concept of poverty clearly (in written form). Currently, the poverty concepts
of all donors appear to be multidimensional: this means that low monetary
income - and consumption - is only one form of poverty. Other forms may
include: (a) lack of information and education; (b) sickness and physical
weakness; (c) uncertainty about income and large risks; (d) physical or social
exclusion, or isolation; (e) lack of opportunity to participate and exert
influence; (0 loss of social status and/or self-esteem, etc.
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The concepts nevertheless differ between - and within - donors, which
fosters misunderstandings and complicates co-operation. Figure 2 presents
semantic differences regarding poverty. The models can be broken down
into two main groups: concepts based on a lack of something, and those
based on human rights.
Figure 2. Typography of Poverty Concepts
Basic needs
and services
Poverty as
a lack of
Income and
consumption
opportunities
Assets
(material and
non-material)
Poverty as
an absence of human rights
Human
dignity
Autonomy
Participation
Self esteem
Political
freedom
and security
Equality
Gender
Social
Ethnicity
Poverty as the lack of basic needs and services appears in many of the poverty
concepts of DAC donors, as does the lack of income. On the other hand,
fewer donors focus on the lack of social capital, land and other natural
resources, and material assets. Only Canada and Sweden address these
aspects of poverty thoroughly in their strategies. It is noteworthy that no DAC
donors have focused on "time poverty", i.e. the lack of time to fulfil all
obligations, which is often a form of poverty plaguing women, and
highlighted in gender research.
The Nordic donors and to some extent the European Commission and the
United Kingdom under its new government, have emphasised the concept
of human rights-based poverty in debates between donors as an alternative
to the more narrow concept of a lack of income and consumption.
Studies emphasising the absence of political and social rights often
conclude that poverty is distributed unevenly between men and women.
Many DAC donors stress the intrinsic value of equality (as a "value in itself").
The donors emphasising income-related poverty (e.g. World Bank) see
gender-sensitivity more narrowly as a means in attempts to reduce income-
related poverty, which in a way is a positive thing, but has also been
interpreted as an insult to the dignity of women.
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The concept of multidimensional poverty is intuitively appealing, but
difficult to implement. The recent evaluation of the Country Assistance
Strategies (CASes) of the World Bank showed that the Poverty Assessments
conducted by the World Bank issued primarily from the perspective of
income-related poverty measured in terms of money. Thus the CAS lacked
measures to affect the socio-political reasons behind income-related poverty.
Nevertheless, many DAC donors emphasise that instead of visible poverty
- or rather in addition to it - attention should be focused on the processes
spurring social exclusion. What are the root causes of poverty? The analysis
becomes very complicated if the aid organisation wishes to operate in a
participatory manner, so that poor people have a chance to define poverty
and its causes themselves. This would be important; donors dependent only
on information from experts may remain unaware of crucially important
factors and viewpoints.
Common working definitions
The governmental aid organisations - i.e. donors - are large organisations
employing several hundreds - and in total thousands - of people. In order
for them to function efficiently the staff members must understand one
another. This requires that all players - ranging from political decision-
makers to senior management, and from intermediate levels of mid-
management to desk officers in charge of projects - conceptualise the main
goals and means in a sufficiently uniform way.
Despite their rhetoric most donors use narrow measures of income-related
poverty (GDP/capita etc.), and this practice must gradually shift towards
multidimensional poverty indicators. A first step could be that poverty/
welfare assessments would attempt to assess not only the money-metric
income flows of households, but also the welfare gains they receive from
public health-care, education and water services, as well as public roads and
environmental protection.
The next step could be that poverty assessments take account of the
amount of disposable resources and assets of households, the certainty or
uncertainty of their income, and the degree of their social exclusion, as well
as their possibilities of participating in and influencing policies. In practice,
of course we encounter some difficulties, e.g.:
- What are the best - and most feasible - measures for assessing these
dimensions?
- Should all indicators be commensurable?
- Should some measures be weighted more than others?
- What are the thresholds for various measures below which people can be
defined as poor (poverty lines)?
- Can we use some proxies that are easier to measure/evaluate if the best
criteria are very difficult to evaluate methodologically (e.g. opportunities
for political participation and influence)?
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Compromises must undoubtedly be made. The recommendation of researchers
in the ODI-co-ordinated Scoping Study was that the DAC Informal Working
Group on Poverty should develop a common multidimensional diagnostic
framework so that compromises between ideal and practical methods could
be made collectively and consciously by the donors. It 'would be important
for donors to use common and comparable proxy indicators, the shortcomings
of which could be periodically tested by more detailed research.
Strategies and approaches toward poverty-oriented development
co-operation
The strategies to reduce poverty employed by DAC donors can be categorised
into four groups: (a) economic strategies, (b) social strategies, (c) political
strategies, and (d) safety net strategies.
Broad-based or pro-poor economic growth?
Poverty reduction requires economic growth, according to all DAC donors.
But not just any kind of economic growth suffices: many DAC donors specify
that economic growth must be either "broad-based" or "pro-poor".
However, donors seem not to have seriously considered what these
definitions mean. According to the DAC Scoping Study, donors have not
studied or defined very carefully the relative importance of growth as
opposed to income distribution. In other words, which is the more important
goal, growth or an even income distribution? The common interpretation is
that growth is broad-based if it favours additional employment more than the
acquisition of new machinery and equipment. Whether or not this kind of
growth is pro-poor depends also on e.g. how many new jobs are created and
how the level of wages changes, i.e. whether employment increases the
incomes of poor persons.
A clear definition of "pro-poor economic growth" would be that economic
growth is "pro-poor" if the proportion of the national income going to poor
population groups grows. However, the DAC-donors have not been able to
define the kind of income distribution policy they should promote in order
for the share of national income to the poor to really grow.
The DAC Scoping Study praised Finland's definition, which is one of the
clearest.27 According to the new policy:
"Finland sees that economic growth as such is not sufficient to
eliminate poverty. There is also a need for a democratic decision
making system, social policy mechanisms fostering equality as well as
a social security system suitable for local conditions, which guarantees
even distribution of incomes and prevents the exclusion of the weakest
members of the society."
Ulkoasiainministerio (1998). Note: Switzerland has the same type of definition in its development
country strategy.
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Austria and Norway have even gone slightly further, stressing that in addition
to the income distribution mechanism there is a need for mechanisms of
income redistribution, i.e. "take from the rich, give to the poor". It is
interesting that of the donors studied, the IMF emphasised the significance
of income distribution more than almost any other donor. Relying on
empirical research, IMF representatives have stressed in interviews that
equality is a significant prerequisite for economic growth.28 In other words:
in the short-term economic efficiency should not be increased at the expense
of equality, since equality appears to bolster economic growth over the long-
term.
Sweden has also emphasised that pro-poor economic growth is more
sustainable than growth which fails to take the poor into consideration. The
DAC Scoping Study praised Sweden's analysis, according to which some of
the best ways to encourage pro-poor economic growth involve trying to
ensure that growth promotes equality between regions, genders and
generations.
The Netherlands emphasises the redistribution of land and assets (capital),
but it does not specify what kind of political choices would serve this end.
The Scoping Study recommended to the DAC Informal Working Group on
Poverty that it incorporate the redistribution of land and other assets in its
work programme.
The attitudes of donors toward the redistribution of human capital (e.g.
increasing the share of poor children in schools) represent a considerably
more problematic issue than redistribution of income or property. Certain
DAC donors have made considerable efforts to understand how basic social
services should be organised so that the benefits are channelled toward the
poorer segments of the population. Great Britain emphasises the significance
of sustainable rural livelihoods in ensuring the financing base and availability
of basic services. Denmark, France, Ireland and Italy have emphasised- each
in their own way - the significance of strengthening social institutions as well
as local initiatives and processes. Many DAC donors feel that active
improvement of poor people's opportunities to participate is an essential
precondition for implementing basic pro-poor services. Among others, the
IMF, Sweden, Finland and UNDP stress the importance of good governance
- particularly in local administration.
The comparative analysis in the Scoping Study provided evidence of
the highly significant - and sometimes contested - policy conclusion that
high tax rates and a large public service budget form a more efficient
combination - ceteris paribus - from the viewpoint of poverty reduction
and empowerment of the poor than a low tax rate and small public service
budgets.
Many DAC members also understand that macroeconomic policy is not
gender neutral. Donors' strategies for poverty reduction should therefore be
28
 Cox et al. (1999).
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based on a gender analysis of economic policy and growth, where the
economy is analysed with respect to its productive as well as reproductive
segments.
Social and political models
Participation is a theme that development NGOs brought to international
debate in the 1980s. At that time involving the poor was a 'speciality' of some
of the NGOs and they made a lot of 'noise' about participation, partly in order
to influence government donors, but also to emphasize their own identity
and profile. They claimed that the poverty-oriented projects financed by
NGOs succeeded better than the projects of government donors because in
the NGO projects much more scope was provided for poor people to
participate in the identification, design and implementation of projects. They
thus feel ownership of the projects, which they commit to carrying out
themselves. The development impact was thus claimed to be more permanent
than in the projects of government donors.
As regards participation, the situation is very different at the end of the
1990s. Almost all government donors, too, now recognise the significance of
participatory methods and the empowerment of the poor. In reality,
however, participation is still far too often merely a rather poorly internalised
buzz-word. On the other hand, the DAC donors have indeed developed their
thinking about participation, political influence, good governance, democracy
and human rights in an interesting way, deepening their understanding of the
institutional factors.
Participatory methods have also brought us some qualitatively new
information about the incidence, depth and dynamics of poverty, i.e. what
kinds of factors drive people into poverty or can help them break free of it.
The World Bank's Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA)29 on Tanzania
generated some very interesting information on social capital, too.
The researchers observed that the more social capital there was in a village
- e.g. official associations and unofficial co-operation and contacts between
residents - the higher the monetary incomes of the village residents. It could
of course be claimed that social capital was spawned in rich villages. This
cause-effect relationship was nevertheless controlled for by the researchers.
It is interesting that the income impacts of social capital appeared to be even
more powerful than those of human capital, which was measured by the
numbers of elementary school graduates.
The conclusion of these researchers was that growth in social capital could
be considered one of the most meaningful objectives of development co-
operation. At least it should be ensured that development co-operation
programmes aimed at promoting economic growth do not undermine the
existing social capital. This has often been the case in development co-
operation: poor societies have been served solutions based on efficiency and
competitive principles, so that solidarity and joint spirit have eroded away.
29
 Narayan (1997).
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The end result has been worse than the starting point from the perspective
of the poorest.
It has also been proven possible to boost social capital with certain
development programmes. In Finland's bilateral aid programme there is clear
evidence of this, e.g. in the southern Mtwara and Lindi regions of Tanzania,
where a Rural Integrated Project Support (RIPS) programme has been carried
out. When a project was set up to improve the educational infrastructure of
villages, the members of the school community were required to come
together to negotiate and draw up a joint development plan for their school
and to gather half of the funds for the renovations. The negotiating and
participatory planning skills and the positive feelings and reciprocal trust
gained from this joint school project later proved to be useful social capital
to help the villagers initiate further projects to improve the water services and
feeder roads in the village.
The emergence of good governance, democracy and human rights in the
core of the rhetoric and action of many DAC-donors can also be explained
by the dramatic political shifts that occurred in the latter part of the 1980s and
early 1990s. Since the end of the cold war it has become easier for the OECD
donors to claim that multiparty electoral democracy, as implemented in
Western industrialised countries, is the one and only correct way to realize
the ideals of good governance and human rights. The researchers have
shown a positive correlation between good government and economic
growth. However, we lack equally clear evidence about the relationship
between democracy and economic growth.30 Moreover, the pro-poor nature
of the decentralization programmes which many DAC-donors are nowadays
eagerly supporting is still based more on optimistic assumptions - albeit
credible ones - than empirical evidence.
The new British Department for International Development (DFID) has
launched a programme under the heading Pro-poor Management. The
programme seeks answers to the following questions, which are highly
relevant for all research about the nature and dynamics of social capital:
1) What kinds of political organisations improve the opportunities of poor
and destitute people to influence government policy and its real-life
implementation?
2) How should governments be reformed to be better able to collect tax
revenues and be responsible for their honest use?
3) What kinds of policies and organisations produce basic services in the
most equitable and efficient manner?
4) How can we best ensure the personal security of poor people and enable
them to defend their rights in public courts of law?
In order to answer these questions, both donors oriented toward practical
matters and researchers interested in more theoretical aspects of social
capital must develop a much better understanding of the societies of poor
30
 See e.g. Healey and Robinson (1993).
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countries, since the institutions and social capital embedded in them are
always country-specific in nature. There must also be open and honest
dialogue with the governments of these poor countries.
Social safety nets
The development aid agencies of the DAC countries have surprisingly little
to say about social safety nets, even though these formed the third prong of
the three-prong poverty reduction strategy presented in the World Bank's
1990 World Development Report and subsequently adopted by many
donors.
Denmark's and Norway's aid planners seem to conceive of safety nets
almost as the social security systems of modern welfare states. But since such
systems are beyond the financing capacity of the poorest countries, some
Danish and Norwegian commentators regard the entire safety net idea as
irrelevant from the standpoint of the poorest countries. In contrast to most
donors, the USAID regards its emergency aid programme as a social safety
net. The IMF definition, according to which the "safety net protects the most
vulnerable groups during exceptionally difficult periods" is perhaps the
smallest common denominator in the safely net ideology of donors.
Practical tools in the donors' safety-net programmes include public works,
targeted food aid, sickness insurance, as well as unemployment and pension
security. In addition, some donors mention that in the poorest countries the
most important guardians of social security are local, traditional and unofficial
social security systems, which assist the poor during the hardest times.
It is clear that the donors have thus far had very limited constructive input
in building the social safety net systems of poor countries and people. It is
perhaps most vital to ask how we could ensure that donors' actions (e.g.
structural adjustment of the economy or agricultural modernisation
programmes) do not increase the income-related risks of poor persons or
undermine the basis of local coping and survival mechanisms.
There is evidence that while structural programmes have reduced the
numbers of the poor, at the same time they have deepened the poverty of
those remaining in poverty to such an extent that traditional safety nets have
collapsed.
Public works on the basis of the "Food-for-Work" .principle - especially
during agricultural slack seasons - is a surprisingly efficient way to create
safety nets for poor people. There is evidence in at least some poor countries
that the targeting of employment benefits to poor people requires that the
wages paid for work are kept very low. If the wage level (money or food)
is high, the more affluent members of the society push their way past their
weaker and poorer neighbours in the employment lines, so that the poorer
ones fall through the safety net.
From Finland's point of view it would be important to understand how the
principle of "Society for All" can be applied and promoted in these poor and
poorer societies where there is insufficient wealth for welfare society
institutions in the sense of the Nordic model.
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The right to own or at least use farm land and the common right to enjoy the
fruits of state-owned or communal forests are the basic elements of social
security in many poor communities. The internal solidarity and social capital
of communities are factors fostering the social security of poor people. If
these factors degenerate it is not easy to replace them, even with large social
sector budgets.
The organising of basic social services in Finland has been weighted
toward providing education, health services, water and food for all people
as universal social rights. The most important thing in poor societies is that
governments (central governments and local authorities) guarantee the
availability of basic services for eveiyone - not necessarily completely free,
but sufficiently subsidised with tax proceeds to allow their use even by the
poorest citizens.
It is good for Finns to understand that the Nordic approach differs in these
matters from the perspective in many other OECD countries. For example,
the Anglo-American "poverty lobby", i.e. the civil servants defending the
poverty-orientation of development aid, NGO-lobbies and researchers, may
oppose development co-operation funds used to finance basic education for
everyone, saying that too much of such aid leaks to the non-poor, i.e. to the
fairly well-off middle class, or to the rich. They often demand that if the
purpose of development aid is to reduce poverty, all aid to education and
health-care should be targeted only for the benefit of the poorest.
The proponents of the Nordic approach often need to sharpen their
argument to convince their British and American colleagues about the
benefits from the standpoint of the poor of providing tax-subsidised basic
services for everyone: what would happen if public services were targeted
only toward the poor?
The answer is that the middle class and the rich would then have to
organise private schools for their children and private health services for their
families. This would probably cause the tax base of local and central
government to collapse, since why would the middle class and the rich agree
to pay taxes if the government did not provide them with services? As a result,
the government would be able to fund only very modest education and
health care services. In contrast, if the middle class and rich have their
children in public schools, it is in their own interest to ensure that the teaching
is of good quality and the conditions satisfactory. The children of poor
families are thus able to enjoy the "benevolence" of richer and more
influential persons - and their willingness to pay taxes - as they attend the
same schools as the children of the more affluent.
Although basic services are in principle targeted at everyone, there may be
a need to finance special activities whereby the poorest families are informed
about these services and their rights to use them, and to encourage them -
who often suffer from gender-related time poverty - to send their children
to schools and their sick family members to public health centres.
It should be noted that targeting development aid to support productive
activities for the poor works by a different logic than development aid given
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for basic social services. Above, I described a "win-win" situation where the
children of poor families benefit when development aid is targeted at schools
also attended by rich children. In productive activities the relationships
between the poor and rich are nevertheless more often "zero-sum games"
than "win-win games": If development aid is targeted at modernisation of
agricultural methods, for example, the poor may turn out not to have money
to participate in the project because this would require the purchase of new
seeds, tools or fertiliser, or taking large new loans on top of old ones. But
if development financiers instead decide to give their aid to non-poor
farmers whose productivity and income levels improve as a result, this
empowerment of the non-poor may prove detrimental to the poor if, for
instance, the empowered non-poor use their increased income to buy out the
remaining fields from the relatively impoverished poor.
Need for historical and political introspection in mainstream
development economics
Since the challenge discussed in my own presentation has been 'world
poverty, I now cite a few relevant sections of a book entitled Challenge of
World Poverty, written by Gunnar Myrdal 30 years ago:
"It has been common in the past to draw a distinct line between
'economic' phenomena on the one hand and 'social' ones on the
other...This is partly due to the rather narrow approach to the
development process characteristic of past thinking in economics,
which relied heavily on simplistic econometric models with highly
aggregated variables. This school of thinking has influenced planning
methods and techniques on the national level (in the developing
countries) and also.. .the work of the United Nations in this area."
"This approach using relatively simple models with easily quantifiable
variables, such as GNP, capital investment, exports and imports, leads
to a neglect of certain very important factors and aspects of the
development process. Thus neglected are all matters relating to
differences in incomes and levels of living - between classes, regions,
sectors, age groups, town and country, matters relating to human
development - health, education, children, matters relating to
consumption - nutrition, housing, social services. To these neglected
factors should be added the crucial problem of social stratification and
many other aspects outside the sphere of the narrow economic
models, particularly the vast underutilization of labour."
Myrdal was encouraged by the statement of a UN expert group announcing
that "the time has now come when the economic approach to development
analysis and planning has to be integrated with a social approach which is
different in nature and would be more relevant to the problems of developing
countries in the coming decade." Myrdal commented on this optimistically:
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"I feel certain that the massive research efforts now devoted to
conditions in underdeveloped countries will in 10-15 years' time
necessitate an entirely new approach in line with what I call an
institutional conception of the problems...We will have to do away
with much of what among economists is often miscalled 'sophisticated'
methods.. .That pretended sophistication usually involves having very
scanty knowledge of the history of ideas and/or of the philosophy and
sociology of science."
Myrdal was too optimistic. Thirty years have already passed since he wrote
about the challenge of poverty and discussed the challenge presented by the
backwardness of his own field of science, economics. But unfortunately the
artificial dividing line between economic and non-economic has not yet
faded into history.
Nevertheless, Myrdal would have some reason to be optimistic today, not
least because the concept of social capital is becoming entrenched. The
World Bank and the Danish aid agency Danida are financing a large-scale
research programme which can be expected to deepen our understanding
of how social capital improves the functioning of markets at the micro-level,
how legislation, government actions and other institutions improve the
efficiency of society, and how the providers of development assistance can
invest their funds to bolster the social capital of poor societies.31
My optimism with regard to international development finance institutions
already began to grow three years ago when the new President of the World
Bank, Jim Wolfensohn, announced the initiation of an ambitious internal
reform programme in the World Bank. The programme goes by the name of
the Strategic Compact.32 The most interesting thing to me about the Strategic
Compact is that Wolfensohn and the World Bank have recognised that the
institute did not have sufficient expertise to perform its prime task alone.
According to Wolfensohn, the main task of the World Bank is reducing
poverty, and to succeed in this the World Bank needs more skills in the social
and sociological analysis of societies.
Wolfensohn is a former Wall Street banker and a "man of action". He has
subsequently recruited new social development experts to the World Bank,
initiated a research programme on social capital, bolstered the Bank's Social
Protection Division by hiring competent European social policy-oriented
economists, created links with other expert organisations in Europe, e.g.
Finland's STAKES33, and drawn up new strategies for the Health, nutrition
and population sector,34 the Social security sector35, and for Good practices
in social policy36. Wolfensohn has also strongly insisted that the global
31
 Serageldin (1998).
32
 Kesu (1997).
33
 STAKES = The Finnish National Research and Development Centre for Social Welfare and Health.
34
 World Bank (1997).
35
 Holzmann and Jorgensen (1998).
36
 World Bank (1999).
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economic elite handling the banking crisis in East Asia, Russia and Brazil
should focus attention on the "The Other Crisis"37 that extreme poverty
causes in millions of poor homes daily around the world.
Wolfensohn newest and boldest - and in a way also the most worrisome
- endeavour is called the "Comprehensive Development Framework",38 or
"CDF". Wolfensohn presented this idea to the directors of the World Bank
on January 21, 1999- His aim was to encourage the other directors and Bank
personnel to think about the development of every client country - i.e.
developing country - in a sufficiently holistic fashion and with a sufficiently
long-term perspective. The CDF stresses that development is not sustainable
if the country's government and broad-based civil society groups are unable
to participate genuinely in the development process (partnership) and treat
it as their own (ownership39).
The main message of Wolfensohn's CDF is that a poor country's
macroeconomic policy issues (about which the country negotiates with the
IMF) and long-term structural and social issues (which are in the realm of the
World Bank) related to the country's development are as naturally linked as
breathing in and breathing out. According to Wolfensohn's proposal the
"Comprehensive Development Framework" consists of the following factors
(Table 5).
Table 5. Comprehensive Development Framework according to Wolfensohn's proposal
A. STRUCTURAL
(1) Good and Clean
Governance
(anticorruption)
(2) Effective Legal
and Justice System
(3) Well-organised
and Supervised
Financial System
(4) Social Safety Nets
and Social
Programs
B, HUMAN
(5) Education and
Knowledge
Institutions
(6) Health and
Population Issues
C. PHYSICAL
STRATEGIES
(7) Water and
Sewerage
(8) Energy
(9) Roads,
Transportation
and
Telecommunications
(10) Sustainable
Development,
Environmental and
Cultural Issues
D. SPECIFIC
(11) Rural Strategy
(12) Urban Strategy
(13) Private Sector
Strategy
(14) Special National
Considerations
37
 Wolfensohn (1998).
38
 Wolfensohn (1999).
39
 As regards ownership Wolfensohn uses a metaphor that has become familiar from the dialogue
between Northern countries and Tanzanian: In order for ownership to be realized in the right way,
the poor developing country (government) must "sit in the driver's seat". In my study on Tanzania
(Voipio and Hoebink 1999) I critisize this metaphor by claiming that it raises unrealistic expectations
that the Tanzanians could in the near future sit in the driver's seat of a vehicle powered by
conventional fuel (car, motorcycle etc.). In a poor country like Tanzania it would be more realistic
to expect local people to be in the "rider's seat" of an oxcart.
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Wolfensohn made the CDF into a framework, i.e. a matrix, by including
another axis where he identified all of the main players in society.40 The CDF
is not intended to be a rigid scheme designed in Washington, imposed on
a country from outside "without adaptation to local conditions. To emphasise
this Wolfensohn included in his draft proposal a country-specific CDF for
Bolivia, where the headings of the matrix fields were changed. The principle
is nevertheless the same: a comprehensive picture of a country's situation
and main players at a glance. The players can be represented by headings
of rows on the y-axis of Wolfensohn's basic matrix (table 6).
Table 6. Wolfensohn's Matrix
(a) Government
- national central government, incl. elected parliament
- provincial or intermediary government, incl. elected officials
- municipal or local government, incl. elected officials
(b) Multi- and bilateral development assistance organisations and financial institutions
(c) Civil society
(d) Private sector
For social scientists Wolfensohn's CDF proposal represents a tremendous
advance. At last, one of the world's main influences of development policy
and an institution with ten thousand economists seems to understand that
development cannot be measured and assessed only in dollars. Instead, there
needs to be a clear appreciation of the interrelationships of physical and
country-specific factors, and of different institutions and people, in order to
understand how development - i.e. change for the better - can be achieved
as the result of a suitable blend or balance of these many different influences.
What I mean by Wolfensohn's Comprehensive Development Framework
being worrisome is the fact that we have had to wait so long for Jim
Wolfensohn. Why have none of the World Bank's ten thousand economists
come up before with the concept that Wolfensohn now presents as a "new
dimension"? I would imagine that undergraduate studies in sociology or
social and economic history might have provided a sufficient base for this
"discovery". Why aren't we learning? Why did the World Bank do things
"wrong" for 50 years, before Jim Wolfensohn came along with the "right"
message?
Thirty years ago some inspired "avant garde economists" organised
seminars in Washington and Helsinki, where the discussion focused on a
new kind of capital, which would revolutionise and correct the previous
Cf. Wolfensohn (1999) appendix 2. Wolfensohn's empty CDF matrix and in appendix 3 the CDF
matrix depicting the situation in Bolivia.
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mistakes of economics: the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal presented
some of the same criticisms as I do now:
"What should we think about a 'new school' of economics which
claims to have made a 'discovery' about the importance for development
of education? This is, of course, nothing new to the educationists or
economic historians, and had also been appreciated by the classical
and neo-classical economists from Adam Smith to Alfred Marshall.
When it is now a discovery for economists, the explanation is simply
that it had been forgotten by members of our profession.. .when in our
development models we have thought merely in 'economic' terms and,
more specifically, in terms of physical investment."
"More striking, however, is that this newest school of economists.. .is
not radical enough. They restrict themselves, in fact, merely to
widening the concept of investment - ordinarily up till then understood
as physical investment - in the capital/output model so as to include
also 'investment in man'".41
I recommend an article by Paul Collier of the World Bank, entitled "Social
Capital and Poverty"42, and I cannot help but wonder what Myrdal would
have thought about Collier's interpretation and use of the concept of social
capital:
"The social capital is the value of overcoming the externality known
as the 'free-rider' problem in the village: everyone wants there to be
a bus, or a school, but nobody wants to help purchase it. Yet (let us
suppose) the economic return on them is higher than that on other
assets. The collective action enables this higher return to be realized.
The value of the collective action is the present value of this
incremental stream of benefits and this is the social capital of the village
community."
"More generally: V = v(SI, L, K), where the bus uses K, and the school uses
both L and K. These conventional inputs are not to be counted as social
capital. Social capital is the contribution of social interaction (SI) to V."
Table 1. Collier's Empirical Data
Variable
Constant
ELF
LnTelephones
Pop.density
Pop. density, squ
Coefficient
-50.11
-0.14
16.35
-0.18
0.00043
T-statistic
-3.27
-1.25
6.22
-3.01
2.92
41
 Myrdal (1969).
42
 Collier (1998).
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At the end of a rather extensive discourse, Collier ends with a series of
conclusions of the following form (for example):
trust = t(liberty, ELF, phones, density, courts, lawyers)43.
My problem is not a failure to understand what the writer means; in plain
English the above formula says that trust is positively correlated with liberty,
but negatively with the number of lawyers. My main problem is that I'm not
sure if I am interested in hearing that research conclusion, or whether I believe
it to be true. I would be curious to hear Gunnar Myrdal's comments on the
studies of Collier, a distinguished economist and head of the World Bank's
Development Research Group. Myrdal commented on the work of education
economists preceding Collier as follows:
"Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall, as institutionalist as they were, would
never have thought of it; Marshall even warned against a translation of
the factor of education into the financial terms of investment and
output... It can only block the way to realistic and relevant research of
the crucially important problem...of the content of education and its
impact on attitudes and institutions, in particular those of economic and
social stratification, and the impact of these factors back upon education."
Another of the economists I greatly respect, Keith Bezanson, the director of the
Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, had the following to say last October
at Kellokoski, Finland:
"Development thinking and the very language of development will have
to be modified.. .To quote Keynes: 'The difficulty lies not in new ideas,
but escaping the old ones.'...Most development discourse continues
with a language of unlimited economic growth and expansion in the face
of a reality of social and ecological collapse...Yet just as the Chinese
ideogram for 'crisis' is made up of two symbols - one for danger and one
for opportunity - it is essential that development thinking look beyond
the dangers and seek out the opportunities...One of the good
opportunities involves the rise of local initiatives as people and
communities around the world demand more control over their
lives.. .This is perhaps driven in part by sheer necessity, by the declining
capacity of the nation-state to distribute social good.. .But it is happe-
ning. There are elements of social innovation, or re-claiming control, that
give cause for optimism...As Robert Putnam writes: 'Successful
collaboration in one activity builds social capital connections and trust
for other activities. The social capital is built from an investment of the
time and caring of individuals: it does not deplete the public treasury.'"
"For much of the past forty years, development has been cloaked in
the pretence that it was value-free or value-neutral. Nothing was further
from the truth. The foundation stone of development thought and
practice was the dominant socio-economic paradigm of the industrial
/l3
 Liberty = civil liberties; ELF = ethno-linguistic fractionalization; Phones = the telephone density;
Density = population density; Courts = independence of courts; Lawyers = number of lawyers.
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North, emphasising individualism, technology, consumption, personal
wealth and the inadvertent neglect of the social fabric of the community.
Values and culture were factors which, for the most part, simply 'got in
the way'; they were dealt with as incidentals, as 'externalities' to the
development model. The rethinking of development must deal with this
and not merely with how to 'enhance' or 'refine' our approach."
Life politics, learning from the 'otherness'
Encouraged by these thoughts, I complete this chapter with a few ideas on
the values underlying our development thinking and about the changes that
would perhaps lead us in more positive and credible directions in the future.
Our concept of poverty is typically characterised by the idea that the poor
are lacking something which the rich have. It is no great exaggeration to say
that the California of the 1960s is still the "norm society" for international
development aid, i.e. the model of a happy society which the poor countries
are supposed to emulate if and when international development co-
operation is to be successful in its objectives.
Familiarising ourselves with the diversity of life in the societies of
developing countries nevertheless awakens our thoughts and senses to the
anthropological "otherness" which has power to make us question our norm-
like concepts. Anthony Giddens has written about this in a book called
Reflexive Modernization.44
"A post-scarcity society is a society in which the aim of 'development1
comes under close scrutiny. Here the affluent have a great deal to learn
from the poor; and the West from other cultures which in the past it
has simply threatened with extinction."
"The idea of a post-scarcity system can no longer mean...a society
in which scarcity has been eliminated by endless abundance...The
ecological crisis shows us that scarcity is in some respects endemic to
human life upon this earth. A post-scarcity order would rather be one
in which the drive to continuous accumulation has become weakened
or dissolved. Here, questions of life-politics connect directly with the
prospects for global justice."
According to the UN Commission for Sustainable Development, the two main
challenges for sustainable global development are: (a) poverty reduction in
poor countries, (b) changing unsustainable consumption and production
practices in affluent countries.45 The critical question could thus be: what
kind of social capital could compensate for the loss that we would experience
in making do with less consumption measured in materialistic units? Giddens
has an intuitive thought about this:
44
 Giddens (1994) in the book Beck, Giddens, Lash (1994).
45
 Http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd9802.htm.
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"The post-scarcity order begins to emerge in so far as individuals
actively restructure their working lives, valuing other things than their
sheer economic prosperity (e.g. valuing time - the ultimate scarce
resource for the finite human being - more than money). It is worth
remembering that the growth ethic was never adopted by the whole
population; many women stood outside, and continued to live for
values other than those implied in 'secularized puritanism1. A generalizing
of some of those values would certainly make a large dent in the ethic
of continuous economic accumulation."
As already mentioned above, the aid agencies - as intermediaries of
experiences and views between South and North - have something to give
to both developing countries and us rich Northerners.
"For us (the non-poor) this implies rethinking the barriers between
scholarship, private life and (political) action: Any practical analysis of
poverty has to examine the whole system, not just poverty and the
poor. Since we (the non-poor) are the ones with more power to act,
it is hard to evade the imperative to turn the spotlight round and look
at ourselves, e.g. our ways of life."46
Should we start this endeavour by rethinking our energy policy principles,
consumption patterns, transportation, trade, taxation or labour policies, or
by re-prioritising our health-care and research budgets? Our rhetoric and
concepts about poverty provide another good starting point. Our views of
the realities of the poor, and of what should be done, are constructed mainly
from a distance, and can be seen to be constructed mainly for our
convenience. What do we know about poor people's own visions of futures
beyond poverty? Whose knowledge counts?
1
 Chambers (1997).
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Building Local Social Capital
in the European Union:
Partnerships and the Third System
Santiago Loranca-Garcia
Summary
The aim of this paper is to outline the contribution of some European policies
or programmes to the creation of social capital. The term social capital
appears seldom in European policy papers or reports, the much more
commonly used expression being social cohesion. However, social capital
is implicitly present in European programmes, particularly in the areas of
regional and local development (e.g. innovation, information, rural
development) and employment (e.g. territorial employment pacts, local
employment initiatives, Employment and ADAPT Community Initiatives),
where area-based partnerships have been instrumental in improving the
effectiveness of policies and measures through strategic planning based on
the identification of local needs and exploitation of local resources. The local
dimension of employment policy and the role of partnerships were highlighted
in the 1999 Employment Guidelines and will receive further attention in the
years ahead.
The paper places a major focus on the contribution of the 'third system' to
the creation of social capital, and how European programmes are supporting
this. The number and health of voluntary or civic organisations, what we
could call the third sector (or system), could be considered as an indicator
of the stock of social capital. In Europe the third system has increasingly
attracted the attention of policy makers, partly for its employment potential
and contribution to social cohesion. Third system organisations have
experienced strong growth in their employed personnel (remunerated or
not), with numbers outpacing the rest of the economy. Third system
organisations are particularly active in the areas identified as new sources of
jobs. They play a major role in the delivery of social services and in the
reintegration of excluded people; they contribute to social cohesion but also
to the creation of social capital, as they foster many local initiatives that
involve other local actors.
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Specific support for their activities is being introduced into European
programmes such as the budget line Third System and Employment, and the
main ESF programmes, where they may play an expanding role. One
innovative means of support is the experiment involving the allocation of
global grants to an intermediary body that will distribute it to people or third
system organisations promoting small initiatives in support of social cohesion
or employment, providing further means to finance hands-on support.
Introduction
Social capital refers to "features of social organisation such as networks,
norms, and social trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for
mutual benefit" (Putnam 1995). Social capital is related to civic engagement
and social connectedness, to the quality and quantity of social interactions.
The research undertaken by the World Bank has shown that the concept
can be interpreted in more or less narrow terms. Social capital can be
understood at different levels. The narrower meaning would include
"horizontal social networks", mainly affecting associations between people.
A wider interpretation would include "horizontal and vertical associations",
including behaviour within and among organisations. An even broader view
of social capital would include formalised institutions such as governments
or legal systems that shape the social and political environment and affect
development patterns.
It is argued that social capital contributes to better education, health and
economic performance. Some authors have argued that countries "with
higher levels of mutual trust have a stronger competitive position in the world
economy. Civic sense and mutual trust could be considered as a social
infrastructure that facilitates investment and commerce, and therefore
economic growth. The argument goes that collective action is facilitated and
co-ordination of social agents eased, adding a new mechanism supplementing
the state or the market, so that "for a variety of reasons, life is easier in a
community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital".
Social capital appears seldom in EU documents, policy papers and reports,
a more widely used term being social cohesion. The First Report on
Economic and Social Cohesion (1996) acknowledged the difficulties in
defining social cohesion. Art. 130 of the EU Treaty defines economic
cohesion. It says that the Community will endeavour to reduce the disparities
of development levels between regions and to reduce the lagging behind of
less favoured regions. However, no definition was provided for social
cohesion. The report linked social cohesion to the objectives of the European
social model, based on the concept of a market social economy, where the
dimension of solidarity is key. In practical terms the report states that
promoting social cohesion entails the reduction of disparities raised as a
consequence of unequal access to opportunities of employment
(unemployment) or to income (poverty). The Amsterdam Treaty later
introduced a mandate for the European Union to act to combat exclusion.
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However, some authors (Bomhof and den Hertog 1997) when analysing
social cohesion and its effects on economic performance use social capital
indicators such as confidence in institutions and civic sense (people's
perceptions of drug-addiction, tax evasion, etc.) to assess if there is a
correlation between social cohesion and economic performance. They
conclude that weak confidence is associated with slower economic growth
and that countries with a stronger civic sense tend to have faster growth.
The European Commission Medium-Term Social Action Programme 1998-
2000 sets out by stating that economic and social progress go hand-in-hand.
The objective is to raise people's standards of living within the context of a
balanced macro-economic strategy: "Social policy should promote a decent
quality of life and standard of living for all, in an active, inclusive and healthy
society that encourages access to employment, good working conditions,
and equality of opportunity". Employment is central to this vision, as it is still
a major determinant of the role and position of people in society, and of their
social linkages.
It should be stressed that the underlying logic is that social policy is not
an add-on to economic policies, but rather that social policies are considered
as productive factors in themselves. Social policies contribute to better
economic performance through the creation of a participative and cohesive
society.
Both social capital and social cohesion have a very strong local dimension.
Most social interaction takes place in a geographically defined space, locality
or region. Associations of people occur mainly within communities, in
proximity areas, and with the aim of fulfilling their local needs. This applies
equally to market economic interactions. The bulk of economic activity is
performed by SMEs, which operate in mainly local or regional markets, and
tend to establish local networks of co-operation with large scale enterprises
or other SMEs at the local level, and this in spite of the exponential growth
of the Information Society (the new Information and Communication
Technologies) that is blurring distance and enabling globalisation of economic
activities. Employment, the key to social cohesion, is also to a great extent
a local phenomenon (OECD 1998)1. There is a wide diversity of employment
and unemployment situations even in areas governed by the same macro-
economic conditions. The local levels constitute a space where most
adjustments and matching take place (labour supply and demand), and
where measures to promote employment are effectively implemented.
The following pages show how EU programmes and policies contribute
to the creation of social capital by taking into account the growing
importance of local employment and development. Two policy instruments
are particularly relevant here: partnerships and financial support. Partnerships
are key aspects of many EU programmes aimed at fostering economic
OECD (1998) mentions that about 75 per cent of employees in the United Kingdom change work
without changing residence.
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development and employment, and of the implementation of the European
Employment Strategy. I will then examine how the third sector, a key player
at the local level in the creation of social capital, is receiving structured
funding support from the EU programmes. This will shed some light on the
EU's contribution to the creation of social capital.
Local partnerships as a source of social capital
Networking, a crucial aspect of social capital, is a key issue in the regional
development and innovation literature. The specific characteristics of a
"milieu innovateur" and the extent to which they can be replicated elsewhere
are widely debated (e.g. local production systems such as industrial districts
in Italy, where co-operative behaviour is fostered by social networks and
trust, are commonly analysed). The innovation literature focusing on
territorial (national, regional, local) systems highlights the key role of the
interactions between innovation system agents. Innovation is considered a
process resulting from the interactions of many actors and where the
networking and co-operation patterns are essential for innovative
performance2. These analyses have been taken into account in the structural
policy. The innovative actions undertaken through Art. 10 of the ERDF (e.g.
Regional Innovation Strategies, Regional Information Society) have stressed
the need for strategic planning based on consensus building and the
involvement and networking of relevant local actors3.
But bottom-up approaches, consensus-building, involvement of local
actors and networking are far from being specific to technological or
economic development programmes. Actually, the development of
partnerships as a way of improving labour market policy formation and
implementation is not completely new. Different forms of partnerships
bringing together local actors have emerged in Europe in the last decade, and
the European programmes have contributed to their dissemination.
A partnership can be defined as a "process involving a variety of different
players from a variety of sectors coming together in a common purpose to
work towards an agreed goal. The process is based on democratic principles,
operates with clearly defined support systems, and involves continuous
evaluation to produce outcomes which will add value" (European Commission
1998).
2
 Morgan (1996) reminds us that lack of social capital helps to explain one of the EU's key problems,
its "inability to transfer technology from university laboratory to industry, from one company to
another and from region to region".
3
 The experience of the Spanish region of Castilla-Leon illustrates these approaches. A regional
technology plan was elaborated during 1994-1996. The process involved the consultation of all
relevant actors (public administrations of different levels, firms, trade unions, professional organisa-
tions, universities, research centres) who debated their problems, needs, strengths and opportunities.
A Regional Technological Forum was created bringing together economic and social actors. The
process of strategic planning has developed social capital and has contributed to a better targeting
of ERDF and ESF funds, increasing the technological effort of the region.
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Partnerships have emerged as a new form of co-ordination of employment
and labour market policy-making (strategic planning) and implementation
at the local level. Various factors have contributed to the growth of
partnerships in different member states, some as follows4:
- The complexity of unemployment and social exclusion problems. These do
not have a single cause; different mechanisms can be at work, implying that
simple solutions do not exist. Different policy areas and institutions
contribute to address unemployment.
- The implementation of individualised integration paths for unemployed
people, including counselling, the identification of individual needs and
guidance on the most appropriate measures, training and/or work experience,
require the mobilisation of different actors.
- There has been a tendency towards the decentralisation of active labour
market policies in Europe, to different degrees. This implies that the
implementation of national measures is being tailored to local conditions.
Even in centralised policy contexts, regional and local administrations have
tended to supplement national measures with their own.
- The extent of the unemployment problem has led to the appearance of new
actors, such as Chambers of Commerce, SME associations, employers, and
in particular community groups. Some develop their own initiatives, while
others get involved in local delivery processes.
The main conclusions of the European Commission's Local Employment
Development Action Programme (LEDA), action-research programme (1987-
1996) shed light on the processes of fighting unemployment at the local level
and the value of strategic planning based on consensus building, participation
and involvement of local actors (Campbell et al. 1998):
- Policy design and implementation are more likely to be effective the closer
these are to the reality: bottom-up approaches that identify local needs,
barriers to accessing labour market opportunities, identification and
assessment of local priorities.
- A strategic approach that aligns policies and measures across different field
is required for tackling long-term unemployment.
- This strategic approach requires the development of partnerships with the
effective involvement of local actors, in particular with excluded groups
and communities, and building a consensus around this strategy.
- Strengthening the capacity for effective delivery of programmes and
measures is essential.
During the 1990s we have seen the emergence of different forms of pacts and
partnerships responding to these principles: the Area-Based Partnerships in
Ireland, the Employment Pacts in Italy, the Local Economic Integration Plans
4
 See in particular: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions,
Partenariat Local: Une Strategic Reussie pour la Cohesion Sociale?, 1998; LEDA (1996) and OECD
(1998).
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(PLIE) in France, and so on. At the European level the Commission has been
supporting the development of 89 "Territorial Pacts", an initiative launched
at the European Council in Florence in 1996. These cover geographical areas
including 36 million people. The Pacts underpin local action for employment
and disseminate good practices. They develop a bottom-up approach,
encouraging local actors to take the future into their own hands, and to
develop action plans and integrated strategies at local level. They should
influence the decision process on priority identification, fund allocation and
project undertaking.
Further to the Employment Pacts, which have a clear strategic planning
nature, many partnerships are dedicated to carrying out specific projects.
Establishing local partnerships is one of the guiding principles of the
Employment and ADAPT Community Initiatives, and for implementing some
measures of Objective 3 of the Structural Funds5. In these cases the object
of the partnerships is the implementation of integrated approaches, the
delivery of new methods of training and acquisition of skills supporting
employability or adaptability, the development of support services and
shared resources, the building of labour market intelligence, and the
networking of micro-enterprises or SMEs.
Building partnerships is not an easy task; it requires work, time and effort.
The development of a common vision, an understanding of each other's
aims, cultures and contexts, an agreed means of communication, good
personal relations, the involvement of all relevant actors, a clear definition
of roles and responsibilities, monitoring and evaluation, and agreement on
decision-making processes are not easy to achieve. But their effects should
not be judged solely by the immediate successes. They can be considered
part of a learning process in which hopefully the actors learn to know each
other, to establish channels of communication, and to talk and work together
with long-term beneficial outcomes.
The European Strategy of Employment, with its origins in the Amsterdam
Treaty, has drawn attention to the local dimension of employment and
encouraged a partnership approach in various action fields.
As a reminder, the European Employment Strategy has three components:
- macro-economic policy co-ordination
- harnessing Community policies in support of employment
- co-ordination of national employment policies according to guidelines
jointly agreed.
The European Employment Strategy has meant a process of convergence,
the so-called Process of Luxembourg, based on the multilateral vigilance and
peer review, that could potentially turn out to be as powerful as the process
5
 The principle of partnership is at the root of the Structural Funds. The partnership is established at
different levels. Vertical partnerships are developed between the Commission and the member states,
between them and the regions, and so on. Horizontal partnerships are developed for the
implementation of measures, this being particularly true in the cases of holistic approaches requiring
the involvement of various activities and actors (eg. integration pathways).
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of convergence was to Economic and Monetary Union. If EMU has been
effective in creating healthy public accounts, price stability and a drop in
interest rates, the Luxembourg Process seeks similar success in the area of
employment policy. The 15 governments of the member states work with
common methods and aims, as expressed in the Employment Guidelines and
the National Employment Plans.
The employment plans are built on four pillars:
- Employability, to promote the labour insertion capacity of unemployed
workers.
- Entrepreneurship, to promote the "esprit d'entreprise" so that new
companies and new jobs may be created.
- Adaptability, to develop the adjustment capacity of workers to the new
technologies and the new forms of work organisation.
- Equal opportunities in the labour market.
The 1998 Employment Guidelines set out that "member states will investigate
measures to exploit fully the possibilities offered by job creation at local level
in the social economy and in new activities linked to needs not yet satisfied
by the market, and examine, with the aim of reducing, any obstacles in the
way of such measures" (10th Guideline).
The Commission Communication "From Guidelines to action: the national
action plans for employment" (COM (1998) 316) stated that member states
increasingly recognise the potential for employment creation in the social
economy, local activities and the importance of new activities which meet
unfulfilled social demands. It concluded that many member states had
announced the commitment to develop action in these fields but only a few
had provided concrete and relevant examples of measures and pilot projects.
The 1998 Joint Employment Report mentioned that partnerships between
local authorities and entrepreneurs in the exploitation of business opportunities
were being attempted in several countries. However, the Commission and
the Council considered that the involvement of local authorities, as well as
other important players such as business organisations and the voluntary
sector, in the implementation of the NAPs remains modest. The NAPs contain
little information on activities carried out at levels other than the national
level. The first evaluation of the impact of the NAPs will be contained in the
Joint Employment Report 1999.
Finally, the 1999 Employment Guidelines adopted by the Council highlight
that "the role and responsibility of partners at the regional and local levels
in job creation and in ensuring supportive conditions and structures need to
be more fully recognised and supported". The new 12th Guideline (replacing
the old 10th Guideline) specifically mentions that to exploit fully the
possibilities offered by job creation at local level "the special role of local
authorities and the social partners should be taken into account".
The trend is therefore to reinforce the process of involvement at the local
level in implementing of the European Employment Strategy and the NAPs.
As a confirmation of this aspect, it should be noted that the Committee of the
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Regions, together with the Council of European Municipalities and Regions,
intends to launch a campaign on Local Action for Employment, through a
number of major conferences held during 1999 and 2000. Starting in Helsinki
in September 1999, mayors and local authorities will be encouraged to take
part in the implementation of the employment guidelines.
But the Employment Guidelines also contain further references to the need
for a partnership approach to various areas, such as lifelong learning, the
introduction of new technologies, and the implementation of new forms of
work organisation. All these are elements that contribute to the development
of high performance workplaces necessary to sustain innovation and
competitiveness, and ultimately employment opportunities.
The third system as a source of social capital creation
One way of displaying civic engagement is through participation in voluntary
or civic organisations. These organisations work in activity areas ranging
between the market and the State. They are known under different names
(voluntary sector, social economy, community sector, third sector, third
system, non-profit sector, civil society). Because they adopt a variety of legal
forms, they bear names that mean different things in different countries.
They constitute a multi-faceted world performing a variety of activities but
sharing a number of characteristics.
- If non-profit organisations obtain profits, they are reinvested in their
activities.
- Needs-oriented, looking for responses to needs rather than obtaining
market advantages.
- Paying attention to socially disadvantaged groups, making reference to
factors such as solidarity and re-affirming the primacy of the individual over
capital.
- Having a close relation with their local environment, the local community
(geographical and human).
- Self-governing and independent of the State.
- Their sources of finance are varied and mixed, combining fees, public
subsidies, donations and loans.
- Though many are small sized, they have a capacity to mobilise a greater
number of voluntary or associated people6.
In recent years the third system has attracted attention from policy markets
and researchers. There are two reasons for such interest: its growth
(particularly in employment numbers) and its role in the provision of social
services.
Despite having little solid data to characterise the third sector, there are
indications that its component organisations etc. have increased in number
6
 It is estimated that between a third and a half of the population in the European Union are members
of voluntary organisations.
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and scale and have created a substantial number of places in paid and non-
paid employment.
Comparative research carried out by the John Hopkins Comparative Non-
profit Sector Project (Salamon et al. 1998) has estimated that the non-profit
share of total employment in the European Union averages 6.89 % of total
employment, compared to 7.83 % in the US in 1995. The same source
estimates that during the 1990-1995 period employment growth in the non-
profit sector was fourfold greater than that in overall employment. The non-
profit sector grew by 23 % (4 % a year) whereas overall employment grew
by only 6 % (a little over 1 % a year). These trends can be confirmed from
data provided by member states in the framework of their NAPs. For instance,
the 1998 German employment plan mentions that employment in the third
sector grew by 20 % in the previous four years, whereas overall employment
remained static.
The Employment Rates Report 1998 (COM (1998) 572) identified great
potential for growth in European countries in communal services excluding
public administration (education, health, sanitary and social services, personal
services). If we compare the structure of employment (sectoral shares of
these communal services of total employment) between the EU-15 average
(20.7 % ) and the US (23.8 %), we observe that these services account for a
bigger share in the US. But the disparity is even clearer if we compare the
structures in terms of sectoral employment shares of the working age
population: 12.5 % in the EU-15 and 17.6 % in the US. This difference means
no less than 12.5 million jobs. If we benchmark European employment rates
to the US ones, it could be said that there is great potential for employment
creation in these services. Of course, employment in communal, personal
and collective services cannot be attributed to the third sector alone, since
private and public sectors are also strongly represented. Nonetheless, these
activities are precisely the ones in which the third sector intervenes and has
been growing faster. An important finding of the above-mentioned John
Hopkins research is that in Western Europe social services7 account for the
largest share of job growth (40 %).
But it is not only the quantitative importance of how many jobs are created
which justifies this attention. The social functions are also important, in
particular those of service-delivery, self-help or mutual support, resource co-
ordination and advocacy. The former are somewhat related to the issue of
the crisis in the welfare state and the contracting-out of various services
previously provided by the State. The increase in unemployment, risk of
exclusion and the poverty situation, together with new demands arising from
social changes such as the incorporation of women in the labour market,
have raised demands for the provision of social services and in ways that
require flexibility and understanding of the needs. The third system partially
occupies this new ground.
Social services comprise care services for children, elderly, handicapped, self-help and other
personal services, refugee and emergency assistance, income support and maintenance.
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One innovative aspect is that we have witnessed the emergence of so-called
social enterprises-organisations that undertake economic initiatives with
social objectives. They produce services and goods, engage in real economic
activity, run economic risks, employ paid work and have a market orientation
(income is derived at least partially from prices or fees paid by final
consumers or from contractual transactions with public authorities). However,
they also have a social dimension, as they are the result of a collective
dynamic involving the community. Stakeholders are also involved, profits are
re-invested and they have as a principal aim to be of service to the community
or to a specific group of people (Borzaga 1998). Social enterprises are
particularly active in what is called the new sources of employment identified
in the wake of the Commission's White Paper on Growth, Employment and
Competitiveness.
Some of these social enterprises have as a social aim the social and labour
integration of disadvantaged persons (work integration social enterprises).
This element has a great value in terms of social cohesion at the local level.
The social enterprises are performing a role that transcends the traditional
role of the State or of private enterprises. They provide services for which the
market did not exist due to demand or supply structure problems. They are
not just subcontractors of previously publicly provided services, as they add
new dimensions through the involvement of users and other stakeholders,
enabling innovation and better service.
The third system is approaching a situation in which some of the
organisations have grown substantially to the point where there is a need to
manage properly the change of scale. At the same time they can fall victim
to their success, as they have contributed to create new markets for new
services, which once made profitable can start attracting economic agents
purely for profit. How the third system will face such challenges is difficult
to predict.
EU support for third system initiatives
Though the main engine of social capital is the non-profit organisations
developing initiatives that contribute to the creation of employment and the
strengthening of social cohesion, many of these initiatives are hindered by
difficulties in accessing finance (granted, borrowed) and by lack of capacities
and support, particularly those coming from small-scale organisations.
The European Union has supported the activities of the third system
organisations through various programmes:
- A small percentage of ESF mainstream money goes to social economy
organisations8. However, some member states are developing ways to
The mid-term evaluation of the ESF intervention (1994-1997) has identified an increase in the
presence of NGO promoters in the area of excluded and long-term unemployment, where
approaches favouring social and professional integration are developed.
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increase the take-up of ESF funding by third system organisations; for
instance the United Kingdom introduced in its Objective 3 Single
Programming Document a priority (known as Priority 4) aimed at community
capacity building so that third system organisations consolidate their role
as service providers in the context of ESF programmes.
- In 1997, 323 social economy project promoters represented about 8 % of
the total Employment Community Initiative projects.
- Almost half of the 1996-97 projects subject to calls for proposals on new
fields of job growth came from social economy organisations.
- The pilot action entitled Third System and Employment, aimed at the
exploration and enhancement of the employment potential of the third
system, is funding 81 projects.
- A budget line has been made available to NGOs for preparatory measures
for Community action on the basis of Art. 13 (non-discrimination) and 137
(combating social exclusion).
- Some policy proposals concerning social economy and co-operatives could
be prepared during 1999.
One of the problems identified is that even though the voluntary sector or
the third system cannot claim they have no access to ESF or structural funds
money, it is true that this access remains restricted to organisations with the
capacity to manage big projects. Lengthy and cumbersome procedures and
match-funding rules hinder access to ESF money for groups and initiatives
of small size but which are socially useful.
In July 1998 the Commission called for proposals on Local Social Capital.
This pilot action aims at developing an instrument, the Local Social Capital
Intermediary Structures (LSCIS), which will facilitate financial aid and hands-
on back-up to promoters of small projects that have difficulties in accessing
traditional sources of support:
"Local Social Capital means an intermediary organisation - operating at
regional or local level - capable of providing backup for people who pool
their resources with a view to carrying out micro-level projects which
promote employment and social cohesion".9
The organisations selected by the Commission as LSCIS will be given a
grant averaging 1 million EUR. They will be responsible for the channelling
of funds in the form of small grants averaging 10,000 EUR, and for giving
hands-on support to local micro-project promoters. In other words, they will
act as intermediaries between the Commission and the people and groups
promoting new initiatives in three areas:
- restoring social cohesion
- reinforcing local networks and groups seeking social inclusion of people
- start-up of micro-business and co-operatives.
Cf. Call for proposals on Local Social Capital, par. 4.
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This model has already been successfully implemented in the framework of
the PEACE10programme. The Local Social Capital pilot projects will serve as
a basis for implementing the money allocated through intermediary bodies
under the new Objective 3 of the Structural Funds. The initial proposal of the
Commission established that at least 1 % of ESF interventions would be
delivered by intermediaiy organisations, with special access rules for NGOs.
The LSC intermediary structures have three main dimensions: financial,
territorial and operational.
The financial dimension of the LSC Intermediary Structures
The IS are responsible for the management of Community funds. Therefore,
they must be financially sound and capable of keeping healthy and
transparent financial relations with the Commission and the project promoters.
In particular, this requires that the IS
- develop fast and sure procedures for the acquisition, management and
transfer of funds
- implement systems of control and verification for the correct use of
allocated funds
- be accountable to the Commission, and provide periodic and detailed
activity and financial reports.
The territorial dimension of the LSC Intermediary Structures
The IS must have a deep knowledge of the socio-economic problems of the
territory, both in terms of the problems and the existing social support structures.
The IS have to intervene in a precise geographical area, where they will
develop the contacts and the co-operation of people in need of support and
of the groups that represent or support them. LSC IS have the advantage of
being close at hand so that new bottom-up initiatives emerge in response to
local needs.
But the IS also have a larger role as engines of the mobilisation of local
resources. The value added of the LSCIS will be confirmed if they show
sufficient willingness and capacity to use the money allocated for activities
as a basis for the leverage of further resources.
The LSCIS should not try to work alone and in isolation. They must develop
and strengthen partnerships with the locally active public services (social,
educational, etc) and economic agents to contribute to the development of
social capital. The LSCIS do not seek to replace existing programmes or
institutions but to supplement them and enhance their reach in favour of
those unemployed or socially excluded.
EU Special Programme for Peace and Reconciliation 1995-1999.
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(b) The operational dimension of the LSC Intermediary Structures
The LSCIS must undertake a number of tasks to fulfil the aims of mobilising
resources. A number of them have been identified:
- to develop awareness of programmes in effective ways so that target groups
(organisations and people) are effectively reached
- to encourage the emergence of initiatives by people and groups
- to establish procedures that enable the accessibility of the IS to target groups
and people
- to set up simple but sound procedures enabling applicants to have rapid feed-
back on the response to their applications
- to devise a comprehensive back-up support system (advice, consultation,
guidance, monitoring, etc) in order to maximise the chances of success of the
micro-projects
- to integrate evaluation as an integral part of the delivery mechanism of the IS.
Conclusions
The complexity and multidimensional nature of problems such as
unemployment and social exclusion, together with the insufficient response
of traditional market or state mechanisms of co-ordination, have fostered the
emergence of new forms of social co-ordination and social action.
The creation of partnerships responds to this need. The process of building
and developing partnerships, beyond better priority setting and resource
allocation, has significant beneficial effects in terms of establishing a more
favourable co-operative environment at the local level, an environment in
which new initiatives responding to local needs can grow.
The third sector has emerged as a new actor at the local level. It has proved
to be particularly active in the provision of social services and generally in
areas where neither the market nor the state have penetrated satisfactorily.
It draws its advantages from its flexibility and closeness to the user. The third
sector is in mutation: it is growing and has prospects for further growth, but
there are still difficulties in gaining funds to finance activities. Despite the
trend of an increased share of resources coming from fees and prices
charged, third system organisations still rely mainly on public funding. This
financial problem can be particularly acute in the initial phases of initiatives.
The pilot projects on Local Social Capital under Art. 6 of the ESF will
experiment with a novel way of supporting small social initiatives emerging
in the third sector. Some private foundations offer similar schemes, and the
mechanism of Intermediary bodies and global grants exists in other areas of
the Structural Funds. However it is a new approach for many member states.
It is new in employment policy and it can contribute to introducing a dynamic
of social capital creation at the local level that could otherwise remain
untapped.
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Social Capital
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Dr. Loranca-Garcia presents one of the few existing operative examples of
applying the concept of social capital in a political programme. It is thus likely
to meet many of the challenges expected in operationalization of the
concept. One of the critical issues so far has been the difficulty in creating
or enhancing social capital with goal-oriented action. Another issue concerns
the indicators of social capital. In the EU project for developing Local Social
Capital Intermediary Structures, the issue of indicators has been touched on
only in passing. It is clear, however, that indicators will be needed when the
project comes to be evaluated.
I first address a few general elements of the programme, and then move
on to some comments from the Nordic or Scandinavian perspective in
particular. But before beginning my more specific comments, one general
remark. Understandably, the EU programme on local social capital is a
political programme, and not a scientific experiment. This is clearly
expressed in the wording of the programme, which reflects the rhetorical and
also political shift from combatting exclusion to promoting inclusion through
supporting employment. Of course, this is all very appropriate, as the EU is
a political actor par excellence. If we wish to characterize the programme of
local social capital in sociological terms, then the nearest counterpart would
be the idea of sociological intervention, as applied in the tradition of action
research. Indeed, the introduction of the key concept of the programme, that
of Local Social Capital Intermediary Structures (LSCIS), is an intervention into
existing structures and modes of action in many countries. It -would be
extremely interesting to learn from a comparative evaluation how this
intervention has been met in different countries.
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Local vs. "personal" and "overall" social capital
I first contrast the notion of "local social capital" with two other kinds of
formulations, one of them being overall social capital, the other one
something called "personal social capital" (Comparative Social Inclusion
Policy in Europe 1998).
Isn't all social capital very "local" by nature? I think Dr. Loranca also stresses
this point in his paper. The notion of social capital seems to be related very
much to the idea of local community as the central context of economic and
social life. Cohesion, then, would be related to the memberships in a local
community. However, there may also be an aspect of social capital that is less
directly related to the local community but more to general social and cultural
cohesion. It may be that the USA and Italy, where Putnam first developed his
theories on social capital, are "village societies" where the local community
has a very important role. But equally it is possible that some other countries
are much less "village societies" than assumed by the theorists of social
capital.
There may also be other forms of cohesion that do not presuppose the local
community as the basic institution. The Nordic countries, for instance, may
appear as sites of weak locality but strong cultural cohesion. This is reflected
in the fact that the word "community" is difficult to translate and use, in
Swedish and Finnish at least, in any colloquial sense. Norway and Denmark,
by contrast, may be much better examples of "local" communities, the former
due to long traditions of geographic isolation and the latter thanks to its very
peculiar history of local communities (municipalities) as key political arenas
and actors balancing out the central power.
Still, there may be something in all countries that represents social capital
in a non-local, general sense. At least the attempts to introduce social capital
as a factor explaining differences in economic development between
countries would presuppose a non-local, nationwide notion of social capital.
In Finland, a prime example would be the common view of our neighbour
Russia as a society of distrust: it is not only, and perhaps not primarily, local
social capital that is the issue here, but a nation-wide phenomenon. It is
interesting that Putnam's main work, the bible of social capital, has been
translated in Russian, and that there is some Russian debate surrounding the
concept. It remains to be seen how the Russian version of the concept of
social capital will emerge.
The concept of "personal social capital" is a new one for me. I came across
it by accident among one of the countless examples of 'grey' literature
flourishing in EU research programmes. The interesting concept of personal
social capital was discussed in a report of a TSER Thematic Research Project
on Comparative Social Inclusion Policy in Europe. The concept relies on
"three sets of personal social goods", namely recognition, income and work.
In the political context of promoting social inclusions, the key component
seems to be work, which is often a necessary prerequisite for creating both
recognition and income. This comes very close to the project ideas presented
by Dr. Loranca, and he is probably well informed of the ongoing research
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work on personal social capital. Still, it may be asked what "local" means in
this conceptualization of personal social capital, and how it relates to the
concept of local social capital. The scarce literature I had at hand did not
provide any clear-cut answers.
Creating civil society from above?
The programme of supporting Local Social Capital Intermediary Structures
could be interpreted as an attempt to create civil society from above. This may
seem paradoxical as the basic nature of the programme is to support bottom-
up approaches. Again, there is nothing inappropriate here, as it is common
practice both by national governments and international organizations to
work from the top to activate people at the bottom. In this programme, the
target group is on the bottom not only in terms of core vs. periphery, but also
in the sense that a final goal is to include persons at risk of exclusion into
a tighter community membership. The support for LSCIS is thus a means of
strengthening local structures/local social capital so that this final goal can
be better achieved.
The problem that may arise in a supra-national programme like this is that
different countries have different histories. They have different social,
cultural and political institutions, and different views on the third sector or
the third system, and the programme of promoting local social capital must
be flexible enough to adapt itself to these disparities. The task is reminiscent
of developing social capital in the post-communist transitional Europe. A
quotation from a report on such a project in Bosnia-Herzegovina may
illustrate this point (Engberg and Stubbs 1999, 9-10):
The task for social development, then, probably becomes much less
that of imposing a, literally, foreign notion of NGOs on an unsuspecting
populace - any cursory examination of current trends, as we will note,
seems as likely to produce less rather than more trust - and much more
that of identifying what kinds of trust existed before and how these can
be rebuilt.
Although conditions in the EU member countries are less dramatic than in
Bosnia, it might be worthwhile considering the meeting of local traditions of
social capital with the concept at least implicitly present in the Local Social
Capital programme. I did not find much reference in this direction in Dr.
Loranca's text.
Another remark based on the report from Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the
experiment there, the goal was to promote social organizations of any kind,
irrespective of their relevance from the point of view of, say, employment
and production. Actually, the authors suggest that not only are non-profit
organizations better than for-profit organizations at this task, but non-
economic organizations work at least as well as civil organizations with
clearcut economic goals. In the EU project on Local Social Capital, the forms
of civil action to be supported have the quite direct and immediate goals of
promoting employment and cohesion. When looked at from the general
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perspective of social capital, the goals on cohesion at least could also be
achieved with more indirect activities.
A state-penetrated civil society: a Nordic peculiarity or
the future of EU Europe?
I finish my comments with an observation that, for me, seems important
when discussing the role of the third sector, or the third system. In the Nordic
countries, Sweden and Finland at least, it would be possible to characterize
much of the activity of the third sector as representing a "state-penetrated civil
society". This expression refers to the fact that the third sector did not emerge
largely as an opposition to the state, but rather as an ally and even as its
predecessor. So the expression has a positive tone in the sense that the state
works in close collaboration with the third sector and often supports it
financially, without questioning the independence of NGOs. But the
expression also implicitly refers to the idea of the state as something good
and supportive, and not something bad and repressive. Now, the programme
of promoting local social capital with EU funds has many features of this
"good state" approach, although it may be politically impossible to use such
an expression in EU documents. This interpretation could greatly facilitate
the introduction of the programme in traditional state-penetrated civil
societies like Finland and Sweden. It remains to be seen whether the project
of promoting local social capital also paves the way for the growth of state-
penetrated civil societies elsewhere in the EU.
References
Engberg, Ulla - Stubbs, Paul (1999): Social capital and integrated development: a civil
society grants programme in Travnik, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Globalism and Social
Policy Programme (GASPP), Occasional Papers 2/1999. Stakes, Helsinki and
Department of Sociological Studies, Sheffield University.
Comparative Social Inclusion Policy in Europe (1998). TSER Thematic Research
Project. Report 1 - CONTEXTS Volume 1, July 1998. PERC/Sociology Department,
Sheffield University.
127
Social Capital
and
Social Policy
Reijo Vadrala
Introduction
In the world of social policy, an issue very much in the spotlight these days
is social responsibility. It features in discussions about the relationship
between the individual and community, the role of the public sector, and
sectoral power and incentives (welfare-workfare). Rose (1995) suggests that
there has been an interruption in social thinking in recent years. The social
dimension has traditionally been seen as an essential component in the
construction of the welfare state. According to Rose (1995, 20) the social
dimension arose in European political thinking in the 19th century. It implied
the emergence of a "social" arena between the legal entity based on legal
rights and the economic entity reflecting individual interests. Rose also
suggests that the emergence of the welfare state has led to linkage between
the social arena and the state. The family has gradually become a social entity,
employment and the employment relationship have become social institutions,
the spheres of civil society have become social spheres, cities have become
institutions of social measures, and so forth. When analysing the present
condition of the welfare state, Rose asks whether we can relate recent
developments in it to the disintegration of the social aspect. Against this
background I would like to challenge somewhat the concept of social capital
and discuss more broadly the question of how, inter alia, the interruption in
social thinking suggested by Rose is manifested in today's society.
Criticism of the welfare state has long focused on the strengthening role
of the state and the restriction of individual autonomy. According to this
argument, the control of the social spheres is suppressing individual
aspirations. Another criticism is that the steering of the social arena by
society, and especially by the state, deprives citizens of their individual
initiative and makes them passive.
130 Social Capital
families. The social security system was to intervene only in the case of a
temporary interruption in an employment relationship or other life situation.
We can thus speak about a normal employment relationship as an anchor
of life or as an "agreement". The concept of the normal employment
relationship refers to the general principle adopted in industrial society
concerning the form of an employment contract for paid work. At the same
time, the normal employment relationship is also a societal concept,
denoting in its deepest meaning the integration of work, basic income, way
of life and values in our society.
c) The generation agreement
The third agreement that has created integration in our society is the
generation agreement. This agreement has allowed us to promote integration
between the various generations and age groups by constructing
comprehensive pension insurance systems, societally produced child care
and elderly care, as well as education systems for children and young people.
People's obligation to take care of their parents has been replaced by a
general societal "agreement", and in this connection the relationships
between the generations and the related risks have acquired a societal nature.
Thus we have established promises that maintain the cohesion and solidarity
of society and permit in principle all generations to lead a secure life on equal
terms with others, irrespective of differences between their starting levels. At
the same time, we have sought to ensure the independence and autonomy
of all generations, which has formed the basis of decent and autonomous
living in all phases of life. The generation agreement has also been linked
with the agreement on normal employment relationships: it has, inter alia,
permitted greater mobilisation of the labour force by providing societally
produced care of children and older people.
d) The gender agreement
The fourth agreement is the gender agreement, which in principle permits
the two genders to participate in the societal division of labour on equal
terms. As a result, e.g. Finnish women's participation in working life has risen
to a level that is high even by international standards. This development has
required undertakings by the state and municipalities to organise day care
and education of children. It has also meant setting standards that promote
equality in working life, as well as changes in income transfers and social
security. This development has led to a new family structure and changed
internal family relationships. In parallel with internal family cohesion is now
each family member's individual world, which also contains an individual life
independent of the family.
I have now described, partly at the level of ideals, the agreements created
during the formative period of the welfare state in Finland. There is naturally
no unanimous decision on how these agreements have been reached.
Rather, history shows that the political approach described above has been
the outcome of great conflicts and struggles. Whereas it has not been able
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to prevent poverty, unemployment and exclusion, it has kept these phenomena
at controllable and reasonable levels from the viewpoint of society as a
whole. In terms of promoting of integration and preventing exclusion, these
"agreements" have formed an ideological basis and a common legitimate
foundation for creating cohesion in society. At the same time, they have
complemented the economy and legal rights with an increasingly independent
social dimension, able to regulate relationships between individuals and
society on the one hand, and between individuals and social groups on the
other. These agreements can be seen as core concepts of social capital in the
sense suggested by Putnam (1993). If social capital consists of norms,
networks and trust, the agreements dealt with above represent the social
capital of the whole of society at the level of ideals.
The agreements reflecting the change in the social area can also be
complemented by other "agreements". It might be useful to examine the
whole spectrum of agreements, e.g. from the civil rights aspect, in order to
form a more comprehensive picture. At this stage, however, I confine myself
to the framework outlined above, since in my view the agreements included
in it amount to anchors of the welfare society.
The changing basis of agreements
During the formative period of the welfare state, the agreements described
above were based on economic growth and its redistribution. We can assume
that factors related to economic growth and mobilisation of the labour force
supported policies promoting societal integration and solidarity. On the
other hand, the agreements considered here -were part of the social thinking
of the welfare society, and their durability as integrating principles was based
on the independent ability of nation states to determine the direction of their
economies and policies. The agreements also constituted part of the social
capital that accrued during the post-war reconstruction period. The relatively
vigorous economic growth would not have been possible without these
agreements, which in fact created the basis for both genders' participation
in working life. They also permitted the mobilisation of the large reserves of
know-how based on education, and created very strong public finances and
related services. To summarise, the economic growth made possible the
agreements improving social integration, but without these agreements the
economic growth would not have been possible. In other words, the social
capital reflected by the agreements has been both a prerequisite for the
economic growth and a result of it.
The challenges of the global economy are confronting the nation states and
testing people's economic and social activities in new ways. In the discussion
on exclusion it is important to analyse how the increasing global market
dependence is reflected in the agreements surrounding the welfare state
analysed above. We can at least assume that the opportunities of the national
level to decide on the means to safeguard our well-being will narrow if the
markets increasingly dominate the choices made by our society.
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of the welfare state. The employment security for the rural people, the
solidarity agreement, the generation agreement and the gender agreement
were interweaved around the rural way of life, forming a combination that
maintained family farms, villages, families and the social structure of the
countryside. Thus, the social aspect of agricultural policies was based on
national policies intended to increase cohesion and integrate the rural
population into society. There was naturally some exclusion as well, but it
could be kept at a tolerable level and under control.
Post-war housing policies were also strongly based on the idea of social
production. Housing was regarded as one of the basic areas of the social
sphere. Housing policies placed a strong emphasis on the promotion of
housing for people with low income and for the socially underprivileged.
Therefore, systems for loans and housing allowances were created in order
to equalise housing costs and enhance socially integrating factors.
Post-war educational policies changed direction in the 1960s, in line with
the notion of replacing the existing parallel school system with a comprehensive
one. The subsegment reform was aimed at creating socially durable
educational policies, which would - at least in principle - create new
opportunities for social mobility. It was also designed to equalise the general
differences between people's starting levels. Plans were also made to
construct integrating structures at upper secondary level, but this stage of the
school reform was never completed. It was intended that the previously elitist
universities would become institutions for the masses drawing all reserves
of talent in the country into the highest level of education as efficiently as
possible. Educational policies were seen not only as closely connected with
social policies, but also as part of the overall aim to create a uniform culture
and an integrated nation.
During the construction of the welfare state, labour force policies were
connected with the industrialisation of the country and the development of
trades on the one hand, and with solving social questions on the other. The
point of departure in labour force policies was full employment and
mobilisation of all labour force resources in order to serve economic growth.
According to Kuusi's thinking, labour force policies and social policies were
closely interlinked. They had to guarantee the participation of all willing
people in the labour market, as a last resort through public measures. Those
unable to obtain work had to be guaranteed a basic income.
The points of departure of industrial policies could be examined in the
same manner. Regional and transport policies were also based on national
welfare state thinking.
The arrows in the figure denote the direction of social responsibility and
indicate the contradictory pressures in opposite directions. On the one hand,
welfare state thinking based on the tradition of modern society emphasises
social responsibility within each political sector. On the other hand, the
increasing dependence on competition in the global economy increases
market dependence and thus also strengthens exclusive tendencies within
the political sectors. Factors that are exclusive and non-integrating themselves
Reijo Vaarala 135
therefore arise within the political sectors. We can also assume that each
political sector earlier formed part of preventive social policies in this respect.
The new pressures are particularly visible in the structural change of
agriculture, where the recent basic trend is a more towards business and
market dependence. Granberg (1996) says that abandoning national
agricultural policies also meant abandoning the social dimension of agricultural
policies and the policies of equalisation of income in agriculture on social
grounds derived from welfare state thinking. The European integration
process involves a change in the operating conditions of agriculture and an
increase in social problems among the farm population. In reference to the
figure it also means that the proactive social responsibility included in
agricultural policies is being shifted towards the last-resort responsibility of
social policies.
The comprehensive reform of education during the last few years has been
a very contradictory process. It has included both the educational reform that
started decades ago and some completely new trends and ideas. The changes
in the nature of information, the revolutionary advances of information
technology, the changes in the labour market, as well as globalisation and
internationalisation are constantly presenting new challenges for national
educational policies. The result is that education is being shifted towards a
market where pupils are increasingly seen as clients making choices. In this
respect, education meets the expectations of the individualised world.
Educational institutions seem to be evolving into mutually competing
suppliers or sellers of education services. Jukka Sarjala, Director General of
the National Board of Education, asks among other things "whether we want
to maintain a strong public school system in our country or whether we are
to let the system split up into single educational units whose supply of
teaching is determined by the demand of the pupils. In the latter case the
pupil becomes a client who ponders whether to go shopping in a
neighbourhood shop, specialised shop or warehouse. If the quality of the
supply is too weak to attract any clients, the shop will be closed." (The
leading article in Spektri, the journal of the National Board of Education, 19
Dec. 1997).
Differences and inequality between schools are growing. Some are
loosening ties with their locality, while others choose or are compelled to
be increasingly tightly bound to their environment (e.g. some schools in
housing estates of poorer areas). The basic trend in educational policies
now emphasises individual competition and success in the labour market
more than equality, solidarity and social mobility. Thus the social political
aspect of education, aimed at preventing exclusion and equalising starting
levels, seems to be a weakening dimension in education policies, and
increasingly confined to a specific social political sector. Preventive social
policies in education are thus in danger of disintegrating, and thereby
producing social problems which will be transferred to social workers,
welfare officers, psychologists and the health sector generally (Simpura
and Vaarala 1997, 5).
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As the figure shows, the weakening support for social responsibility based
on the social agreements within political sectors burdens the last-resort
responsibility of social policies and threatens to marginalise social problems.
Problems in the labour market, in the farm population, in housing and in
education are increasingly dealt with in the social policy sector as exclusion
issues. The individual's own responsibility as well as competition between
individuals and population groups are increasingly emphasised in the
various political sectors, in contrast to the earlier social responsibility, social
rights and solidarity. In such a situation the gap between winners and losers
cannot be closed any more. Thus, the essential elements of social capital are
weakened.
Discussion of the increasingly burdened social policies has failed to
produce any alternative models to satisfy the issues of social responsibility.
In fact, demands to shift social responsibility back to individuals and their
local communities are also increasing in the field of social policies. The
paradox of this discussion lies in the agreements analysed above. The
agreements of the welfare state have in principle never aimed to free people
from their social obligations towards their communities. That the service
systems in society are not always very active in the practical implementation
of this responsibility is quite another matter. On the other hand, measures
of support and activation have often been targeted at those population
groups which do not themselves have resources for self-help. For instance,
in substance abuse and drug policies, a more active responsibility has been
required of families and local communities as educators, despite the fact that
it is these institutions which have weakened most as educational communities
as the structure of society has changed. To summarise, responsibility and
activity are often required of those population groups which would need
external aid the most. Thus, the elements, procedural rules, networks and
trust of social capital do not seem to work well in circumstances where the
agreements of the welfare state are replaced by market-oriented agreements
and where people lose the resources to make independent decisions about
their own lives.
Increasing pressures for change on the basis of the generation agreement
The generation agreement has become an important component of the
welfare state. It has been connected with participation in work and also with
education, pension policies, societal services and the division of societal
caring work. In parallel with the generation agreement, our society requires
of us more of our own responsibility - individual responsibility and individual
insurance, e.g. in the field of pension policies, education and training. In this
situation society plays a lesser role, competition between the generations
intensifies and societal integration weakens. Changes in the labour market
and the period of youth have, among other things, shed new light on the
position of children and young people, as well as on parents' responsibility
for the education and maintenance of their children. Youth researchers have
suggested that, historically, 'youth' is a rather new phenomenon, which has
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also changed many times in the past. Youth emerged on the threshold of
industrialisation, after the prohibition of child labour, and led to the
formation of the modern family, as well as a novel spell of inactivity between
adulthood and childhood (Maki-Kulmala 1993). At the present time we could
propose a thesis that youth is being reborn as a new phenomenon, because
new periods of inactivity are again emerging in the chain of childhood, youth
and adulthood as a result of the changes in the labour market and education.
Thus, we are facing a new kind of youth as a stage of life requiring new
orientations and measures in our society.
The gender agreement is changing form
In the welfare state the state has been able to function as a kind of channel
and instrument for women's equality aspirations. If the role of the state
weakens, it will directly influence the structure of welfare services, which
have been an important channel for women's participation in working life.
Pressures for increased housework and emphasised responsibility of the
family involve a change in women's position above all. The discussion about
individual responsibility in care and caring is connected with the division of
work between the genders. In practice the question is who will take care of
children, as well as handicapped, sick and older people (cf. Julkunen 1992,
50-53).
Exclusion is changing form
The break-down of the agreements that integrate our society and improve
its cohesion enhances the risks of exclusion and adds new features to it. On
this basis we could therefore assume hypothetically that social capital is
weakening. I do not claim that social capital is exactly the same as societal
integration and cohesion, but the concepts are somewhat interrelated.
Unemployment seems to have become an extensive and permanent
phenomenon weakening the basic income and inclusion of the population.
Thus, unemployment does not only produce bare subsistence at the
individual level; it also has extensive societal impacts. Problems that are
relevant to exclusion are not only connected with threats of exclusion of
individuals, but also with a more widespread weakening of societal
cohesion. Uncertainty about paid work creates uncertainty in all areas of life
dependent on paid work. For instance, the nature of housing policies
changes when it becomes more difficult for individuals to meet loan
commitments. The promises of full-time employment previously implicit in
education are replaced by promises of placement in the labour market. This
changes the motivational basis and nature of education.
Urban lifestyles and housing have introduced new vulnerability to
exclusion. In urban culture, various forms of paid work are a prerequisite for
basic income. For the majority of the population there is no realistic option
to paid work or social security.
The individualisation of the urban, postmodern way of life has involved
loosening connections within communities. For some people this has meant
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a release from the close control of the local community, whereas others have
experienced exclusion, increased helplessness and loneliness. Public measures
designed to enhance connections within communities may or may not result
in greater control at the individual level. Within families, for instance,
individualisation has created increasingly contradictory impacts which can
pull family members in different directions. From childhood onwards, each
family member has an individualised life and world, and the combined
power of the family cannot always create cohesion and security. In this
respect the family in modern society is more vulnerable and fragmented than
ever before. Those with sufficient resources experience cohesion and
security in the family, while those without live in increasingly conflict-ridden
families.
The nature of residential communities is changing along with society, with
many contradictory tendencies occurring in our living environment. Migration
to urban areas has entered a new stage, for example, and the fundamentals
of urban housing are changing. In Finland, urban housing and the
construction of residential communities have been based on the above-
mentioned agreements and presumptions of the welfare state. Therefore,
housing estates, for instance, were originally thought of as "leisure areas" for
the employed labour force in industrial society. Now their significance is
changing with the decline of the normal employment relationship. We are
already seeing severe problems on some housing estates as unemployment
accumulates from one generation to another.
Conclusion
As many of the changes described above are contradictory in nature, it is
difficult to discern a single, unambiguous direction. It is, however, clear that
these changes entail new risks and threats of exclusion. Some of these threats
are connected with exclusion from work, and others with exclusion from a
basic income or loss of inclusion. All of these threats are intrinsically
connected with the reformulation of the agreements described above. On the
other hand, in terms of the social capital concept, the question is how to
prevent an interruption in social thinking and improve the cohesion and
social agreements of communities and thus their social capital. Over the next
few years, the central political challenges will be the following:
a) How to link the ongoing economic reformulation with the changing social
arena so that societal splits are prevented?
b) How to identify those with social responsibility so that the preventive
aspect of the welfare state is maintained and the central social agreements
of the welfare state strengthened?
c) How to construct new measures to prevent exclusion and protect against
existing threats?
We could adopt the general principle that preventing exclusion in the welfare
state cannot be based solely on defending the old structures. People live in
new circumstances where global dependence and local life are interlinked.
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It is important to create new social thinking to balance future plans based
exclusively on economic thinking. At the level of principles, prevention of
exclusion is still anchored in two central arguments: a) basic agreements and
their related forms of social security and services must be developed, and b)
the changing structures of people's immediate and nearby communities must
be supported. Instead of merely defending the established welfare state
structures, the social capital supported by these structures must be developed
so as to meet the new conditions of the internationalising and otherwise
evolving community.
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Social Capital:
The Concept and
Its Problems
Raj Ilmonen
Since the days of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, economic welfare has been
assessed in economics in terms of natural resources, i.e. land ownership and
economic capital. The progress of industrialization and technological
development in the 1900s has made clear that the growth of national wealth
does not rest exclusively on the amount and quality of natural resources. Nor
does it depend solely on capital and the different ways of investing it in
various sectors, but also on workers' individual professional skills and their
improvement. Articles discussing human capital, skills and education as
significant boosters of national wealth began to appear in the 1950s and
1960s.
It has undoubtedly proved worthwhile to focus on workers' unused
professional skills and what bearing this disuse has on production growth.
Focusing on individuals has, however, been the weakness of this approach,
as the ways of organising work, and work relations in general, have been
brushed aside, despite their growing importance in the globalization of the
economy. It has even been claimed that they play a specially decisive role
in the pursuit of a competitive edge. It is thus understandable that the World
Bank in particular has targeted the micro-level economic cooperation both
within and between organizations. Such bonds have become known as
social capital (see Hjerppe 1997; Woolcott 1998), a notion that has gained
increasing attention in the 1990s. This article, too, focuses on social capital.
I begin my review by defining social capital and explaining why it has
become so popular in the 1990s that it is now regarded - along with the "Third
Sector" - as a "wonder concept" ("Wunderbegriff"), and the solution to any
current problems. Later I examine the background of the concept of social
capital. Then I present Robert Putnam's study on social capital. I also weigh
the weaknesses in his frame of reference and concentrate on one of the
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central elements of social capital: trust. Lastly, I attempt to estimate where the
concept of social capital is fruitful and where it seems to hold more promise
than the discussions in institutional economics would suggest.
The topicality of social capital
In his archeology of knowledge, Michel Foucault discusses how new types
of knowledge and concepts have created their own realities. They have not
done so in a social vacuum, though. The new types of knowledge have
developed simultaneously with the visible changes in the environment
(especially in its modes of operation), and have provided an interpretation
for these changes. An interpretation always has its supporters (a social or
professional group, a religious sect, a social class, etc.), whose world view
and ideology colour the interpretation and thereby the shaping of new forms
of knowledge (Foucault 1997; Deleuze 1990, 103-108).
The concept of social capital ties in with the new interpretations about
the current changes in the visible environment. Although having a
multiphasic background, the concept has taken shape only recently.
Almost magically, it seems to offer solutions to problems that arise when
old social structures crumble. However, social capital is a tricky and
complex notion, like so many other "promising" concepts. Frequently it
encompasses three elements. The first element includes a) social networks
and the ways in which they are organized. These represent the formal side
of the concept. Besides this, social capital has a substantial component that
aligns it closely with the concept of an institution in institutional economics
(e.g. North 1990). Social networks are thought to hold together due to b)
the trust that the members have towards one another, and c) the normative
rules and reciprocal expectations connected to that trust (e.g. Putnam 1993,
167-176). A social network and the confidential relations connected to it
are thought to provide capital or, as Pierre Bourdieu puts it, a resource for
its members that can be moved around by the members, either individually
or together if need be (1986).
However, social capital is not like economic capital, since it cannot be
separated from its supporters and the relations between them. In this respect
social capital is not as easily movable as economic capital. Nor can it be
invested, in the true sense of the word, to increase its value. Despite these
"flaws" the concept of social capital attracts attention. Why is that? There are
several reasons. I mention only a few topical elements here, one of which
is doubtless the strong comeback of economic liberalism to both economic
and socio-political discourses in the 1980s. The reform of working life and
the diminishing economic leeway of the nation-state have both, in turn,
paved the way for the return of liberalism. Underlying this development one
can also see the processes implicit in the concept of post-industrial society
- the erosion of traditional communities and social classes, as well as the
consequent sociophilosophical discourse on the characteristics of a good
society (see Ilmonen 1998b). Many of these discussions date back to the
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fragmentation of the feudal society and are linked to names like Thomas
Hobbes and John Locke.1
At least two of the more recent changes in working life are clearly
connected with the concept of social capital. First, the globalization of the
economy has forced businesses operating in the global market to reconsider
their production regimes. They are abandoning the old Fordian course of
action in favour of a new system of networks that underlines the importance
of flexibility. As a result, old hierarchical organizations based on supply have
been dismantled while some of the less important activities have been
externalized and dispersed around the global village. Work based on core
skills is being transformed into a client-centered activity based on teamwork,
and both the designing and testing of actual products have largely been
turned over to information technology. The Fordian mode has been replaced
here by global economic networks where not only are goods produced but
also, courtesy of the fictional economy (bonds, currency, etc.), fast earnings
are cashed in (Castells 1996; Martin and Schuman 1997).
Secondly, due to externalized operations in businesses and a flexible
economy based on networks, reliable jobs have become a rarity. This
unstable world continually reshaping itself implies increased risks and a
constant need to change jobs. In this process the social world is being divided
anew into winners and losers. Losers seem to be withdrawing into solitude
and shame or looking for a new identity in the old (religious) communities
(Sennett 1998, 134-). Becoming or being a winner entails belonging to
networks of social relations that help reduce risks. Several studies have
concluded that the people who find work are those who have wide social
networks to back them up. The long-term unemployed, on the other hand,
lack such networks altogether, or those they have disintegrate eventually
(Kortteinen and Tuomikoski 1998).
Another obvious element that has helped popularize the concept of social
capital may well be the discourse sparked by neo-liberalism surrounding the
role of the welfare state. In this discussion the welfare state has been
redefined as harmful rather than positive. Thus the safety net for paid labour
provided by the state, which was formerly perceived as a positive thing, has
become an economic burden and a bureaucratic control mechanism which
stresses only citizens' rights instead of their duties (Ilmonen 1993, 58). In
political rhetoric it has subsequently been easy to transfer responsibilities
from the state to citizens and to the social networks of civil society (Culpitt
1992, 16). The idea has been to return to the grass-roots level of solidarity
(cf. Benhabib 1992), that is, to the unused social capital potentially found in
civil society. Proving the existence of such unused social capital is no easy
It is exciting to notice that during the economic liberalism of the 1980s and 1990s the same themes
have been topicalized that were brought up by John Locke, the central source of inspiration for
liberalism, when he took a stance against a strong monarchy and state. Wanting to make sure that
private ownership would have a legal position in relation to the state, he nominated "political society",
i.e. civil society, as a guarantee of that. By "political society" he meant the orderly aspect of civil society
(Locke 1996, 117-119).
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task, however, and several studies have been undertaken to trace it. So far
the results have not been particularly encouraging (see Mathies, Kotakari and
Nylund 1996), though this is hardly surprising. Talk of transferring the duties
of the welfare state to civil society has overlooked the fact that a variety of
associations, organisations, etc have flourished with the aid of the welfare
state. Such suggestions would mean turning the clock back. In a country like
Finland this would involve returning to the pre-war situation, when we still
had a strong local sense of community and social networks were based on
families and relatives.
The third cluster of elements that have made social capital topical includes
the gradual weakening of the old familial and other connections,
individualization, urbanization and the growth of social differentiation,
which have forced people to interact increasingly with strangers. Because of
these long-term processes that began as early as the 1500s, permanent
behavioural models, e.g. those based on fixed roles, have changed. Other
people's actions can no longer be anticipated based on those models: they
have become unpredictable. This is especially true of strangers, the "others",
whose cultural rules of behaviour are totally unknown. The resulting
dilemma can only be solved by trusting others. This entails taking a big risk,
though, because the "social matrix" is increasingly antithetical to trust, as
observed by A. Seligman (1997, 160). This is one of the central paradoxes of
modern society.
Allied to the above paradox is the fact that these days people are required
not only to trust others in a situation where this has become ever more risky,
but also to trust social institutions. It is well accepted that trust and its social
consequence - the bestowal of legitimacy - have been tested hard during the
last decade. In Finland and elsewhere people have begun to be ever more
suspicious of political parties and political and economic elites (see
Martikainen and Yrjonen 1991; Ruostetsaari 1992). It is no wonder, then, that
political parties have started to champion strengthening of the family and
"good communality". The dividing line in this rhetoric is between neo-
liberals and communitarians. The former stress the individual and especially
his or her rights and political autonomy. The communitarians, on the other
hand, are concerned about the foundations and consequences of that kind
of morality. They point out that people are not autonomous actors; they have
their own historical backgrounds and social ties, but do not guarantee
morally sound behaviour. It is easier to assume that underscoring rights in
practice amounts to bestowing legitimacy on the privileges of the strong. The
neo-liberals, in turn, see that the "good communality" advocated by the
communitarians is actually a return to the old social ties, the idealized
"Gemeinschaft", and moral identity. It is hard to reconcile this with the
present way of life, and bad experiences of it can be found in the recent past.
Zygmunt Bauman goes further in suggesting that strong communality and
morality based on obligation equals "a long march towards prison" (Bauman
1996, 35; see also Kotkavirta 1998, 89-90).
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The neo-liberals and communitarians seem to be having a hard time finding
common ground in their political and moral battle. There is one thing they
seem to be able to agree on, however: the state must not be given a significant
role in the running of social affairs; the duties of the state should rather be
handed over to self-guided associations (the communitarian view) or to
autonomous individuals (the neo-liberal view).
In conclusion, the concept of social capital has become more prominent
as a result of neo-liberal political and economic thought. It is believed to open
up possibilities for diminishing the duties of the state, yet is not seen as a
solution to the problems created by the dismantling of the welfare state and
privatising public services. The concept of social capital is also seen to have
conservative qualities, a return to the old society based on obligation,
especially if it is linked to communitarian thinking. On the other hand, social
capital appears to have positive attributes, too. The modern economy is seen
to exist as a collection of networks, and an individual can only emerge as a
winner in the new economic order if he or she belongs to a network (Castells
1996, 168-200).
Some background to the concept of social capital
The concept of networking provides a clue to what discourse within the
social sciences the notion of social capital belongs. Prior to discussions about
the influence of human capital on economic growth, attention was directed
at how such capital was organized, and how its means of organization
affected the economic productivity of businesses. Over two centuries ago,
in his treatise "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations" (1776, transl. 1933), Smith put forward his soundest - from a modern
viewpoint- idea that the division of labour, in particular, on the national level
and in businesses increases the productivity of work. He gives an example
of the latter in his famous story of pin production, which becomes more
efficient as soon as different people start performing the individual stages of
pin-making instead of just one person doing so from start to finish (1933, 7).
However, according to Smith, the extent to which the division of labour can
be achieved in a given society depends on the size of the market (ibid., 23-
28). Smith argued strongly for the market because, after all, it is the expansion
of the market that makes it possible to increase the effectiveness of the
economy on the business level.
Smith's reasoning lacks an empirical foundation, and it was later revealed
as skilful speculation. Smith admitted that pins, as well as other commodities,
were in his day mostly handmade; they began to be produced industrially
only in the 1800s (Brown 1996, 118). Despite this, Smith's ideas about the
division of labour, both in businesses and on the level of society, have had
far-reaching consequences. They later found their way into the classic works
of economics and sociology. Karl Marx, among others, used them, when he
noted that workers of the same rank in the division of labour were in the best
position to share similar experiences and feel solidarity towards one another.
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Marx stated that without solidarity, particularly those caught in structurally
weak positions are unable to improve their situation; they cannot achieve
that goal alone, except on rare occasions. Marx concluded that it was thus
more sensible for them to act collectively, without shortsighted pursuit of
personal gain. This can only be achieved if people's solidarity towards others
in a similar position is strong enough. This, in turn, means that those who
work in adverse conditions need to trust each other.
Naturally, trust does not come out of thin air even when people live in
roughly similar conditions. Even if they find themselves in structurally similar
social positions, it is by no means automatic that they trust or feel solidarity
towards one another. Marx realized this too, when he stressed that it was
possible to gain international solidarity only through political means. He had
the right insight, but his solution was wrong. Trust cannot be bestowed on
people, as it were, from above; instead, they need to engage in concrete
interaction with each other. Later, Georg Simmel focused on the same issue.
He emphasized the importance of reciprocity and the expectations of
"fairness" connected with it as strengtheners of social interaction and creators
of trust.
Simmel's idea of the fairness of reciprocity ties him to a discursive tradition
whose intellectual roots are found in the economic and political framework
of the 1600s. Relations between the economy and politics were currently
being reformed as they broke free of the grip of local and family communities
following urbanization and the expansion of the market economy. The
autonomous individual was placed at the centre of an economic exchange,
instead of the family. Family honour no longer bounds the individual, who
instead became morally responsible for his own choices (Seligman 1997, 53).
A good expression of this novel source of economic operation revolving
around the individual was the principle of Caveat Emptor, which was
introduced at the beginning of the 17th century and is still widely in use.
When two parties, A and B, make an agreement, this principle frees party A
from all responsibility regarding the future conditions of their agreement
(ibid., 87). Thus, if a deal was arranged on credit, which was already a
common practice in those days, and the parties had agreed that the payment
be made in a particular foreign currency, the seller had to assume the risk
of a possible decrease in currency rates (this is how it is even today). The
seller could not be confident that the sense of honour of the buyer's family
would guarantee the potential loss to be shared between the parties.
As the family or local community no longer provided guarantees for the
validity of the moral code governing people's interaction, a new and strange
situation emerged. The Ego could no longer decipher with certainty the moral
code on which the ^4/ferwas acting. All the Ego could do was trust the Alter.
This situation spawned a long-lasting period of reflection in the field of
politics, initiated by Puffendorf and Grotius and continued by Locke, Hume
and Kant. Their reflections led to keeping promises becoming the central
idea in the theory of politics, and friendship becoming an important theme
in the moral philosophy of the 18th century (Seligman 1997, 14-15, 33;
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Misztal 1996,28). Keeping promises and friendship were not separate entities
in the philosophers' view; trust connected them. A central prerequisite of
friendship was keeping promises, and therefore a friend was especially
trustworthy. Friendship became in this instance a prime example of a
relationship of trust. The relationship of trust, in turn, was later to become
a central ingredient of social capital.
The other ingredients of social capital, social networks and the norms of
reciprocity in social exchange, entered the mainly sociological discussion
almost by accident. The notions about the division of labour were later
transferred from the classic works of economics and sociology to managerial
thinking, and this led to Taylorian applications under the umbrella term
"scientific business management". However, the writings disregarded the
discourse on solidarity initiated by Marx, as 'well as Simmel's ideas on the
fairness of exchange, and earlier philosophers' views of trust. In managerial
texts and organizational theories the work organization was rather seen as
a form of rational machinery the effective functioning of which entailed
separating planning from execution. As a result of this separation, executors
very often had to deal with tasks handed to them by a small number of
planners with means that felt alien to the executors.
Setting goals on the managerial level without prior discussion with
employees went against the principle of trust. Providing means from above,
in turn, eroded the principle of fairness. Thus, it was no wonder that
executors started to resist the system. The resistance was not always
organized and actively striving towards formal goals. On the contrary, it was
often unplanned, passive resistance that'was also hard to break. It was rooted
in the unofficial personal relations of the workplace. These relations, in turn,
were made up of small groups known as "cliques", "clusters", etc. Inside firms
the "cliques" and other similar small groups created unofficial networks of
relations alongside the formal organisation. These networks were governed
by norms that differed from the official norms of the firm. The maintenance
of these networks was based on the mutual interaction and trust between
their members. The identification of the existence of these unofficial
networks within firms made it into the history of social research in the
Hawthorn studies undertaken in the Western Electric Company in Chicago.
European anthropology and sociology provided an intellectual background
for the Hawthorn studies. The theoretical lineage goes from Emile Durkheim
to A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, who significantly influenced especially W. Lloyd
Warner's sociological views and his famous study Yankee City (Chicago).
Warner worked with an Austrian-born psychologist E. Mayo. They were
mainly interested in small groups and their informal relations, seeking to
explain the findings of the Hawthorne studies on the basis of Durkheim's
theory of collective consciousness and Vilfredo Pareto's circulation theory of
elites.
Interest in social networks was rekindled through another tradition of
thought, too. In his formal sociology Simmel had already drawn attention to
the change that occurs in a romantic relationship when a third party enters
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the picture. Different control games become possible and the flow of
information grows less smooth. Simmel concluded that in triadic social
networks (and other, more complicated ones) social exchange must be
reciprocal and fulfil normative expectations in order to prevent the network
from crumbling (1908,6-20; Wolfe 1990,145-161; Woolcock 1998,160-161).
J. Moreno, among others, later used Simmel's ideas to his own advantage
when he connected them, in accordance with his own therapeutic orientation,
to European Gestalt psychology. Bringing together these two sources led
Moreno to view a small group as a "social configuration" based on attraction,
rejection, mutual choices, friendship, trust, etc. (Eskola 1971, 121-122). The
reasoning of Mayo, Moreno and K. Lewin, who also dealt with similar topics,
had a lot to offer to later socio-psychological research on small groups
(Secord and Backman 1964, 252-253; Eskola 1971, 137-139; Scott 1991, 12-
13), which was important to the analysis of social networks and their inner
norms.
However, the concept of social capital was not yet applied in socio-
psychological studies of group dynamics any more than in the network
analysis that had its origins in the work of Moreno and Lewin. Nevertheless,
the notion of trust was important in them, too. The concept of social capital
did not begin to take shape until the 1970s and 1980s, with the ground-
breaking works of Pierre Bourdieu and M. Granovetter.
In his renowned work "La Distinction" (1979) Bourdieu introduced
different types of capital. He wrote about economic, cultural and social
capital, but he concentrated on the distribution of economic and cultural
capital in France. Based on his findings he created, like Lewin, social spaces
into which the French social classes could be placed. The creation of social
spaces in the Bourdieusque analysis suggested that the concepts of economic
and cultural capital in themselves implied the concept of social capital. They
constituted the basis for the formation of social spaces in which taste and
economic capital tied the members of especially the elite and middle classes
together within their respective class boundaries (see also Bourdieu 1985).
Later Bourdieu sought to clarify the concept of social capital, suggesting
it to be a collection of existing and possible resources to some extent linked
to having institutionalized relations, acquaintances, and knowing people
(1986, 248). These networks of acquaintances form a collectively controlled
capital that can be utilized immediately or over time. The period must not
be too long, though, since social capital may fade away unused if reciprocity
vanishes. Thus it must be cherished constantly through "pure" sociality
(Simmel) and social exchange (Bourdieu 1986, 249-250).
Whereas Bourdieu owes a lot to Marx, Weber and even Simmel, Granovetter
based his writings on a different theoretical tradition. In 1973 he published
an important article in which he tried to solve the grassroots and overall
problems of transfer in society with the help of sociometry. He divided social
networks into those with strong ties and those with weak ties. The former
describe, in modern terms, great social capital. However, they are clusters of
similar people who know each other. There is no problem of trust in those
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clusters, since the members' commitment to their cluster is strong (ibid.,
1362). However, this is only one side of the matter. On its downside lurks
a chance that the cluster is very exclusive and thus fails to connect its
members to wider social circles. Social networks with weak ties do not suffer
from this hindrance. On the contrary, they can span long social distances and
connect their individual members with society as a whole (ibid., 1369,1377-
1378). Thus, Granovetter suggests in modern terms that social networks with
weak social ties are actually the ones that can integrate their members into
society, rather than those with strong social capital. Social networks with
weak ties have their problems, too; the problem of trust is constantly present.
Granovetter's notions on strong and weak social ties are known as the
Granovetter Hypothesis. But although he regarded it as only a "fragment of
a theory" (ibid. 1378), more was to come. In 1985 he published his ground-
breaking article "Economic and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness", in the wake of which the discussion about social capital
truly began. In this article Granovetter leans on K. Polanyi's research on
"moral economy" and tries to prove that the labour market, for instance, is
not functioning on rational choices but is rather embedded in existing, and
sometimes weak, social relations and trust (1992, 58-63).
Granovetter does not yet employ the concept of social capital in his article,
though. It was introduced later into Anglo-Saxon sociology by J. Coleman,
whose thinking depended heavily on the institutional theory of the economy.
In his article "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital" (1988) he
observed how the reasons for a person dropping out of school were further
divided into smaller elements. The primary elements were economic, human
and social capital. Economic capital refers to the family's means of paying for
their children's education, while human capital was connected with Bourdieu's
cultural capital relating to the parents' educational background. Coleman, in
turn, connected social capital with the strength of interaction inside the
family and with the community in which it lived (ibid. 110, 113). Based on
his observations, he suggested that if social ties were weak, the child's
success in school was poor, and vice versa.
Coleman may have been responsible for slipping the concept of social
capital into the sociological discussion that favoured individual-centered,
rational choices. However, it can be said that R. Putnam stabilized its position,
although he stressed the collective side of the concept. In 1993 he published
the results of his ten-year project in "How to Make Democracy Work", in
which he compares Northern Italy with Southern Italy. He suggests that
Northern Italy fares better economically than Southern Italy precisely
because the former has more social capital than the latter. What he, like
Coleman, means is that the former is characterized by long-lasting social
networks (societies, self-help organizations, etc.). The members of those
networks have been tied together by mutual trust and norms of reciprocity.
Since Putnam, numerous sociological articles have been published on
social capital. Next, however, I concentrate on Putnam's theoretical framework
and the central findings of his study.
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Robert Putnam and social capital
Although there are several ways of thinking, and social practices, that have
made the concept of social capital increasingly topical, they cannot be
unproblematically transformed into the notion of social capital or into a
scientific discourse based on it. They must first be translated into scientific
language. This usually presupposes a set of concepts based on pre-existing
theoretical formulations and research carried out using those concepts.
Robert Putman's book "Democracy" is significant in this respect.
Putnam's basic question is what circumstances are best suited to support
the creation of a strong representative (political) institution (1993, 6). He
begins to unravel this question with the help of two basic assumptions about
institutional economics. The first is that every institution has its social
implications, which shape the politics. The other, in turn, postulates that
institutions themselves are products of historical development (ibid., 7-8).
However, these are, according to Putnam, insufficient assumptions. They
link institutions into diachronic time only. In addition, an intermediary
assumption about synchronic time is needed, according to which the
performances of institutions must be judged in their respective social
contexts. This starting point, however, is too broad and self-evident to
promote further research. A mere reference to a topical social or other kind
of context is not enough. Furthermore, it must be demonstrated what it is that
makes the context crucial. It must be discovered which element of the social
context has the greatest bearing on the performance of an institution.
To answer the question posed above, the performance of an institution
must be defined first. Putnam sees it as a simple chain following the
principles of implementation theory (executive theory). The chain goes as
follows: social demands-political interaction-government-choice of policy-
implementation (ibid., 9; see also Bacharach 1977). Once performance has
been defined, the context must be clarified further. Putnam, like other
"institutionalists", regards economic environment and political tradition as
the central factors in it (ibid., 10). (Putnam does not explain why precisely
these are the central factors.) To examine these factors, Putnam compares
Northern Italy to Southern Italy. This comparison is an historical one in which
Northern Italy as a civil society has for long been in many ways stronger or
"more civic" than its Southern counterpart. This observation makes the
comparison meaningful and leads Putnam to two common conclusions. The
first is that regional government is the more efficient, the more civic the social
environment is (ibid., 98). The other generalization is that a region is the
wealthier, the more civic it is. The accuracy of the latter conclusion was
confirmed by standardizing the political and economic factors statistically,
which led to a loss of their explanatory power. Thus, only the level of
civilization remained (ibid., 157), and it alone sufficed to explain the growth
of economic wealth, too.
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From his empirical generalizations Putman arrived at two slightly broader
theoretical conclusions:
1) When civil society is strong, or "civic", the market functions better than it
otherwise would (1993, 181). This way he managed to confirm the idea in
institutional economics that the economy is not an island apart from other
social activities but instead leans on existing social structures, institutional
arrangements and the trust created by them.
2) When civil society is strong, even the state functions better (ibid., 98, 173,
181). So Putnam proposes that social capital is necessary for the smooth
functioning of both government policies and the economy. These
generalizations are Putnam's answers to the politically loaded debate over
the supremacy of either markets or hierarchies. According to him, neither of
them functions well unless there is a third, Simmelian (Noro 1991),
intermediary factor: a civilized civil society. The views about the antagonism
of the market and the state cherished by neo-liberals and real socialism are,
therefore, false. Both must be fitted into civil society, whose nature over time
will decide how the relationship between the market and the state comes to
be shaped.
In other words, Putnam's view is that it is exactly the high degree of
civilization in civil society that secures the smooth functioning of the market
and thepolis, since "civilization" guarantees social order and the unhindered
functioning of society. Putnam admits, naturally, that social order can be
maintained even in such uncivilized conditions where strong hierarchical
dependence and exploitation are prevalent (1993, 180). But the market and
the state do not function in such a situation without friction. Social order
alone is not a sufficient guarantee of the fluency of the economy and politics.
The reason for this, according to Putnam, is that a society based on a non-
civilized social order is built on a network of dependence and abuse typical
of a feudal clan system, that is on patronage or a master-and-servant
relationship. Conforming to it is sensible since the obedience towards
superiors required in patronage is rewarded by handing down tasks and
supporting "subordinates" in other ways too. However, carrying out the
received tasks requires unconditional loyalty towards the clan. Because all
clans function in the same way, no one has any reasons to trust anyone but
the members of their own clan. This type of thinking is quite typical of
Southern Italy. Following another researcher of Italian life, E.G. Banfield,
Putnam calls that mode of operation amoral familism (1993, 144; Banfield
1958).
Amorality does not indicate a lack of morality but a special moral code. Its
rule of thumb is syllogistic: Always put your own and your family's interest
first, since others do likewise. Unless you do this, you will be deceived. Thus,
guard your own interests (Putnam 1993, 88)! This is rational short-term
action, since everyone does likewise. In the long run, however, this mode
of action leads to a situation described by Thomas Hobbes: perhaps not to
"everyone's war against everyone else" but to a battle among families over
spheres of interest. Another problem with amoral familism is that mistrust
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towards other families, and towards anyone outside one's own family in
general, limits economic and other transactions in the modern world
considerably, as has been demonstrated in studies on immigrants (see Misztal
1996, 88). Economic and social activity turn inwards and promote the
development of ghettos in cities. The third problem with amoral familism is
that it feeds on itself (Putnam 1993, 88). This is not only true of the economy
but also of the realm of politics, where hierarchically made decisions are seen
as guarding the interests of clans and are thus not legitimate in the eyes of
others.
The other extreme in Putnam's division, civic society, is marked by the
existence of social networks of reciprocity and trust. As an example he
mentions the "popular sociability" that developed in 19th century France and
that became more common in Northern Italy, too, in the late 19th century.
It was characterized by mutual aid organizations, trade organizations, credit
institutions2 and the voluntary work institution ("aiutarella"), etc. (1993,139).
These and other reciprocal social networks formed the welfare state of the
time (ibid., 199). Their existence strengthened, in Putnam's opinion, the
mutual trust of the population. That, in turn, required not the feudal,
hierarchical structures of oppression, but strengthening of equality and
common participation (ibid., 104-105), both of which amplify the moral
preconditions for crossing family and other group barriers.
In addition to more frequent participation and equality, the reciprocity of
social exchange and cooperation are important in "popular sociability",
because the participants form networks and are able to shape the norms
governing their lives through them. Another advantage of reciprocity is that
it makes it easy to punish and expel those who break the norms (1993, 166;
see also Coleman 1988,106-107). This naturally strengthens the norm-based
feeling of community that is another cornerstone of social capital. Its third
basic element is the trust shared by the members of the network of
reciprocity. Putnam regards this as the most important element of social
capital (1993, 170). Trust may well be a strategic ingredient of social capital
because it is the one that turns social capital into a self-sustaining system.
Trust creates cooperation; it makes the coordination of functions and
communication easier. These, in turn, strengthen the norms of reciprocity
that, again, strengthen the feeling of community and shared identity, which
further fortifies mutual trust among the members. The trust is the stronger the
longer there has been reciprocal interaction between the members and the
more exclusive is the network of reciprocity (cf. Coleman 1988, 106-107;
North 1990; Putnam 1993, 167 and 1995, 67).
According to Putnam, there are two kinds of reciprocal interaction or social
exchange: "balanced" and "generalized". The former refers to a simultaneous
exchange of equally valuable performances. In the modern world this is a
In mainland Europe foreign trade was already conducted through credit at the beginning of the first
millennium. The word "credit" derives from the Latin "credere", which means to trust, to have faith.
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comparatively rare form of exchange, and as such it does not necessarily
require trust. The latter, in turn, refers to a noncoincident social exchange that
creates expectations of reciprocity. It is essentially based on trust, since it
presupposes that a given favour will be returned in the future. This kind of
expectation requires restraint from the short-sighted pursuit of personal
interests and an investment in long-term delayed advantages (1993, 172).
Naturally, trust is not created in a vacuum but shaped only through
familiarity secured by mutual interaction. Interaction yields information
about the other person, about his or her trustworthiness, and ensures that the
other person receives the conveyed information. Spreading of information
in a social network and the reputation that it conveys about the other
members of the network are important social commodities that strengthen
social capital (see also Diani 1997,129).3 Without social networks, spreading
the reputation of their members and the trust based on it would be much
harder, since both are underrated as collective commodities in society
(Olivier 1984, 608-609). Neither can be brought about without the help of
others. Forcing trust on others is as futile as trying to force oneself to fall
asleep; if the parties involved decide to mistrust someone, that state of affairs
cannot be changed with orders or flattery. Trust must be rather earned
indirectly by acting in ways that generate it. Trust and good reputation are
in a sense "by-products" (see also Coleman 1988, 118). This is one of the
pitfalls of trust and, at the same time, of social capital as a whole.
Despite these complications, it is fair to say that social capital is created in
communities characterized by trust and the norms of reciprocity. They are
Putnam's civilized communities, i.e. communities with strong moral resources.
It should be pointed out, though, that these resources do not always serve
only the values approved by the majority, as Putnam wants us to believe by
his term "civilized". Organized crime is also based on unofficial social
networks governed by tight moral codes, and where trust prevails among
members. In any case, regardless of the ends social capital is used towards,
it still cannot necessarily be spent like economic capital. Indeed, it can even
grow when its consumption intensifies cooperation and creates a spirit of
communality among participants (Putnam 1993, 171). However, there is
possibly a limit to the amount of social capital gathered into a social network
that one party alone can consume. Only a lack of consumption will exhaust
social capital (Putnam 1993, 169), because as social interaction fades, trust
can no longer be strengthened. To preserve social capital, it must, not unlike
economic capital, be kept in motion.
When social capital is in motion, it feeds on itself. This strengthening of
social capital takes place, according to Putnam, mainly indirectly: First, a
betrayal of trust increases the potential costs in individual transactions.
3
 It should be borne in mind that spreading information in a social network is not just an altruistic
collective service for the benefit of the other members of the network. Information can also be
distributed to forward the distributor's own personal ends (Coleman 1988,117). If those personal ends
are uncovered, suspicion, which weakens trust, will arise in the social network.
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Second, a social network sustains the existing norm of reciprocity. Third, its
existence makes communication easier and improves the flow of information.
Fourth, previous successful instances of cooperation, which strengthen the
members' faith in its possibilities, accumulate in the networks (Putnam 1993,
173-174).
All in all, Putnam suggests that social capital is an emergent phenomenon
that follows this pattern: social networks - norms of reciprocity - trust - social
networks. This pattern as a whole defines a civilized community. Thus,
according to Putnam, social capital does not solely support the economy and
credible politics but is rather a counterpart of a social contract. It is based on
legitimacy and morality rather than legal criteria, which coincide precisely
with Durkheim's notion when he discusses the noncontractual element of a
contract (1990, 71, 255-257).
A critique of social capital and Putman
Putnam's project is currently in political demand, being connected to the tug-
of-war between neo-liberals and communitarians. Right after the publication
of his book "Democracy", Putnam took part in the debate and sided strongly
with the communitarians (Favell 1998, 222). He stresses how fortunate those
who live in a civilized community are (1993, 113). At the same time he frets
over the considerable decay that has occurred in the social capital accumulated
by American society over the past few decades (1995, 73). He believes that
this development will weaken the integration of American society as a whole.
In clinging to this belief Putnam brushes aside the Granovetter Hypothesis
without mention. This hypothesis postulates that it is not the disintegration
of strong ties but of the loose ones that are fatal to social integration.
Putnam's stance has its notable predecessors, however. The first, Tocqueville,
was followed by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, and more recently by
Roger Brubaker and Willy Kymlicka. All agree that social and political
integration on a macro level can only succeed in a universal, civilized culture,
i.e. is in one characterized by, in Putnam's terms, strong social capital (ibid.,
214).
Putnam does not deal with national political culture as such but makes it
clear that expanding the civilized community to the macro level would bring
about a "good" (i.e. highly integrated) society. Here he returns to the ideas
of Talcott Parsons and Emile Durkheim, who were convinced that a
uniformity of norms and values forms the basis for the functioning of a liberal
democracy. Sharing norms and values provides vitality for social capital and
accelerates its accumulation. The accumulated social capital, in turn, helps
overcome the constant threat posed by the individualistic pursuit of personal
gain. This viewpoint includes an implicit normative emphasis. Putnam tries
to negate Thomas Hobbes's solution to the personal gain dilemma, just as the
communitarians and their predecessors did. Social capital (or a civilized
community) is an alternative to a strong state, a mechanism that balances the
unrestrained pursuit of personal gain (Favell 1998, 219).
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In Putnamian thought, and other schools of thought based on the concept
of social capital, the political dilemma is not caused by the state acting as a
regulator but by the strengthening of communality in the civil society. The
Parsonian communal values and norms cannot be perceived as the binding
force behind the civil society, though. It is impossible to reach such
communality in multi-cultural surroundings, especially if the various groups
do not even seek common values (Putnam 1993,175; Favell 1998,223). Thus,
the message of Putnam's research is that a common value system is no
solution to the Hobbesian problem of "everyone's war against everyone
else". The solution is rather trust and, overall, a civilized community
characterized by varied social networks and values. But what should be done
now that, as Putnam claims, even networks (associations) are shattering
(1995, 67-68)?
In order to resolve the question posed above, it is not right to tie normative
(i.e. political) assumptions and explanatory factors together, as Putnam has
done. Neither should normative assumptions be taken as given. Civilized
communities can be like religious sects, oppressive traps, "ventilated
nightmares" (Henry Miller) with no exits. In addition, they may try to utilize
less civilized means to subdue other small communities, as happened in the
former Soviet Union and the Balkans. A completely different perspective,
then, is that the state, especially the welfare state, and its expansion are not
enemies of the civilized community. Historically, they have rather taken
shape together in symbiosis, as Putnam too has later acknowledged. On the
other hand, he has never promoted an intervention by the state into civil
society in order to strengthen it (see Woolcock 1998, 157).
Social capital encompasses - at least in the Putnamian usage of the term
- strong normative assumptions, and is in this respect a problematic concept.
The latter part of the concept may mislead an inattentive reader, too. Because
of this, it is appropriate to ask in what sense social capital is capital at all. For
social capital to be regarded as "real" capital, it must meet at least the
following criteria: Social capital must be 1) a resource that can be used on
demand (Hjerppe 1997, 27). This is exactly how social capital is perceived.
However, this does not mean that social capital can be stored or deposited,
like "real" capital, to preserve its value. It simply vanishes in the long run if
it is not used, as Bourdieu and Putnam both stress. 2) Social capital must,
consequently, be accumulable in one way or another (Hjerppe 1997, 27).
This view has its problems, though. Social capital is a social structure,
pictured as a network, that can be either tight or loose. It is usually loose if
the network is very open. If it is closed, it is - at least in principle - tight
(Granovetter 1973; Coleman 1988). But if the network is open and loose it
is hardly a structure at all; it is then questionable whether it functions as a
form of social capital, as a resource. If the network is closed and tight, it may
be a rigid social structure insofar as it becomes very costly to its members.
For example, members may be forced to submit themselves to actions they
do not all approve of. In such a situation, accumulating vast amounts of social
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capital makes no sense to individual members. In other words, maximizing
the amount of social capital does not lead to a sensible end result because
even if social capital has its advantages, it also has its costs, too. Contrary to
economic capital, it is more sensible when accumulating social capital to aim
for an optimal amount rather than maximizing it (Woolcock 1998,158). Social
capital can actually turn from a resource into a hindrance. Anyone who has
broken free of a religious sect, or something similar, can vouch for this/1
3) Furthermore, social capital should be a resource that also diminishes when
used (Hjerppe 1997, 27). In this respect, too, social capital appears to be
different from economic capital. Social capital can, of course, be perceived
as diminishing from an individual user's point of view. After receiving a
favour, requesting a new one is not easy unless the previous favour has been
returned first. On the other hand, if the social network as a whole is mobilized
to use its inherent potential, social capital may even increase, as studies on
mass movements (see e.g. Ilmonen 1998a), and Durkheim in his sociology
of religion, among others, have demonstrated (1980).
Social capital, again, is not capital at all in the same sense as economic
capital. When it is also brought up that the former is always personal and
concrete, while the latter is increasingly impersonal and virtual, it becomes
evident that the concepts of social and economic capital have very little in
common. So, why talk about social capital instead of more modestly settling
for social resources? It is hard to say, but perhaps putting emphasis on the
economy, stressing the importance of the free movement of capital, and -
in this time of unrestricted markets - the concept of capital per se, have strong
positive auras.5 This lures researchers to widen the usage of the concept into
areas where it does not fit. On the other hand, an alternative way of referring
to the subject matter of social capital only as a social resource would be too
general and unclear. This is why the term "social capital" is still used here
while at the same time the reader is urged to bear in mind the special nature
of this capital.
The complexity of the concept of social capital creates its problems. Social
networks, trust and norms can be combined in many ways to bring about the
desired outcome: a civilized community. However, the combining can also
be done so that the end result is a closed network that oppresses at least some
of its members. It may, among other things, prevent them from belonging to
other networks. Thus, it raises the question of how to distinguish between
these different combinations of elements of social capital, and what
4
 In relation to social capital, the situation is analogous to over-investment, but only analogous. Over-
investment means "lazy" capital, i.e. capital with poor profitability. The over-investment of social
capital, in turn, means that it turns from a resource into a hindrance, which over-investment as such
does not do. !
5
 While visiting Finland on 15th April 1999, Michael Woolcock suggested, among other things, that even
if social capital may not be akin to real capital, the concept is worth adhering to, partly because it
smooths the path to "high policy", is interdisciplinary by nature, challenges the prevalent social
theories, passes over the problems of more culture-specific concepts, such as comparability of
housekeeping practices, and connects with classical sociological views.
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consequences these combinations have on the macro level (Woolcock 1998,
158). It is by no means clear that a closed and oppressive network would
nurture activities that would support, for example, general social or
economic policies, as Putnam seems to think.
The third problem is whether the concept of social capital is a medium or
a message in interaction. To be precise, we must ask which of its elements
are mediums and which are messages (Woolcock 1998, 156). It may be
sensible to think that, like Bourdieu's "field", a social network as such is
mainly a tool for its members. But where does trust fit within social capital?
On the one hand, trust is precisely that "medium" which binds the network
together, but at the same time it is a message about the affinity between its
members. One way of making sense of all this is to separate the different
levels of trust analytically (Ilmonen et al. 1998, 46-47). When trust is based
on rational reflection and knowledge about other people's actions, it is best
regarded as having a mainly instrumental value. When, on the other hand,
it additionally has a strong emotional component through which it creates
a shared identity, it constitutes a message about the medium or the content
of that message.
The fourth problem stems from the fact that Putnam and other advocates
of social capital see it as a public commodity. As such it is underrated and
thus not offered by individual actors, since they do not expect to benefit
decently from it (Putnam 1993, 170; see also Olivier 1984). Because of this,
social capital can only be generated as a by-product of other collective
projects, such as being a member of various associations. However, it is
exactly these various associations that have been regarded as the embodiments
of social capital (see Putnam 1995). This is why it is difficult to distinguish
the sources of social capital from the benefits achieved through it (Woolcock
1998, 156). This may well be the reason why the idea of social capital
becomes so easily entangled in normative weightings, and both right-wing
and left-wing politics are being defended with it. Social capital has been used
as grounds for minimizing state intervention and as a means of controlling
the free functioning of the market and liberal economic policy. (To be quite
honest, however, Putnam has tended to criticize both extremes in his
articles.)
The fifth conceptual problem is that social capital is usually associated with
social integration. A "good" society is a strongly integrated society. With this
type of thinking, attention is directed at that which binds the members of a
society together, while that which sets them apart is disregarded. What is left
out of focus, then, is - except on a very general level - the question of which
individuals' or groups' interests social capital mainly serves. For example,
Putnam assumes that social capital exists between equal parties, but this is
not always the case. Putnam hardly addresses those economic and political
forces that form the social space and favour one group of people in time and
space over another (cf. Saphiro 1997, 9). Because the social world is
hierarchical, the exchange of the members of a social network is not, and
cannot be, equal between those involved. This arrangement leads to a
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who did not belong to a particular clan, then knew what to expect of
individual clan members. Their actions were predictable in that they were
predetermined by the system of social roles. In the true sense of the word
they were not actions at all but forms of behaviour (ibid., 35-37; see also
Campbell 1996, 25, 95). Behaviour adhering to a given role was familiar to
others and followed the honour code. Thus, it did not require others' trust,
but only confidence (Seligman 1997, 37, 79, 95).
The other condition was the erosion of the cosmological wholeness of
premodern society, as a result of which communities were divided into
public and private spheres. Legitimacy and the problem of confidence,
closely connected to it (Seligman 1997, 14-15), were linked to the public
sphere and to the administrative decisions made within it. This led to a
situation where the problem of trust emerged in the private sphere (ibid.,
106). The problem was closely allied to social differentiation, the Reformation,
and the process of individualization that gained momentum because of them.
On the one hand, the differentiation of society, urbanization and the
increased mobility of the population detached the members of pre-modern
society from their old family networks. As a result, they were not bound by
old roles and expectations to the same extent as before. On the contrary, the
differentiation and modernization of societies forced people to assume and
reconcile several roles. They could no longer simply behave; they rather
became agents capable of doing things differently. Thus an outsider could
not know which role, if any, each individual was acting out at any given time.
Instead, people met each other ever more as strangers: "others" whose
actions were not predictable.
On the other hand, the Reformation strengthened the idea of an individual
who was conscious of himself and was, precisely because of that consciousness,
forced to choose his own path in this world. In the inner reality of such an
individual conscience replaced mercy granted from above and the sense of
honour regulated by the family. Conscience was seen as an inner mechanism
that turned an individual into a moral agent responsible for his own choices
(Seligman 1997, 54). Rather than his will being transparent, it was unclear to
the "other". Especially in the case of a "generalized" exchange where a favour
might be returned a lot later, people could not know how the other party in
the exchange, the moral agent, would act. The dilemma was eased to some
extent if his reputation was known, but besides that, all people could do was
to trust that he would act morally. Seligman aptly points out that the problem
of trust actualizes in cases where nothing else can be done except trust
someone (ibid., 21).
Trust is, according to Seligman, connected to individualization. Its central
manifestation is a person's ability to change roles and role expectations.
Changing roles requires, in turn, freedom from old ties and the ability to use
one's potential to act as an agent. Acting as an agent is precisely what is
central to trust, Seligman argues. Additionally, there must be a shared view
of the other's inner moral value, i.e. that he is personally responsible for his
own actions and does not follow some imposed moral code (ibid., 68). If such
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a code is followed, though, the other acts in a familiar manner. Then trust
does not become a problem (ibid., 70). This is also true of a situation where
the other is known to be committed to some strong value ("super good"), as
C. Taylor puts it (Taylor 1989,19-20). This value gives him a steady identity,
which makes him familiar to others. In this case, too, the other's actions are
predictable and trust does not become problematic (Seligman 1997, 79).
Seligman connects the concept of trust mainly to agency and to a shared
view of the other's moral value. At the same time he actually separates trust
from social capital, by replacing trust with the concept of confidence, which
is specifically connected to strong shared values and identities. These form
the basis for the familiarity of another person and for the involvement in
associations, too (ibid., 79). If, following Putnam, social capital is seen to
materialize especially in the involvement in associations, trust cannot be
regarded as its central element, as Seligman does. Here, trust is a resource
that becomes available only in unfamiliar, sporadic circumstances. Only
uncertainty necessitates trust. One can easily agree with this view but still
bring trust safely back into the realm of social capital. As emphasized earlier,
it is not necessary to regard associations as the central manifestations of social
capital. Their place can be given to unofficial social networks or weak social
ties with no institutional (e.g. legal) identify.
Seligman's view of trust implying risk is approved when trust is reserved
for "weak" social networks that have been formed by chance. The risk goes
two ways. On the one hand, we cannot know if the expectations we have
of the other are realistic or not. The latter choice leads us to a difficult
situation: we will be let down (Ilmonen et al. 1998, 50). This type of risk can
be minimized through exercising power, as also suggested by Niklas Luhman
(1979, 112). On the other hand, giving up our own familiar and safe role
includes a risk factor. We can never be sure if the other will approve of our
switching from one role to another. He may cease to trust us (ibid., 64). This
situation can no longer be remedied through the exercise of power. Instead,
we should act in such a way as to restore the other's trust.
Both the above risks make trust a very fragile resource that is becoming
increasingly rare. Seligman holds the opinion that, if the post-modernists are
to be believed, even friendships are void of trust. Rather, they are likened to
"socializing with the neighbour's dog" (ibid., 163). Trust becomes thus an
empty notion with no point of reference in the modern world. Drawing
conclusions as far-reaching as these is hardly necessary, though. Even
Seligman offers an alternative way to understand the basis of trust. He refers
to Adam Smith and G.H. Mead, who stress that an independent ego is born
only in a situation where we are able to detach ourselves and to look at
ourselves and others from a distance, through the eyes of the "generalized
other". This impartial observer's viewpoint creates the basis for a moral
standard that is independent of any outside, collective morality. But as the
former imposes complete role expectations on people, the latter explicitly
requires discussion about them. At the same time it forces people to reconcile
conflicting role expectations, since the "impartial" observer is not just
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anyone, as J. Gronow points out in his critique of Seligman, but rather the
"generalized other", who embodies several others as well "with conflicting
interests and role expectations (Gronow 1998,183; Seligman ibid., 113-114).
External, collective morality is always tied to a place and time: it is the
morality of a subculture. Individual morality, in turn, is based on the
viewpoint of the "impartial" observer. Being based on the "generalized
other", it is paradoxically more common than collective morality. Only
common morality creates a basis for an autonomous ego that uses personal
discretion. If our starting point is that everyone's ego and moral codes are
based expressly on that "impartial" observer's gaze, then the others are, after
all, not unknown but familiar to us. However, they are only familiar in the
sense that they, too, share the views of that "generalized other", as Gronow
forcibly points out (ibid., 183). From this it follows that a basis is laid for a
relation of trust between "me" and "others".
The theoretically presented solution to the problem of trust is elegant, but
problems emerge when attempts are made to put the solution into practice
in a multi-cultural world. A central issue is then the impartiality of the
"impartial" observer or the range of the generalized other's gaze. After the
cultural turn of sociological research, we know that the epithets "impartiality"
and "generality" are myths. Even in small societies with a strikingly uniform
culture, there seem to be strong divisions that narrow the range of the
generalized other's gaze significantly. These divisions can be based on
gender, age groups and different organizational positions at work, for
example.
Another problem, at least as great from the viewpoint of trust is that
focusing the "impartial" observer's gaze on ourselves requires a distancing
act. This has historically led to "housekeeping of feelings", the central feature
of which is detaching feelings and actions from each other. It lures people
into "playing" with feelings, having a calculated relationship with their own
feelings and especially to their expression (see Ilmonen 1999). Strengthening
this housekeeping of feelings also restricts the scope of all relations of trust
considerably, and stops them developing into strong emotional bonds. This
is especially likely to happen when in our everyday life we come into contact
with things that erode trust.
The "flexibilization" of working life and the "shareholders first" ideology
seem to be things that erode trust, as R. Sennett (1998) and others emphasize.
They convey to everyone the simple message that no one should trust their
employer, commit themselves to their work organization or build their
identity around work. On the contrary, if one wants to get along in the world
one must gamble with the risks inherent in changing jobs and be mistrustful
of one's current employer. Employees' private lives cannot remain immune
from stresses of this kind. Sennett suggests that working life can no longer
provide parents with a moral character model for bringing up children, or a
model for family life in general. Family life may be (have been?) the strongest
bastion of relations of trust (Sennett 1998, 25-26). But these days children
learn from their parents that to get on in life they should not trust anyone.
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So why should they trust even their own parents (who seem to betray their
employers or anyone else as soon as a lucrative opportunity presents itself)?
As parents are faced with this sort of challenge, they must work quite hard
to maintain their children's trust. Seligman refers to this too (ibid., 165), but
further clarifies it: we are all more dependent on trust than ever before, and
yet the preconditions for this dependence have been weakened significantly
(ibid., 97, 160, 174-175). Attempts at solving this problem have referred to
a return to familiarity, to strong group ties (fundamentalism), and yielding to
the pressure of the masses, to "other-directedness" (Riesman), and to
withdrawing into the private realm.
If trust is understood the way Seligman sees it, the end result is similar to
Putnam's conclusion from studying American associations: social capital
diminishes. Are we, then, faced with clan-based "amoral familism" or
"everyone's war against everyone else" (Hobbes)? This may be an overly
pessimistic cultural evaluation of our time. It is based explicitly on the
assumption that social networks survive expressly on "strong" ties, familiarity
or firm trust. But there may be an alternative reality where social networks
based on trust are project-related and constantly changing. Networks can
also be weak but still important, as Granovetter emphasises (1973). The
people Sennett interviewed, for example, revealed that new jobs are
expressly sought with the help of acquaintances, and that the risks involved
in changing jobs are minimized precisely through existing social networks.
If trust is, on the whole, as scarce a "natural resource" as Seligman would
have us believe, then one might start to wonder if it has ever emerged in a
"pure" form in the wake of modernisation. If this suspicion proves correct,
the notion of trust might appear to have very little use in the social sciences,
as it would not have a counterpart in social reality. At the same time the whole
idea of social capital would become obsolete.
There is another option, however. We do not have to think, like Seligman,
that trust exists as a distinct social mechanism. Even friendship, a prime
example of a relation of trust, is based not only on trust but also on familiarity.
Friends know each other, and this familiarity is an integral part of trust. In
my view it can be justifiably assumed that even today a relation of trust does
not exist in a pure form without any connections to outside social reality. In
this respect, Seligman's way of likening trust to an individual's relationship
with God is misleading. In the end, neither trust nor any other social
mechanism comes about or can be sustained in isolation from other social
mechanisms and practices.6
6
 F. Tonkiss and A. Passey, among others, demonstrate how charity organisations have always wavered
between two "logics". The first has to do with charity and the other with performing well. In other
words, wavering has taken place between the original cause of the existence of the charities and their
functional efficiency. Charity connects to the faith that organizations really fulfill their original mission
irrespective of who the needy are. Good performance, in turn, is linked to the confidence that the
organisations do their duties well. These two expectations are intertwined and not necessarily
conflicting. However, the closer to modern times researchers have come, the more pressure has put
on the organisations to manage the latter duties at the cost of the former (1999, 261, 272). What is
true of charity organisations appears to apply to many other voluntary organisations too, such as
consumer cooperatives and the trade union movement (Ilmonen 1986; Ilmonen and Kevatsalo 1995).
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The critique of Seligman could be taken further with the forceful argument
that he, while underlining the difference between trust between people and
confidence felt towards institutions, fails to see the similarities between the
two. Discerning the similarities is easiest when concentrating on the content
of trust rather than on its object. Then it can be observed that both trust
between people and confidence felt towards institutions refer to the same
thing: the future and its predictability. Trust is invested in people and things
precisely because they have features that make the future controllable. Just
as a friend's familiarity is a reason to trust his or her word, an institutional
practice (such as a comprehensive incomes policy agreement) guarantees
that those who are parties to it can trust each other. It is the time perspective
itself, rather than the object, that makes trust a central mechanism of social
activity. As J.M. Barbalet suggests, pride refers to an actor's past, whereas trust
refers to the future. Although Barbalet used the term "confidence" instead of
"trust", this applies equally to the notion of trust. It is a social mechanism
through which the possible can be brought into the present (1998, 86-87),
thereby diminishing the complexity of the future (Luhman 1979, 112).
In the end, it is plausible that trust - if seen in the Seligmanian way -
functions only in an institutionally stable environment. The negotiations
concerning roles entailed by trust cannot be carried out in just any
circumstances. Rather, secure circumstances are called for, where the use of
force and violence, among other things, is ruled out. Only under such
circumstances are the actions of "others" predictable enough, so that their
presence does not pose a threat to the ego. In other words, I am trying to
convey the idea that if the future is controllable, even if only on an imaginary
level, trust is created - regardless of whether it is people or institutions to
which the feeling of being in control can be attributed. Trust is always
stronger when it is backed up on a personal level by institutional modes of
action that are relatively stable and familiar to the members of a given society.
If they are missing, then and only then will trust become a rare natural
resource, and a clan-based institutional system, "amoral familism", will
replace it. However, I do not have strong empirical evidence to back up my
idea, although a study on Finnish working life conducted last year accords
with my views (Ilmonen et al. 1998). Relations of trust between the leadership
of an organization and the representatives of the trade union movement
involved function well if stable institutional modes of action backing them
up are present (such as an open flow of information, inclusion of both parties
in the development of activities, etc.). The different parties appear to work
together in such organizations in a more "civilized" manner - just as Putnam
saw happening in Northern Italy.
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Social Networks
as Capital
Network Cohesiveness as Determinant
of Instrumental Benefits and Basis of
Co-ordination in a Public Organisation
Jan-Erik Johanson
Abstract
The aim of this study was to assess the significance of social capital in a public
organisation according to two theoretical frameworks. Following the structural
hole theory (Burt 1992), sparse social networks enable actors to gain control
and information benefits. According to the social capital theory (Coleman
1988), a cohesive social network creates trust and commitment to co-
operation. Theories describe favourable outcomes of opposite poles of social
structure, but the discussion shows that it may also result in negative
outcomes if there are unfavourable situational factors. Empirical findings
indicate that a sparse social network increases the employee's indirect
control and speed of information retrieval.
The results concerning the amount of information were contrary to those
expected, which may reflect not only negative outcomes of social structure
under unfavourable situational factors, but also the importance of cognitive
factors in evaluating the amount of required information. Moreover, a dense
social structure increases trust in the democracy of decision-making, but does
not affect organisational commitment. In conclusion, the findings suggest
that in order to maximise favourable outcomes of the social structure, a
balance between dense and sparse social networks might be needed.
Introduction
Social capital is often functionally defined as those aspects of social structure
which actors can use as resources for the realisation of their interests
(Coleman 1990, 305). In this sense, members of a social structure are
168 Social Capital
investors who wish to profit from their investments (Burt 1992, 46). The
analysis of social capital complements the discussion of physical, human
(Becker 1964) and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1989). Even though maintaining
a social structure requires time and effort on the individual's part, the benefits
are at least partially dependent upon the objectives and behaviour of other
actors in the same social network (Coleman 1990; Johanson - Uusikyla 1998).
Therefore, social capital is unique in that it does not lend itself to full
ownership by any individual or group in the social network.
There are two main approaches to the analysis of social capital. According
to the first approach, social structure helps in acquiring control and
information benefits in a competitive environment (Burt 1992; Friedman -
Krackhardt 1997; Gabbay- Zuckerman 1998). In the second approach, social
structure helps remove barriers to co-operation and economic transactions;
it can instil trust and commitment to co-operation amongst members of the
social structure (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993). While sometimes the two are
viewed as somewhat contradictory due to the level of analysis (Podolny -
Baron 1997), the different approaches reflect opposite sides of a beneficial
social structure (Johanson - Uusikyla 1998). A social structure which
provides control and information benefits is likely to be different from one
which facilitates the formation of trust and commitment to co-operation.
The aim of this study was to analyse the significance of an intra-
organisational network in a public organisation. The social capital theory
(Coleman 1988,1990), which has been extended to cover whole societies
(Putnam 1993), together with the structural hole theory (Burt 1992) provide
the theoretical base for empirical analysis. The aim of the discussion is to
show that these two theoretical frameworks describe favourable outcomes
of two poles of social structure and that situational factors also play an
important role in defining the benefits produced by social interaction.
Social capital in networks
It has been argued that a group of three actors (triad) is a fundamental type
of social structure. In a group of two actors, conflict easily leads to
polarisation of views, but in a triad the third actor can mediate conflicts
between the two others. In addition, the pressure imposed by the majority
is relevant only in groups consisting of at least three actors. Moreover, the
threat of leaving the group has little impact on triads, as any one actor leaving
the group does not dissolve it totally (Krackhardt 1999). Both social capital
(Coleman 1988) and structural hole theory (Burt 1992) can be presented as
triadic structures, although neither theory is confined to the analysis of small
groups (Figure 1).
Structural holes as key to control and information benefits
The structural hole theory makes use of the central concepts and findings of
social network analysis. One such finding is the strength of the weak tie thesis
(Granovetter 1973). New information is likely to circulate through occasional
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ties between otherwise unconnected social groups. An actor who holds a
connecting position between two unconnected groups gets information
faster than others. For instance, information about new job opportunities is
likely to be transmitted first to those holding connecting positions.
Structural hole theory is a generalisation of the strength of the weak tie
thesis. However, the starting point of structural hole theory is not the strength
of ties between actors in a social structure, but the existence of ties as such.
Structural hole refers to the absence of ties between actors in a social
structure. The analysis is not confined to the examination of information, but
also deals with the acquisition of control. The basic idea behind structural
hole theory is that actors can advance their competitive position by
optimising their social network to maximum benefit with minimum effort. In
this sense, the sparse social network with the most structural holes is also the
most conducive to gaining competitive advantage (Burt 1992, 26-34).
The number of ties in itself is insignificant; what counts is how actors' ties
fill the structural holes in the social network. In a competitive environment,
structural holes offer tempting opportunities for exploitation. In social
closure, where alters are connected together, the ego's quest for control and
information benefits is restricted (Figure 1). An ego who is situated in a
structural hole between two unconnected alters is likely to obtain more
beneficial information. Structural holes enhance information retrieval in
three different ways; firstly, their existence provides information sources to
an actor which are not accessible to others in the network. Therefore, the
actor acquires a competitive advantage over others because of his additional
knowledge. Moreover, social capital is thus transformed into individual
property, i.e. into human capital (Ibid.).
Figure 1. Structural Hole and Social Closure
Structural hole Social closure
Alter
Ego
170 Social Capital
Secondly, the position in a structural hole speeds up the circulation of
information so that the ego gets information quicker than others. For
instance, an early hint of redundancies may help an employee in securing
his or her own job as opposed to an employee who reads about the
redundancies in a newspaper. The third advantage of structural holes is
found in the alternative channels toward decision-makers. An actor who
occupies a position in a structural hole can channel positive information to
upper levels of the hierarchy through various alternative indirect routes.
What is more, the information not useful to an actor can be fed to his/her own
network, thus creating a debt of information for which payback can be
expected in the future (Burt 1992, 13-14).
Structural holes can also be used for manipulation, which provides control
benefits (Burt 1992, 30-32). A classic example is an entrepreneur who uses
the disconnection of two buyers to increase the price. Although 'control' is
the notion used in structural hole theory, a central characteristic of control
is that there is either an explicit or implicit assumption of acceptable
behaviour (Horwitz 1992). Particularly in public sector organisations, control
refers to monitoring and evaluating activities which may result in intervention
if the behaviour of employees is not in line with the officially stated rules and
objectives (Wirth 1986). In structural hole theory, the control benefits may
be used for advancing any behaviour, unlimited by rules or moral boundaries.
Therefore, the implication of control in the structural hole theory is not far
from the relative interpretation of power, which states that A has power over
B to the extent that A is able to make B do something he/she would not
otherwise do (Dahl 1961).
There are two means of controlling a structural hole. If an actor is able to
see the benefits they bring about, he/she is also likely to avoid the restrictions
produced by a dense social structure. The first option is to replace contacts
in a dense social structure with contacts in a sparse social structure.
Alternatively, extending the original network to new partners who are
unconnected to the members of the original network might also be a suitable
strategy to achieve control benefits. For example, an actor could incorporate
a competitor of an existing partner into his/her network. In this way, an actor
could play network partners against each other (Burt 1992).
Social closure as a source of trust and commitment
The structural hole theory represents an instrumental interpretation of the
value of a social network, whereas social capital theory reflects a view of
social networks as a source of trust and commitment. According to the social
capital theory, it is useful even for a rational actor to commit to co-operation
with other actors in a social network. A dense social network creates trust
and commitment to co-operation, which in turn facilitates economic
transactions (Coleman 1988).
A tightly-knit social structure facilitates economic transactions in two major
ways, by 1) creating circulation of credit slips, and 2) lowering transaction
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costs. Circulation of credit slips is connected to the reciprocity of transactions.
In a tightly-knit social structure, an actor can be relatively sure that time and
effort invested in the social structure are returned in the future. In this 'way,
it is possible to build credit associations in which members of the social
structure invest money in a common fund. In turn, these provide loans to
every member of the association. A tightly-knit social structure can lower
transaction cost, because in a dense social structure actors need not rely on
formal control or contracts (Coleman 1990).
The cohesion of social structure may result in a fortuitous circle in which
trust increases co-operation and, in turn, co-operation increases trust among
members of the social structure (Putnam 1993,171-172). Even so, the
formation of the fortuitous circle requires the existence of favourable social
norms (Coleman 1990). A dense social structure, which is based on reciprocal
links between the actors - social closure (Figure 1) - provides a good
structural platform to enforce the fulfilment of obligations and return of
credits (Putnam 1995).
In a similar fashion, as actors may try to increase their control and
information benefits by moulding their network into a sparse social structure,
members of a sparse social structure may also try to increase connections
amongst its members in order to establish trust and commitment. Still, the
formation of ties between other members of a social structure might prove
a difficult task. For a single actor in a social structure, this would require
creating ties between other members with whom the actor has no direct
contact. In the end, it may well be that tightening the social structure in order
to create trust and commitment might prove more difficult than finding
structural holes for exploitation.
Even in a dense social network, numerous ties are not conducive to the
formation of trust and commitment if actors are not equal in the network. In
vertical networks the circulation of information is unreliable; information is
not transmitted from lower to upper levels of the hierarchy because it is
beneficial for subordinates to conceal some of it from managers. In a
hierarchy it is not an easy task to enforce reciprocity of transactions, as
sanctions are seldom applied to the upper levels. The contradiction between
the social capital theory and the structural hole theory is evident here. In
terms of trust and commitment, the situation in which the ego resides in a
structural hole is one of the least favourable. For instance, a social structure
between a manager and two unconnected subordinates neither creates
interdependence nor prevents mutual alienation of the subordinates. The
interaction takes place vertically between the supervisor and the subordinates,
so mutual obligations become unilateral duties of the subordinates. When
dependence replaces reciprocity the incentives for opportunistic behaviour
also increase accordingly (Putnam 1995, 174-175). Consequently, vertical
interaction may give rise to a circle of mistrust, in which exploitation by the
manager creates shirking by the subordinates.
Still, dense social structures may have harmful consequences beyond the
loss of control and information benefits, as highlighted in the structural hole
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theory. The pressure to conform in tightly-knit social groups can restrict
individual freedom to the extent that repression replaces mutual obligation.
Furthermore, tightly-knit social groups which have only limited connections
to their social environment often discriminate against outsiders. For example,
tight co-operation between merchants might easily become collusion against
their clients (Fortes - Landolt 1996).
The structural hole theory and the social capital theory give mutually
contradictory prescriptions for the development of social structure. According
to the structural hole theory, reducing connections between actors in a social
structure would be an appropriate option, whereas the social capital theory
gives the opposite prescription. As both theories can be applied to multiple
levels of analysis, contradiction is independent of the level of analysis.
An obvious solution to the contradiction can be found in the difference of
outcomes. If one wishes to advance competition, a sparse social network
with a number of structural holes would be the most suitable social structure.
A dense social structure with social closure would be preferable if one
wished to bring about co-operation among members of the social structure.
Of course, this does not resolve the value problem of whether we should aim
to create co-operation or competition in the first place.
This discussion of social capital has shown that both sparse and dense
social networks may produce negative outcomes if they are connected to
unfavourable situational factors. An isolated but dense social structure may
well discriminate against outsiders and pressure toward uniformity may
restrict individual freedom in tightly-knit social circles. Moreover, if structural
holes are connected to the hierarchical differences between actors, information
benefits might be lost and control may turn into exploitation and dependence.
Figure 2. Consequences of Network Density under Unfavourable and
Favourable Situational Factors
Favourable
Situation
Unfavourable
Control and
information
benefits
Dependence,
information
breakdown
Trust and
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If we consider both control and information benefits at the same time as trust
and commitment to co-operation, another interpretation comes to the fore:
social capital may be short of maximal at both ends of the continuum
between sparse and dense social networks. The maximally sparse social
network could decrease co-operation to the extent that members of the social
structure would become unable to agree on the basic rules necessary for
competition (Wallace 1970). Likewise, maintaining a dense social network
could require such individual investments of time and energy that interaction
would pose a threat to efficiency. Therefore, in order to maximise both types
of benefits of the social structure a balance of social capital is probably found
somewhere in the middle ground between the sparse and dense social
networks.
The method
The study was carried out in one social and health sector organisation
(n=4 200) in Garden City (pseudonym). The city has about 180 000 inhabitants
and is one of the largest in Finland. The organisation was created when
separate social and health organisations were integrated in 1992. The new
organisation consists of nine units; five are based on provincial boundaries,
three units have a centralised function, and a planning and development unit
co-ordinates the budgetary process. As a result of the unification, units were
given more financial freedom by the introduction of a new budget system.
Practices such as management by results are used to stress the importance
of efficiency.
Research respondents
The data consisted of relational and attitudinal measures of 172 employees
in the social and health organisation. Some 87 percent of the respondents
were women and the average age overall was 47 years. The educational level
of respondents reflected the professional nature of their social and health
duties, as 70 percent held a university degree or equivalent. Response
numbers from individual work units ranged from 8 to 29. Equal percentages
(47 %) had come from the former social and health organisations, while the
rest (6 %) originated from other parts of the city administration.
All of the hierarchical levels are represented in the data. Nine of the ten unit
heads took part in this study. Nearly 42 percent of the respondents performed
some type of supervisory function, having at least one subordinate, and the
rest were operative level employees. Among all respondents the average
tenure in the city administration was 16 years, which indicates not only the
low turnover in the organisation, but also the rapid expansion of social and
health services in Finland during the 1970's.
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Procedures
The empirical evaluation of the theoretical assumptions required the use of
both relational and attitudinal data from the same research subjects. The
gathering of relational data began in the summer of 1994 and terminated in
the summer of 1996. Attitudinal data were gathered in the summer of 1996.
Relational data were gathered using the snowball-sampling procedure,
which is in many ways superior to other forms of network data gathering.
For instance, all the actors do not have to be named in advance and new
actors can be included at subsequent steps of data gathering (Doreian and
Woodard 1992).
In addition to the top manager, unit heads of financially independent units
were chosen as first-level respondents (n=10). During individual interviews,
a pen and pencil questionnaire was given to the respondents. Respondents
•were asked to name at least ten individuals whom they considered important
in their work. After identifying their social networks, respondents were asked
to state their relationships with these actors. The question was "Which of the
actors do you give advice to or ask advice from?" They were asked to evaluate
the frequency of their contacts in the advice network with a four point scale:
1) we meet infrequently, 2) we meet a couple of times a month, 3) we meet
a few times a week, and 4) we meet daily. Contacts occurring at least a few
times a week were used as the cut-point for dichotomization, which means
that only the strongest social contacts were incorporated in the actual
analysis.
The 66 second-level respondents identified by first-level respondents were
contacted by telephone and the same questions put to them. In addition, 156
third-level respondents received a mailed questionnaire. A total of 232
employees were thus identified in these three levels of data gathering. At
some stage, any snowball sampling has to be terminated. The most
convenient strategy is to end data gathering when most of the new contacts
have already been cited by the respondents on the previous levels (Wasserman
and Faust 1993). With this procedure sampling goes on until a certain
saturation point is reached. In this case no such saturation point was reached
at the second or third level, and the network seemed to enlarge exponentially
beyond this point. Therefore, no fourth-level respondents were approached.
The social network identified in the gathering of the relational data
provided the basis for gathering the attitudinal data. The same 232 employees
received a mailed questionnaire containing questions related to their work
and work environment. In addition, the respondents were asked to state the
number of subordinates they had and their educational background. All in
all, 172 responses to both attitudinal and relational parts of the data were
obtained, which corresponds to a response rate of 74 percent.
The data were analysed using multiple regression analysis. Because
standard statistics programmes do not include modules for the examination
of network data, relational indices were calculated with the help of the Ucinet
software package, which was developed to analyse properties of network
data (Borgatti et al. 1999).
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Independent measures
The explanatory variables reflected the employee's position in the advice
network within the social and health organisation. By default, advice is
asymmetric, so that giving advice is not automatically reciprocated. In other
words, an advice network is an asymmetric network in which the maximum
number of ties is n(n-l). Network density offers a simple way to operationalise
the cohesiveness of a social network. In practice, network density (d) is
obtained by contrasting the actual number of ties (1) with the theoretical
maximum: d=l/n(n-l). If the network is totally disconnected the network
density will be 0, and in case of maximum cohesiveness the density will be 1.
Network density was calculated on three levels of measurement. Firstly,
the density of the employee's direct network was calculated. The density of
a direct network is dependent upon the number of connections taking place
between the ego's direct contacts. Secondly, the density of the indirect
network was calculated by taking into account the connections between
employees reachable through one intermediate1. Thirdly, the cohesiveness
of the work unit was taken into account by contrasting the actual work unit
interactions to the situation in which all employees in a unit would be
connected. The first two relational indices cover only a limited portion of all
the interactions taking place in the social structure, thus reflecting features
of both the personal and extended personal networks.
Dependent measures
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to state to whom they would
turn if they encountered a problem they were not able to solve alone. This
question was used to measure an employee's indirect control. A single
employee received a maximum number of seven nominations from colleagues,
but most employees were not mentioned at all. Therefore the distribution of
the variable measuring indirect control proved to be highly skewed, and was
corrected by a logarithmic transformation. The speed of information retrieval
and access to the sources of information were also measured in the data.
Respondents gave Likert-scale scores to the following: 'I get information
about changes in my own work very quickly', and 'I often have to make
decisions without sufficient information'.
On the basis of an example provided by previous research (Putnam 1995),
trust was approached in terms of decision-making. Employees stated their
opinions in several Likert-scale items concerning various aspects of the
democracy of decision-making. Commitment to co-operation was measured
using items measuring organisational commitment. Employees gave their
1
 In the analysis of ego networks it is customary to consider only the density of the direct network. The
reason for this practice is usually found in the data-gathering procedure. Ego-centric network data
consist of the ego's direct ties and the connections between these but exclude the overall social
structure. In this case the total network data were available, which enabled the use of indirect density
measures. Moreover, the theoretical discussion implies that indirect linkages are important, at least
concerning information benefits.
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opinion to Likert-scale questions concerning their affective commitment to
the organisation (Allen and Meyer 1990) as well as their intent to stay in it
(Mueller et al. 1992). Reliabilities of scales and scale items are represented
in Table 1.
Table 1. Reliability of Scales and Scale Items
Organisational commitment a=0,72 Trust in the democracy of decison-making a=0,74
1 *It was definitively a mistake to 1 *Employees are not usually informed about
come to this workplace. decisions taken by managers.
2 T don't feel like part of the group 2 Managers encourage employees to express
here. their opinions.
3 *I have thought of changing my 3 'Managers are unwilling to transfer decision-
employer in the near future. making powers to their subordinates.
4 This is the best workplace in which 4 Employees usually have a say in decisions
I have ever worked. that affect their own work.
5 I'm proud to tell others I'm working 5 Important decisions are usually made together,
for this organization.
6 I work very willingly in this
workplace. 'reverse-coded
Control measures
Hierarchy and division of labour constitute the basis of any organisation, so
it is important to take them into account in the analysis of instrumental
benefits and prerequisites for co-operation. The hierarchical position in
particular is closely connected to the idea of a structural hole. A standard
image in organisational charts is a chain of command in which the manager
co-ordinates the duties of unconnected subordinates. Likewise, the position
of managers, either between levels of hierarchy or between the organisation
and its environment (Child 1984), puts managers in a liaison role which may
give them a head-start in acquiring new information as compared to shop-
floor employees.
Especially in the public sector, employees not only need highly specialised
knowledge in performing their duties, but also formal qualifications -
'degrees' - in order to gain employment in the first place. One of the
consequences of specialisation is the formation of powerful professional
groups able to control the content of professional work (Macdonald 1995).
Moreover, membership in a professional group may well decrease commitment
to a particular organisation, due to the dual commitment to one's professional
group on one hand and to the organisation on the other (Cohen 1995). In
practice, the number of subordinates and the level of education (Statistics
Finland 1997) were included in the analysis to control for the effect of
hierarchical position and functional specialisation.
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Results
The results of regression analyses are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The
inclusion of several network measures from the same relational data may
pose problems if the measures correlate strongly. In this case, the
intercorrelation of network measures was not substantial; the highest
correlation was found between work unit density and density of the direct
network (r=0.25 p<0.01). However, in interpreting density measures one
needs to take into account that the denser the social network the fewer
structural holes there are.
Table 2. Results of Regression Analyses Explaining Indirect Control, Speed of
Information Retrieval and Access to Sources of Information
Regression co-efficient (standard errors in parenthesis)
Variable
Constant
Density of direct network
Density of indirect network
Density of work unit network
Level of education
Number of subordinates (In)
Model 1
Indirect control
0.33
(0.20)
-0.41*
(0.18)
-1.19"
(0.40)
0.25
(0.33)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.06**
(0.01)
R2=0.36
Model 2
Speed of information
retrieval
3.91**
(0.47)
0.52
(0.45)
-2.52*
(0.96)
-0.02
(0.79)
-0.03
(0.08)
0.03
(0.03)
R2=0.07
Model 3
Acces to information
2.59**
(0.46)
1.41**
(0.43)
-0.94
(0.93)
-0.08
(0.77)
0.05
(0.08)
-0.03
(0.03)
R2=0.09
Note: *p<0.05 **p<0.01
Considering that the data were based on survey questionnaires, the
proportion of explained variance was rather high for explaining indirect
control of employees, but low for assessing information benefits. This result
does not contradict the structural hole theory, which sees structural holes as
a critical resource in competition between otherwise equal partners. The
findings provide some evidence for assumptions of favourable outcomes of
a sparse social network for an ego. A social network in which an actor obtains
a position in a structural hole increases her control over others and speeds
up information retrieval.
The results concerning access to the sources of information were
contradictory to the basic assumptions of the structural hole theory. This may
reflect the negative consequences of a sparse social network under
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unfavourable situational factors. However, the number of structural holes
was not connected to the hierarchical position of employees. The highest
correlation between hierarchical position and network indices was found
between work unit density and hierarchical position (r=-0.11 p>0.05). Hence,
a suitable position in the social network helps employees to balance control
and information advantages provided by the formal position.
The finding that structural holes were detrimental in terms of access to
information even though they did not coincide with the hierarchical position
may well refer to cognitive features in evaluating the amount of required
information. A dense social structure is often saturated with information,
even to the extent that everyone possesses roughly the same information.
Therefore, a member of a social group does in fact receive most of the
information circulating in a cohesive social structure. Moreover, the
discrepancies between levels of knowledge among members of a tightly-knit
social group are likely to be low, which implies that social comparisons are
difficult to make. As a sparse social network is less prone to become saturated
with information, the employees are unlikely to express that they feel in full
command of information. Consequently, improved access to sources of
information also helps employees to see deficiencies in their stocks of
knowledge.
Table 3- Results of Regression Analyses Explaining Trust in Democracy of
Decision-making and Organisational Commitment
Regression co-efficient (standard errors in parenthesis)
Variable
Constant
Density of direct network
Density of indirect network
Density of work unit network
Level of education
Number of subordinates (In)
Model 1
Trust in democracy of
decison-making
12.06**
(1.37)
2.23
(1.29)
-2.81
(2.78)
5.27*
(2.29)
-0.04
(0.23)
0.39**
(0.08)
R2=0.24
Model 2
Organisational
commitment
28.10**
(1.77)
-0.81
(1.67)
-5.30
(3.60)
0.28
(2.95)
-0.67*
(0.29)
0.14
(0.10)
R2=0.05
Note: *p<0.05 **p<0.01
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The significance of indirect network density in defining control and
information benefits is important. The structural hole theory acknowledges
that structural holes beyond those between direct contacts might also
increase the ego's control and information benefits. However, the empirical
measures suggested by this theory are based on analysing the cohesion only
between the ego's direct contacts (Burt 1992, 126). The result obtained here
suggests that the analysis of cohesion in a direct network gives too negative
a view of the benefits provided by structural holes. Moreover, it is noteworthy
that control and information benefits are dependent upon those whom the
actor has not directly selected into his/her social network. Conscious
acquisition of structural holes thus becomes extremely difficult, as the actor
should take account of the cohesion of both direct and indirect networks
when choosing his/her network partners.
Trust in the democracy of decision-making and organisational commitment
were affected neither by direct nor indirect network density. Here, one needs
to take into account the significance of the level of analysis. Both direct and
indirect network densities describe a restricted part of the social structure,
whereas trust in the democracy of decision-making and organisational
commitment represent characteristics of the organisation as a whole.
Consequently, favourable micro-level interaction patterns are not enough to
produce positive macro-level outcomes. Even so, direct or indirect network
densities did not prove to decrease trust or commitment either, which would
have been a plausible outcome of interactions within dense but isolated
social groups.
More important to the social capital theory is the connection between trust
in the democracy of decision-making and work unit density. Work unit
density increases trust in the democracy of decision-making, which represents
some evidence for the favourable outcomes of a cohesive social structure.
Organisational commitment was not affected by any of the network
measures, however, which implies not only the dual commitment of
professional groups to their professional association and their organisation,
but also that the environment of the organisation might pose obstacles to co-
operation which cannot be surmounted solely by appropriate structural
conditions or intra-organisational norms.
Both the structural hole theory and the social capital theory received some
empirical support from the findings of this study. Nevertheless, the favourable
social patterns of these models differ from one another. Superficially
examined, it would appear that tightening the social structure could enhance
the prerequisites for co-ordination, but at the same time actors would lose
some of their control and information benefits. It might be that neither a
maximally sparse nor a maximally dense social network is optimal for the
development of social capital if we consider both types of benefits
simultaneously. Consequently, social capital might be maximised somewhere
between sparse and dense social networks. However, one needs to
recognise the differences on the basis of the explanation of the various
benefits provided by social interaction. Both control and information benefits
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emerge from the sparse personal or extended personal network, but
prerequisites of co-operation are fortified by cohesion on the work unit level.
This leads to a problem between individual and collective action. Thus,
employees may have sparse personal networks which provide instrumental
benefits and do not pose a threat to co-operation, as long as not too many
of their colleagues have equally sparse networks.
Conclusions
The aim of this study was to assess favourable outcomes of sparse and dense
social networks according to two different models. Following the structural
hole theory (Burt 1992), empirical evidence gave partial support for the
control and information benefits provided by sparse social networks. On the
other hand, dense social networks encourage the prerequisites for co-
operation as described by the social capital theory (Coleman 1988). Those
findings are not contradictory, as the outcomes predicted by the two theories
are also different. However, the results do have a bearing when examining
the preferred form of social network. It seems the simultaneous provision of
instrumental benefits and prerequisites for co-operation requires a balance
of social capital somewhere in the middle ground between sparse and
cohesive social networks. It would nevertheless be hasty to conclude that in
order to maximise social capital, everyone should participate in social
interaction in a similar fashion. It may well be that employees' sparse
personal networks provide efficiency to organisational communication; they
do not undermine the basis of co-operation as long as the majority of
employees participate actively in the social interaction.
According to the results, gaining benefits from the social network requires
detailed knowledge of the social structure as a whole. The benefits are
partially dependent upon the connections between those actors that an ego
can reach only through indirect links. However, an employee's possibilities
to influence the structure of a social network beyond direct contacts are very
slim. Although he/she could try to find a more favourable social network, in
a work environment this would necessitate a change of workplace, which
is not an easy option to take. Consequently, actors need to consider the
structure of the total network when choosing their direct contacts. They also
have to adjust somewhat to the restrictions imposed by the social network.
The significance of indirect contacts is also methodologically relevant. The
gathering of total network data is usually a time-consuming and arduous
procedure. One alternative for bypassing this problem is the use of
egocentric network data which contain information on an ego's direct
contacts and on contacts between them. The egocentric network data can be
gathered through standard survey instruments. The results obtained here
nevertheless indicate that egocentric data may give too negative a view of
the favourable outcomes of sparse social networks. In fact, they may totally
ignore the favourable effects of a dense social structure.
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The starting point of this study was the connection between sparse social
networks and instrumental benefits on one hand and the favourable outcome
of dense social networks in terms of trust and commitment to co-operation
on the other. Indirect control emerged as the bridge between trust and a
sparse social network. If employees cannot resolve a problem, they turn to
the occupants of structural holes for a solution. As structural holes were
unconnected to the hierarchical position of employees, they appear to be
informal channels of knowledge transmitting new information throughout
the organisation. However, disconnection of the formal position from
structural holes may well diminish formal authority to the extent that the
informal network becomes a quasi-hierarchy.
Patterns of interaction do not exist in a social vacuum, so the benefits of
a favourable social structure might not be realised if connected to unfavourable
situational factors. Status differences between actors may well thwart the
positive outcomes of a sparse social network, whereas hostility towards
outsiders could result from interaction in a dense but isolated social structure.
Here, the results suggested that the connection between sparse social
networks and information benefits is not straightforward. Moreover, empirical
evidence also provided some support for the influence of extra-organisational
factors in defining the prerequisites of co-operation. Further research is
needed to examine to what extent the benefits derived from social networks
are conditioned by the situational and external factors of the social structure.
The importance of situational and external factors does not necessarily
diminish the value of a social network. Instead, enlarging the scope of
relational analyses may well enable the identification of types of social
structure which could better satisfy both organisational goals and employee
needs.
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Abstract
In recent years, social capital has emerged alongside natural resources, man-
made physical means of production and know how (natural capital, other
physical capital and human capital) as a factor used to assesss developmental
disparities between countries. Social capital refers to the communal
characteristics which manifest themselves in e.g. trust, reciprocity and
networks. In terms of policy-making, the relevant question is how to assess
and reinforce social capital. The questions posed in the report, on the other
hand, concern the conceptual nature of social capital and its relationship with
other concepts related to capital. Trust and the forces that keep communities
intact and functional are generally debated issues in social science.
This collection of articles is mainly based on the papers and commentary
presented at an international seminar held in Helsinki on 15 April 1999. The
articles discuss problems associated with the concept of social capital and its
definitions and shed light on the possibilities of this concept in concrete
welfare policy contexts.
Key words: social capital, social economy, civil society, partnership
Tiivistelma
Sosiaalinen paaoma on noussut luonnonvarojen, tuotantovalineiden ja
osaamisen (luontopaaoman, muun fyysisen paaoman ja inhimillisen paa-
oman) rinnalle viime vuosina etsittaessa syita maiden valisiin kehityseroihin.
Sosiaalisella paaomalla viitataan sellaisiin yhteisollisiin piirteisiin, jotka
ilmenevat esimerkiksi luottamuksena, vastavuoroisuutena ja verkostoina.
Politiikan kannalta kysytaan silloin, miten sosiaalista paaomaa voidaan
arvioida ja vahvistaa. Tutkimuksen kysymykset taas koskevat sosiaalisen
paaoman kasitteellista luonnetta ja suhdetta muihin paaomakasitteisiin.
Luottamus seka yhteisoja koossa ja kaynnissa pitavat voimat ovat yleisen
yhteiskuntatieteellisen pohdinnan ajankohtaisia kohteita.
Suurin osa kokoelman kirjoituksista perustuu Helsingissa 15.4.1999 jarjes-
tetyn kansainvalisen seminaarin esitelmiin ja kommenttipuheenvuoroihin.
Artikkelit kasittelevat sosiaalisen paaoman kasitteeseen ja sen maarittelyyn
liittyvia ongelmia seka esittelevat mahdollisuuksia soveltaa kasitetta
hyvinvointipolitiikkaan liittyvissa konkreettisissa yhteyksissa.
Asiasanat: sosiaalinen paaoma, sosiaalitalous, kansalaisyhteiskunta, kumppa-
nuus
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